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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to determine whether the introduction of a transport 
economic regulatory authority would serve as a valid intervention mechanism in 
the Public-Private Partnership of the transport infrastructure in South Africa. In 
order to achieve this objective, the study focused on the analysis of the concept 
of Public-Private Partnership, and how it has unfolded in a number of 
industrialised countries. Much attention was devoted in examining how the 
Public-Private Partnership arrangements followed by the studied countries 
influenced the current transport infrastructure management process in South 
Africa. 
To deal with the above, a host of macro-environmental variables were analysed 
in respect of their potential impact on the South African Department of Transport. 
The establishment of various agencies by the Department of Transport was seen 
as a consequence of the influence of the prevailing environmental forces. The 
outcome of the analysis revealed that a sustainable transport infrastructural 
development is a product of genuine partnership between the public and private 
sectors.  
Competition for the market and the significance of such competition in the 
transport infrastructure were outlined. The main goal of competition within the 
context of this study is to diffuse the economic power of the toll road industry and 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. The study also unearthed a 
need to deepen the talent and skills of both public and private sector officials as 
this would enable them to protect the citizens’ right to make well-considered 
choices in the toll road industry. 
The study identified a need to establish a transport economic regulatory authority 
that would control the market dynamics of power relationships in the transport 
industry. Such a body should be creative and need to have regulatory oversight 
 v
over transport infrastructure. 
 
Key concepts 
Public-Private Partnerships, transport infrastructure, concession agreement, 
regulatory intervention, competition for the market, competition in the market, 
road user’ fundamental rights, regulation of toll road industry, Department of 
Transport, transport economic regulatory authority. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Presently transport businesses world-wide are increasingly becoming exposed to 
the economic elements of competition, private ownership and tendered 
operations to the extent that transportation matters have taken on important 
economic dimensions. These economic elements have created new challenges 
that have prompted the public sector to loosen its monopoly on transportation 
and deliberately strive toward designing strategies geared at improving the 
provision of transportation services, thereby reducing the level of subsidy from 
the State. The efficacy of the strategy to involve the private sector as a partner in 
service delivery is excellent; and Hensher and Brewer (2001:14) support that the 
provision of electricity, telecommunications, water and gas utilities, and postal 
services could be done more effectively in partnership with the private sector. 
The outcome of the above research study clearly indicates that the application of 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) is a phenomenon that if extended to the 
transport sector could benefit it tremendously. 
In fact, Mr Radebe, the then Minister of Public Enterprises has in his foreword 
address in 2000, stressed the fact that South Africa has begun to integrate itself 
into the global environment as a worthy member of the international community. 
More precisely, South Africa has become an important agent towards the 
realisation of the African Renaissance dream. In this regard, the accelerated 
restructuring process involving the Public-Private Partnership that aims to enable 
the private sector to have a stake in state-owned enterprises has become a 
matter of urgency because of the private sector's economic muscle. Seen in this 
context, the researcher of this investigation is not only motivated but is also 
indebted to the study conducted by Hensher and Brewer (2001), which shows 
 2
clearly how Public-Private Partnerships could achieve wonders in improving the 
economy.  Thus, the focal point of this study is to determine the efficacy of 
Public-Private Partnerships in the transport sector with regard to the 
improvement of service delivery. This will receive attention in the chapters that 
follow.  
Having said the above, the National Treasury (2001:3) acknowledges the fact 
that the concept of Public-Private Partnerships is a relatively new phenomenon in 
South Africa. Consequently, Treasury Regulations have come out with a simple 
definition that sees Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as  
“…a contractual arrangement between a public sector entity and a private 
sector entity whereby the private sector performs a departmental function 
in accordance with an output based specification for a specified, 
significant period of time in return for a benefit, which is normally in the 
form of financial remuneration. Such a contract also involves a substantial 
transfer of all forms of project-life-cycle risk to the private sector. The 
public sector retains a significant role in the partnership project either as 
the main purchaser of the services provided or as the main enabler of the 
project”. 
The process of accomplishing a Public-Private Partnership includes a stage 
usually referred to as the commercialisation phase. According to Roodt 
(1991:33), “commercialisation is aimed at making state enterprises economically 
viable without the transfer of ownership”. Seen from the context of toll roads, 
commercialisation is regarded as bringing the roads into the market place, 
putting them on a fee for service basis and managing them as a business 
(Heggie 1995:32). Roodt (1991:30) supports this by saying “commercialization 
implies a change in organisational culture. This calls for the redefinition of new 
values by management for both the organisation and its employees”. 
The validity of the statements by both Heggie and Roodt is confirmed by the way 
 3
the South African National Roads Agency Limited’s Horizon Twenty Ten Strategy 
has encouraged the private sector to submit unsolicited bids to develop and 
maintain the road infrastructure and services (SANRAL, 2002:28). According to 
SANRAL (2002:7), the public sector has transformed its organisational structure, 
which is a clear indication of a move towards a change in organisational culture 
and values because it is only in the presence of such a move that Public-Private 
Partnerships can come into being.  
Roodt (1991:33) stresses the importance of communication during the 
commercialisation process, as this would help to facilitate production and 
innovation. This is also confirmed by the Horizon Twenty Ten Strategy document 
which states that the Agency has moved beyond organisational structure that 
typifies bureaucracy and has since its formation, embarked on informing, 
educating and communicating to various stakeholders with a view to stimulating 
the interactive relationships. The internal capabilities and attributes of employees 
of the South African National Roads Agency Limited have also been factored into 
the organisational design of the agency.  
In his research, Roodt (1991:33) further reveals that government officially 
embarked on a commercialisation programme in 1987, when a White Paper on 
privatisation and deregulation was tabled in Parliament. Although supported in 
the political and economic environments, these initiatives were rejected by the 
black unions affiliated to COSATU as they were deemed not to serve black 
interests. The process of Public-Private Partnerships as discussed in this study 
takes into consideration the South African situation that encompasses the stages 
from the time when the national roads network was still under the South African 
Roads Board (SARB) (Mitchell and Dehlen, 1980:205). The process includes the 
contemporary era of the South African National Roads Agency Limited as 
reflected in the Horizon Twenty Ten strategy document (SANRAL, 2002:1).  
According to the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996:10), 
government has a role in controlling tariffs and in setting service and safety 
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standards. Attention is focused mainly on how to subject the concession 
companies to economic regulations. This brings the dimension of striving to 
establish regulatory intervention in a Public-Private Partnership arrangement 
which is part of what this study seeks to achieve.  
It is crucial to point out that this study focuses on transport infrastructure with 
extensive emphasis on the Public-Private Partnership initiatives as applied in the 
road network. The focus is therefore on the road transport infrastructure precisely 
because a number of countries identified for this exploratory study had in the 
past, executed Public-Private Partnership projects in the road infrastructure.  
1.1.1 Need for the regulatory authority 
The Department of Transport has increasingly recognised that its role should be 
in crafting policy for service provision, and not in providing services. This 
separation of policy making from provision makes it possible to introduce the 
private sector entities that normally compete in the provision of services in the 
market place. What needs to be avoided at all costs is to allow operators to 
operate as monopolies. This view is supported by Arnold (2008:273) who 
maintains that natural monopolies need to be subjected to among other things, 
price regulation. It is on the basis of this reasoning that the study strives to 
explore various regulatory interventions in the Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement. 
Regulation means government imposed controls on particular aspects of 
business activity. When government regulates an infrastructure sector, it imposes 
direct and indirect controls on the decisions or actions of enterprises within that 
sector. Government controls can cover many dimensions of business activities. 
In addition to economic regulation, a government may impose environmental 
requirements on infrastructure enterprises. The focus of this study is on the 
economic regulation of private sector entities dealing with transport infrastructure 
such as roads. 
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Within economic regulation, the two core regulatory tasks are the setting, 
monitoring, and enforcing of maximum tariffs and of minimum service standards. 
Of the two, control over the maximum prices that enterprises can charge is the 
more visible and controversial regulatory task. Although tariff levels usually 
receive the most public attention, they are by no means the only dimension of 
economic regulation. Economic regulation may also include controls over tariff 
structures, quality of service standards, access conditions to networks, entry and 
exit conditions for participants, and investment obligations relative to existing and 
new customers. 
1.1.2 Private versus public good characteristics 
A public good is one where the benefits of its provision cannot be limited only to 
those who pay for it, and where its use does not limit the quantity available to 
others. The provision of a road is an example of a public good. Anyone using a 
road benefits from such a road and the fact that one person uses it does not 
decrease the amount available for someone else. What this study strives to attain 
is that toll roads operators should not be allowed to operate as monopolists.  
1.1.3 Pricing versus fairness 
Shiftan, Button and Nijkamp (2007:541) stress the importance of charging 
motorists prices which cover the costs of congestion and environmental damage 
they impose on others. While this study is in support of the wisdom outlined by 
the above theorists, a motivation to establish an economic regulatory authority is 
presented to ensure that there is fairness in the determination of prices to be paid 
by the users of transport infrastructure. The study would therefore encompass 
the analysis of how other countries have ventured into Public-Private Partnership 
and also how regulatory mechanisms were set in place to ensure that the 
process unfolds unhindered.  
A transport economic regulatory authority serves as an institution with oversight 
responsibilities on the setting of tariff structures for operators. In an attempt to 
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assess the validity of establishing such an institution, an outline of regulatory 
institutions in other selected countries would receive attention to guide the study 
to arrive at the right regulatory option in South Africa.  
Figure 1.1 details the process whereby the Public-Private Partnership is 
supposed to begin to take charge of the national roads that were under the 
Department of Transport’s Roads Board. In this context, however, it should be 
noted that the formation of the South African National Roads Agency Limited is 
aimed at affording the Department of Transport to align itself with government’s 
commitment to the process of the transformation of the public sector. The latter 
body was thus formed in 1998 as an independent statutory company operating 
along commercial lines to deliver and maintain the national road network in South 
Africa. Its purpose is to maintain and develop South Africa’s 7200 km national 
road network (SANRAL, 2002:6). This study also explores whether a Public-
Private Partnership is indeed the recommended strategy for implementation in its 
current status, which lacks the intervention of an independent transport economic 
regulatory body.  
Consequently, the Project Information Memorandum (1998:22) which was 
prepared by the N3 Consortium clearly states that toll roads are not owned by the 
toll concession companies but they remain the property of the state and are 
handed back to the state after a 25 to 30 year concession period. Sader 
(2000:90) also confirms the idea that the private sector may not own the 
infrastructure but would have the right to build it, to operate it and to transfer it 
back to government under a Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) agreement.  
Again, it should be noted that the process of change meant to usher in the 
Public-Private Partnership has impacted on the Department of Transport thereby 
giving rise to a commercialisation phase as indicated in Figure1.1. This led to the 
need to apply business principles to government-owned enterprises, hence 
various agencies were formed, inter alia the National Roads Agency. With the 
advent of this process, new opportunities presented themselves and the result 
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was the formation of various private sector entities, amongst which the 
establishment of toll concession companies like the N3 Toll Concession (Pty) Ltd. 
The South African National Roads Agency played a catalytic role in ensuring that 
the concessioning process of national roads takes place as planned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Public-Private Partnership process 
As a point of departure, this study sees the Public-Private Partnership as a 
process that requires the intervention of a regulatory body that should focus not 
only on the toll road network but also on the entire transport infrastructure in 
South Africa. Accordingly, Geddes (2005:42) states that the private sector 
consists of a number of individual businesses, some of which are unlikely to want 
to commit scarce resources to partnership schemes, unless there is a direct 
benefit to them. It is important but also imperative for this study to ascertain 
whether the private sector is actually getting what is legally and legitimately due 
to it or not in terms of the above arrangement. This is so because citizens are 
often getting the short end of the deal by being exploited. 
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1.2 WHY PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS? 
According to the National Treasury (2001:3), correctly used Public-Private-
Partnerships could be a useful service delivery option and could have a number 
of benefits, such as operational gains and strategic clarity. This should be seen in 
the light of the need to reduce the state subsidy to the public sector. Hence, it is 
important to note that, according to the South African Reserve Bank’s September 
Quarterly Bulletin (2005:27) South Africa’s outstanding foreign debt rose 
substantially in the first quarter of 2005. In total, the country’s debt increased by 
US$3,1 billion from US$42,3 billion at the end of 2004 to US$45,4 billion in the 
first quarter of 2005. Clearly, these figures show that substantial amounts of 
funds are needed which government alone cannot generate, thus there is a great 
need for the private sector for assistance.  
It should be stressed that it is the intention of government to strive increasingly at 
attempts to lower the public sector’s borrowing tendencies, because the 
repayments of such debts become obstacles in its desire to meet such burning 
commitments as those of a social and educational nature. For ease of reference, 
the Budget Review (2005:19) summarises the debt trends and borrowing costs in 
Table 1.1, which simultaneously indicates a summary of the anticipated trends in 
total debt and state debt costs. No doubt, a Public-Private Partnership is a way to 
go if progress is to be achieved in the transport industry in South Africa.  
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Table 1.1: The total debt and state debt costs 
 
   Projected figures 
R billion 2004/05 2005 / 06 2006 / 07 2007 / 08 
Net loan debt (end of year) 
% of GDP 
Domestic debt 
Foreign debt 
 
481,7 
 
34,3% 
 
412,5 
 
69,2% 
 
540,5 
 
35,4% 
 
455,7 
 
84,8% 
 
603,9 
 
36,1% 
 
507,2 
 
96,7% 
 
666,4 
 
36,1% 
 
559,4 
 
107,0% 
State debt costs 
% of expenditure 
% of GDP 
 
48,9 
 
13,2% 
 
3,5% 
 
53,1 
 
12,7% 
 
3,5% 
 
56,6 
 
12,4% 
 
3,4% 
 
59,4 
 
12,0% 
 
3,2% 
 
Source: Budget Review 2005:19 
 
Public-Private Partnerships may form a means of attracting investment that 
would eventually improve the country’s economic outlook. In the light of Table 1.1 
total government debt as a percentage of GDP is projected to increase from 34,3 
percent at the end of March 2005 to 36,1 percent by the end of the 2007/08 
(Budget Review, 2005:19). In order to attract investments, Treasury has 
reviewed its treasury operations, implying that restructuring efforts are now 
focused on increasing the investment capabilities of major state enterprises, 
particularly in transport infrastructure. The Department of Public Enterprises also 
ensures that state-owned enterprises attract more foreign direct investment so as 
to provide access to new technology and thus contributing positively to South 
Africa’s industrial competitiveness (Policy Framework for Accelerated Agenda for 
Restructuring, 2000:4). 
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The South African government also aims to promote wider private ownership and 
participation in the economy, improving service delivery in terms of cost, quality 
and access, and to promote human resources development, including the 
development of management skills for state-owned enterprises. Comparative 
assessment of the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and Public-Private 
Partnership initiatives shows short-term job losses in some sectors, either from 
existing over-employment or from new challenges facing these enterprises 
(Policy Framework for Accelerated Agenda for Restructuring, 2000:6).  
According to the Department of Finance’s Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (1996), as quoted in the Accelerated Agenda Towards 
the Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises Policy Framework (2000:13), the 
macro-economic perspective of South Africa is changing rapidly. This is 
confirmed by South Africa at a glance (2006/2007) which states that ”economic 
policy will continue to focus on increasing economic growth and investment in 
order to create employment”. There are indicators signalling a change in the 
economic outlook of the country. For instance, Table 1.2 shows the main 
economic indicators in the form of the real GDP growth on a year-to-year basis 
and population growth trend dating back from 1999 up to the projected year 
2004.  
As all things change over time, within the context of this study, this should be 
looked at in relation to the reintegration of the South African economy into the 
world economy. Accordingly, many opportunities unfold as a result of the 
modernisation of South Africa's transport infrastructure. The State President, Mr. 
Thabo Mbeki, stressed that, in order to service the broad range of requirements, 
there has to be investment in infrastructure development in the form of Public-
Private Partnerships (Mbeki Speech: The African Renaissance, South Africa and 
the World.  
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Table 1.2: Economic indicators 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Real GDP 
growth 
(%y-o-y) 
2,12 3,36 2,22 2,70 3,40 3,70 
Population 
(m) 
43,0 43,8 44,7 45,1 45,5 45,9 
 
Source: Business Monitor International, Q4 2002:13. 
 
In addition to the change in the real GDP as reflected in Table 1.2, the 
Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises 
Policy Framework (South Africa 2000:155) states that “‘state owned enterprises 
ownership can be broadened through the National Empowerment Fund in ways 
that address the problems in existing empowerment related financial 
engineering". The new approaches would provide a range of equity schemes for 
those previously excluded from the mainstream economic participation”. In the 
toll roads industry, the issue of empowerment of the historically disadvantaged 
enterprises or individuals is imperative and forms part of the concession contract 
(N3 Project Information Memorandum, 1998). 
The process of ensuring small, micro and medium enterprise (SMME). 
participation in the Public-Private Partnership setting is not confined to the road 
sector alone but open to all sectors of the economy. It should be mentioned that 
government has embarked on a restructuring process of the parastatals like 
ESKOM, Transnet and Telkom (Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring 
of State Owned Enterprises Policy Framework, 2000:131–147). These 
parastatals are in the process of restructuring with the aim of eventually 
achieving a workable and viable Public-Private Partnership arrangement. Such 
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type of arrangement or agreement ensures that the private sector also shares in 
the newly formed enterprise. In the long run, this is aimed at attending to the 
macro-economic needs in which investment is promoted, public sector debt is 
reduced, and social concerns such as employment losses and improving service 
delivery are addressed (Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State 
Owned Enterprises Policy Framework, 2000:13).  
1.2.1 Public-Private Partnership in infrastructure (international perspective) 
The general feeling in many parts of the world still holds that Public-Private 
Partnerships is a way of eradicating poverty, particularly if a country is faced with 
a depression. In his exploratory research study, Mitchell (1987:6) also argues 
that when the United Kingdom economy was in a depression, an ambitious 
Public-Private Partnership programme was developed. The programme involved 
among other things, the sale to the private sector of major nationalised industries 
such as British Telecom and Amersham International. The question is if Public-
Private Partnerships have become a trend in most parts of the world, in following 
the trend, what mechanism should be put in place to ensure that the users’ of 
infrastructure are protected? Emanating from global trends, this study intends to 
make rational suggestions as to what South Africa should do in order to maintain 
mutual relationship between transport infrastructure providers and the users. 
Bradshaw and Smith (2000:104) reveal that “in the United Kingdom Public-
Private Partnership arrangements also covered peripheral to major public utilities 
such as the British Rail Hotels". Both the above research studies maintain the 
view that for a programme to reach fruition, it needs substantial support from 
government institutions. In the final analysis, the United Kingdom received the 
necessary support from the private sector to execute the programme now 
famously known as the deregulation and liberalisation of the competition policy. 
From such valuable support, the momentum to deregulate and liberalise the 
conomy was both gained and maintained. 
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The United Kingdom’s Public-Private Partnership policy, although it appeared to 
be effective, was severely criticised, and perhaps unnecessarily so when looking 
at the merits of the policy per se. The criticisms revolved around the fact that 
there was a substantial shortage of procurement skills required for the 
improvement of service delivery in the public sector. It was therefore deemed 
essential to focus on building procurement skills capacity to ensure that value for 
money was achieved (HM Treasury, 2003:59). To avoid such a pitfall in South 
Africa, the National Treasury (2001:7) has established a Strategic Framework 
that has prescriptive powers on how the Public-Private Partnership Supply Chain 
Management is to operate. 
Beesley and Little-Child (quoted by Thomson et al., 1986:57) are in support of 
Public-Private Partnerships and they stress that: "the concept is desirable 
particularly based on the fact that it has the potential to yield beneficial results to 
users in terms of enhanced responsiveness and safety in roads". According to 
these theorists, the rationale behind Public-Private Partnerships is to improve 
performance by allowing the market forces to take control of the situation. The 
pertinent question is whether the market forces without any regulatory body will 
be sufficient to determine toll tariffs that would be acceptable as viewed by users 
in the transport industry in South Africa.  
It needs to be emphasised that the study seeks to assess the validity of 
introducing the overarching transport economic regulatory authority as an 
intervention in the management and operation of the transport infrastructure. Of 
major importance is that credit must be given to the good work done by the 
Department of Transport in the strategic management of the road network 
through its South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL).  
It should be taken into consideration that the road network is one of the 
indivisible public goods that are in the government’s asset register and is 
confirmed by a study conducted by Botha (2005:1). In this respect, Botha 
(2005:1) specifically states that ‘roads mostly exhibit the classic characteristics of 
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public goods, which requires fiscal intervention’. In addition, Botha stresses the 
fact that taxes are required to fund public sector infrastructure expenditures, 
which, in turn, reduce the levels of disposable income of taxpayers throughout 
the economy.  
1.3 THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT 
The Department of Transport, amongst other national bodies, such as the 
Department of Public Enterprises, which also plays a role in state-owned 
enterprises, is the most authoritative in respect of the responsibilities for land, 
sea, and air transport. These include the subsidisation of the rail and bus 
industries as well as managing airports and international civil aviation. In line with 
the wisdom of (Flaherty, Bell and Coleman, 1997: 21), the Department has also 
oversight of road transport which includes vehicle standards and safety. It 
therefore means that a Public-Private Partnership that comes into being should 
take serious cognisance of this reality if it is to function within the law of the land. 
Naturally, there exists an inseparable relationship between land use and 
transport, which implies that if the Department of Transport is to achieve its aims 
and objectives, it needs to interact very closely with the Department of Planning 
and Development as well as the Department of Environment and Tourism 
(Flaherty et al., 1997:21). The reason for this interaction is that in the 
transportation planning process, particularly when taking strategic decisions in 
the construction of toll roads, the Department of Environment and Tourism has to 
give authorisation in terms of the environmental impact assessment plan 
compiled for a particular corridor. In his research studies about the risk profile 
analysis in Public-Private Partnership projects, Sader (2000:29) discovered that 
when there is a vacuum between political statements and administrative actions, 
projects often run into difficulties. It is often primarily due to lack of institutional 
integration, so that in cases where more than one sector is involved, failures of 
this nature occur. 
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In as far as South Africa’s transport administration history is concerned; the 
previous Department of Transport was in charge of, among other things, the 
planning, implementation and control of road infrastructural strategies. The 
National Roads Branch of the Department of Transport was responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of the national roads system. Its funds were 
derived from the National Road Fund, which also made a contribution of 70 
percent towards the cost of construction of special roads by the provinces. The 
income of the fund was derived mainly from a portion of the duties on liquid fuel 
apportioned to the fund (Transport Conference, 1980: 205).  
This chapter has tried to capture South Africa’s transport history and it is included 
here with a view to understanding the present situation so as to profile the future 
prospects as derived from the ever-changing role of government. The historical 
information further states that the construction, maintenance and operation of 
provincial roads of various classes were under the provincial administrations. The 
income of provincial administrations was derived from Treasury, with small 
income sources being vehicle and other licenses and permits, provincial taxes 
and levies, and the National Road Fund. The annual budget of each province 
was determined by Treasury on the basis of a formula that took into account the 
land area, length of the road system, car, tractor, truck population and traffic 
volume. Treasury allocated to each province the difference between the amount 
based on this formula and the province’s own transport income (Transport 
Conference, 1980:206).  
Lastly, the construction, maintenance and operation of freeways, roads, and 
streets within the municipal area were the responsibility of each municipality. This 
excluded certain through roads such as arterial roads or major roads, which were 
the responsibility of either the provincial administration or the Department of 
Transport’s Roads Branch. Municipal road funds were derived mainly from 
municipal rates and taxes, with a small contribution from the province. The 
contribution from the National Roads Fund was mainly to compensate for the 
cost incurred in respect of maintenance of the freeway systems. 
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The municipalities channelled a portion of their funds into a consolidated 
municipal transport fund for use on roads and transport projects in the area. The 
only user charges, which municipalities levied, were fees for parking in streets 
and municipal garages (Transport Conference, 1980: 206).  
1.4 THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
The early eighties saw the beginning of a deliberate move on the part of 
government to adopt a policy of promoting Public-Private Partnerships in the 
construction and maintenance of the road network industry in the country. This 
came as a result of a severe economic downturn that was brought about by 
external forces, particularly the economic depression, which led to hardships that 
were specifically experienced by most industrialised countries from 1980 to 1982. 
A need to stimulate the South African economy came earnestly to the fore; 
however, the scope for economic expansion was constrained by the existing 
obligation to repay part of its foreign debt. To make things worse, the government 
expenditure was estimated to increase by 13,9 percent in 1986/87 (South African 
Reserve Bank, 1986:18). 
This situation was so bad that it brought about the establishment of new 
companies in the transport industry. The new dispensation was well disposed 
towards the need to diversify resources as a way of expanding the pool of capital 
and expertise necessary for providing adequate skills essential to improve 
transport services the Department of Transport is expected to deliver. In other 
words, the reason for the establishment of the concession companies was 
viewed as an approach by the Department to express its interest in Public-
Private Partnerships in the road construction industry through concession 
agreements. The main problem was and still is financial resources necessary to 
pay for the design, construction, maintenance and operation of certain roads and 
the capacity to collect tolls to defray some of the costs (Mitchell, 1987:2). 
In pursuing the above objectives, the Department of Transport has gone even 
further by way of instituting a commission to investigate the possibility of 
awarding concessions to a consortium of private institutions that consists of 
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construction companies, banks, consulting engineers and toll operators. It is 
important to note that the need for increased private sector participation in the 
road sector was already a worldwide phenomenon as indicated in the previous 
paragraphs and therefore not limited to the South African context (Mitchell 
1987:2). 
To effect the necessary adaptations, the Department of Transport had to undergo 
profound changes since 1996 mainly due to financial needs and constraints plus 
the requirements of the new political dispensation. One of these important 
changes is the establishment of the National Roads Agency in 1998.  Presently, 
rather than the Department of Transport being made responsible for doing road 
construction works, a Roads Agency is now charged with the responsibility of 
implementing tendering work ordered by the Department of Transport (SANRAL, 
2002:56). In other words, while the formulation of policies and regulations falls 
directly under the Department of Transport, the financial risk has been 
apportioned to the party best able to deal with it. The current strategy is that a 
concession company or a consortium of companies is awarded a contract to fully 
manage the road infrastructure (DOT Business Plan, 1999-2000:53). 
In trying to avert financial risk in the construction of roads, the government is no 
longer required to act as a financial guarantor in any of the concession 
agreements. For example, the concessionaire of the N4, Trans Africa 
Concession (or referred to as TRAC) has agreed to carry the full financial costs 
of building a R2 billion road between Witbank in Mpumalanga (South Africa) and 
Maputo in Mozambique. This venture has heralded a new era for road financing. 
It is definitely a first in what promises to be a dynamic programme of toll-road 
concession contracts in South Africa. Hence, under the envisaged Public-Private 
Partnership contract, the risk of designing, building, financing and operating the 
road is transferred to the private sector (DOT Business Plan, 1999-2000:53). 
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1.4.1 Commercialisation 
The concept of commercialisation can be seen as a financial break-even based 
on commercial principles for public enterprises. It is also a process leading 
towards privatisation and should not be seen as a means of creating measures 
by which monopolies are artificially created through protective legislation. As 
already pointed out, this should be seen as a worldwide phenomenon with 
enormous challenges and opportunities that should be accepted by the South 
African public sector because it offers greater business potential.  
Perhaps it is now appropriate to advance reasons why public institutions deem it 
prudent to pursue the commercialisation route in the strategic management of 
their organisations of late. The main reason is that it is now a requirement of the 
South African law that every state developmental institution should ensure that 
civil society is adequately represented on the board of public corporations. 
Against this background, public institutions are further required to be transparent 
and open in both structure and decision-making processes. This means that they 
should act within the framework of public policy and that they should be duty 
bound to inform the general public as well as to account to parliament (Republic 
of South Africa, 1994:128). The commercialisation of public institutions is 
purposefully designed to fulfil these requirements as contained in the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme.  
In the previous sections, the concept Public-Private Partnership has been 
defined, however, more clarity of the term is necessary in order to put into 
context the macro-economic processes that distinguish clearly between public 
and private goods. According to Basanes, Uribe and Willig (1999:17), private 
goods are those that allow rivalry and exclusion, and public goods are those that 
exhibit non-rivalry and non-exclusion. Theoretically speaking, the commercialised 
roads which in principle are under the management of the private sector, are 
classified as private goods and therefore would allow rivalry and thus need to be 
subjected to a regulatory authority to control the pricing structure in the market 
 19
place. Governments throughout the world, including many poor African and 
South Asian countries, are commercialising their public operations to cut costs, 
improve user orientation, and increase sector-specific revenue (Estache and De 
Rus, 2000:236). In these countries, those of South Asia in particular, specialised 
technical agencies have been introduced to manage utilities such as potable 
water, electricity or housing for the poor. In the South African situation, technical 
agencies like the South African National Roads Agency Ltd (SANRAL) that serve 
as regulatory authorities overseeing the strategic management of national roads 
were established. It is therefore theoretically correct for the South African 
National Roads Agency Ltd to be autonomous as supported by Estache (1995:9), 
where he points out that "the Agencies are usually autonomous or responsible to 
a government minister and are empowered to override local authorities".  
However, practically this is not attainable. Sader (2000:57) points out that "it is 
evident that practically, governments tend to be very hesitant to grant these 
newly established regulators sufficient autonomy to become a truly technical 
authority". On the contrary it is found that political objectives are frequently 
introduced, resulting in the imposition of the criteria and conditions that do not 
accommodate investor concerns. 
In South Africa, the commercialisation challenges have led to new national 
objectives being formulated as embodied in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. The responsibilities of different levels of Governments have 
changed; hence the tolling of roads has shifted from the Department of Transport 
to the National Roads Agency. This came as a result of the national Roads Act, 
Act No 7 of 1998, that allowed for the tolling of national roads (Republic of South 
Africa, 1998c:34). 
Commercialisation could also be viewed as the first step towards the free market 
system. The free market system suggests that the service delivery system should 
be removed from the public budget and placed separately on its own, with its 
closed profit and loss account. According to the New Zealand experience as 
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contained in Heggie (1995:1), this transition from a government enterprise to a 
private concern could be categorised into four stages. Firstly, the area of no-
centralised control, then the area of central government control (bureaucratic), 
followed by that of central government control (commercial) and lastly the area of 
free market or privatisation control. 
1.4.1.1 Stage 1: No centralised control 
This stage is largely categorised by an uncoordinated development of local 
routes that are meant to service only local needs by means of the most 
rudimentary types of routes and pavements that appear to have little or no 
ownership to take care of them. 
1.4.1 2 Stage 2: Central government control (bureaucratic) 
In this stage, government’s responsibility is more focused on networks and 
funding provision or assistance for local roads. This is often characterised by a 
mix of government ministries or bodies having some responsibilities in this 
respect. These bodies are usually working with mixed objectives and sometimes 
function between policy and service delivery often with social objectives also 
being taken into consideration. 
1.4.1 3 Stage 3: Central government control (commercial) 
At stage three, government is solely responsible for the legislative framework and 
also for setting up appropriate bodies or structures with clear objectives and a 
clear split between policy and service delivery. This stage is often characterised 
by significant competitive input from the private sector in the service delivery 
sphere. Figure 1.2 gives an illustration of the government’s role at national level 
and the subsequent formation of service delivery bodies such as the South 
African National Roads Agency Limited.  
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Figure 1.2. Central Government Control 
(a) Policy Level 
Figure 1.2 above is meant to clearly demonstrate the role played by government 
at national level with respect to the formulation of legislative frameworks and 
policy guidelines that steer the efficient management of the transport system in 
South Africa. For example, at the Department of Transport level, a National Land 
Transport Strategic Framework was drafted to guide the nine provinces on how 
to deal with land transport planning.  
(b) Service delivery level 
Within the spirit of cooperative governance, the Department of Transport 
established the South African National Roads Agency Limited in 1998 to deal 
with among other things, the concessioning of toll roads. Subsequent to that, the 
Department of Finance established a Public-Private Partnership Unit at the 
National Treasury level. The unit gives guidance to Public-Private Partnership 
projects at all spheres of government in South Africa. The joint effort of the South 
African National Roads Agency Limited and the Public-Private Partnership Unit 
could enhance the quality of service delivery in South Africa. A point under 
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investigation in this study is the possible establishment of a transport economic 
regulatory authority that would serve as an intervention in the transport 
infrastructure. 
1.4.1 4 Stage 4: Free market or privatisation control 
In stage four, we find that whilst some aspects of the road facilities fall into this 
category such as toll roads, there are very few countries that operate in this 
category. Ownership and responsibility for transport performance is transferred 
or sold to the private sector where market forces dictate the level of service and 
investment in these transport facilities. However, currently the trend is to move 
from stage 1 to other stages but it seems unlikely that stage 4 will be reached in 
its entirety (Wilcox, 1995:1-2). The reason for this is that government’s 
intervention is still needed in ensuring that safety and law enforcement are 
executed and ownership of land is left in the hands of government. 
Presently, South Africa exhibits the characteristics of stage 3, which means that 
the National Roads Agency has taken the responsibility of executing policies 
while service delivery is left in the hands of the private sector. A move of this 
nature should be in the interest of the citizens and should also support the 
economic development of the country. If a commercialised public enterprise 
cannot make it in a competitive free market in the long run then it has no right to 
be maintained (Gildenhuys, 1993:34).  
Furthermore, the financial muscle of the private sector is of crucial importance 
because South Africa is currently experiencing a critical need for the construction 
of roads in order to enhance accessibility and mobility in the country (Moving 
South Africa, 1999:33). Against this dire need, the major problem is that 
government does not have adequate finance and is looking for ways and means 
of alleviating fiscal constraints (Republic of South Africa, 1996c:15). This led to 
government launching various spatial development initiatives such as the Maputo 
Corridor and the N3 TC, which are based on concession agreements.  
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Such a step was undertaken with a view to exploring ways of managing and 
financing roads in South Africa. After a thorough evaluation of the various 
privatisation alternatives that were meant to privatise the state-owned assets one 
could only hope that a control measure was put into place to monitor the entire 
process. Such a conclusion is also supported by Kohlberg and Fitzsimons 
(1985:6), who argue that there should be a mechanism in place that would 
ensure that a stable flow of funds and the success of the commercialisation of 
roads as a rational option are sustained by government. 
Kohlberg and Fitzsimons (1985:4) are of the opinion that before anything could 
be done a feasibility study of road investment should be conducted by 
international concession consultants contracted by the Department of Transport 
so as to look into the possibility of embarking on a Public-Private Partnership. 
The partnership should be solely for the improvement of the road network in 
South Africa. The main aim should be to explore ways and means of lessening 
government expenditure.  
After government had commissioned such a study, its findings of the road 
investment study revealed that the system of investing in roads could be applied 
in South Africa. To this end, Kohlberg and Fitzsimons (1985:4) further point out 
that a consortium of private organisations consisting of bankers, contractors and 
consulting engineers be formed. This was an important step in that for the first 
time a practical beginning was made that resulted in introducing the process of 
Public-Private Partnership in the road network industry in the country. 
1.4.2 The establishment of the National Roads Agency in South Africa 
The term agency is defined by Hattingh (1986:95) as "the formal authorisation by 
higher governmental body to a lower body to perform tasks or render services on 
its behalf, and the costs of such duties or services are borne by the higher 
authority". Despite the fact that Hattingh lays much emphasis on the relationship 
between governmental bodies, the same principles could also apply to private 
enterprises. An agency's role is also seen as that of serving as a representative 
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for its principal and ensuring that proper channels are followed in the event of a 
principal entering into a contractual agreement with other parties (Nagel, 
1997:71).  
In 1998, the Department of Transport as a higher governmental body or principal, 
established the South African National Roads Agency Ltd (SANRAL or NRA) as 
its representative. In terms of the Department of Transport’s Strategic Plan 
(Department of Transport, 2005/06:13), there are agencies that have been 
established as indicated in Figure1.3. These agencies serve as intermediaries of 
the Department of Transport, and the purpose of the South African National 
Roads Agency is discussed in this study because it plays a significant role in the 
process of concessioning of toll roads. 
1.4.3 Purpose and role of an agency 
The Department of Transport’s Strategic Plan (2005/06) outlines the purpose of 
the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) as that of 
maintaining and developing South Africa’s 7 200 km national road network. In 
terms of the 2005 monetary value, the agency also manages assets with an 
estimated value of more than R135 billion. The agency is a company registered 
in terms of the Companies Act, with the following principal tasks: 
• strategically plan, design, construct, operate, rehabilitate and maintain the 
national roads; 
• deliver and maintain a world-class primary road network; 
• generate revenues from the development and management of assets; 
• undertake research and development to enhance the quality of roads;  
• advise the Minister of Transport on matters relating to roads; and 
• upon request from the Minister of Transport and in agreement with a foreign 
country, the agency can finance, plan, construct, acquire, provide, operate 
and maintain roads in this country.  
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Figure 1.3: The Department of Transport and how it establishes its 
agencies 
Source: Department of Transport 2005/2006:13. 
 
The following abbreviations have been used in the figure above: 
ACSA:  Airports Company of South Africa 
ATNS:  Air Traffic and Navigation Services 
CBRTA:  Cross-Border Road Transport Agency 
DASLC:  Domestic Air Services Licensing Council 
DEPE:  Department of Public Enterprises 
IASLC:  International Air Services Licensing Council  
NPA:   National Port Authority 
PE:   Public Enterprises 
RAF:   Road Accident Fund 
RC:   Regulatory Committee 
RSR:   Rail Safety Regulator 
RTMC   Road Traffic Management Corporation 
Parliament (Transport Portfolio Committee) 
Minister of PE 
Transnet
NPA
S M
SANRAL
SARCC
UTF
RAF
ATNS
ACSA
Metrorail
Minister of Transport
Department of Transport
CBRTA
SACAA
SAMSA
RSR
IASLC
RTMC
RC
DASLC
DPE
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SACAA:  South African Civil Aviation Authority 
SAMSA:  South African Maritime Safety Authority 
SANRAL:  South African National Roads Agency Limited 
SARCC:  South African Rail Commuter Corporation 
SM:   Shosholoza Meyl 
UTF:   Urban Transport Fund 
1.4.4 Agencies and trading companies 
As indicated in Figure 1.3, the Department of Transport’s Strategic Plan 
(2005/06:13) lists six trading companies operating under the Minister of 
Transport. These are the South African National Roads Agency, Airports 
Company of South Africa, Air Traffic and Navigation Services, Road Accident 
Fund, Urban Transport Fund and the South African Rail Commuter Corporation. 
There are other agencies that were formed subsequent to the establishment of 
the South African National Roads Agency. The Strategic Plan further outlines a 
host of agencies falling under the Minister of Transport. These are inter alia the 
Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (CBRTA), the South African Maritime 
Safety Authority (SAMSA) and the Civil Aviation Authority. 
The South African Rail Commuter Corporation, as shown in Figure 1.3, had since 
been established during the transformation of the then South African Transport 
Services. It came into being as a fully commercially viable legal body in terms of 
the legal succession to the South African Transport Services Act, 1989 (Act No.9 
of 1989) (Maluleke, 1998:1). The mandate of the SARCC to ensure that at the 
request of the national Department of Transport or any local body designated as 
a transport authority, rail commuter services be provided in the public interest 
(Department of Transport Business Plan, 1999:7). 
The establishment of the National Roads Agency, just like other agencies, was 
seen as a product of transformation of a public service that has been attained by 
government. The agency was established through an Act of Parliament as an 
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independent statutory company with the Minister of Transport as the sole 
shareholder (Government Gazette No.18798, 1998). The current study seeks 
also to investigate this kind of arrangement to find out whether it should remain 
as it is in the context of the South African road transport infrastructure. 
There are three golden rules that should be kept in mind in the management of 
an agency. Firstly, representation is based upon a tri-partite relationship, which 
simply means that there will be more than two parties concerned. Secondly, the 
agency should have the consent or authority of its principal to act and should act 
in accordance with such authority or mandate. Thirdly, only the principal and the 
third party acquire rights and duties in terms of the contract, even though the 
contract was concluded by the representative and the third party (Nagel, 
1997:71). 
Since the commencement of the NRA Act, all national roads and the 
responsibility of the national roads vest in the NRA. In addition, the NRA is given 
the power to perform all strategic planning with regard to the South African 
national roads system. This also includes the design, construction, operation 
management, control maintenance and rehabilitation of roads for South Africa. 
The agency should see to it that all these functions are financed in accordance 
with its business and financial plan. This is to ensure that government’s goals 
and objectives concerning national roads are met. 
The NRA may, at the request of the Premier of a province, and with the Minister’s 
approval, perform any work in connection with any road, whether on the national, 
provincial or municipal level. The SANRAL, with the power vested in it of a road 
authority, may charge a fee for any service rendered. It is within the agency’s 
discretion to appoint any private person, institution or body to perform the work 
on its behalf. The provision, establishment, erection and maintenance of facilities 
on national roads for the convenience and safety of road users can be done 
through the recommendation of the agency (Government Gazette No.18798, 
1998). If the agency is vested with the power of charging fees as defined above, 
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it cannot therefore regulate itself in terms of ensuring that the fees are justifiable. 
The examination into whether an independent transport economic regulatory 
authority need to be established becomes imperative as it is supposed to ensure 
that the toll fees charged by toll road concessionaires are just and fair. 
In the bidding process for the management of toll roads by private entities, 
guidelines and criteria are set to enable prospective bidders to comply with 
tender requirements. The requirements to be complied with in respect of private 
sector involvement in the roads sector is that of ensuring that small, medium and 
micro enterprises are fully engaged in various projects. A range of projects 
available for the emerging entrepreneurs pertains to the construction and 
consulting work. Based on the criteria set, the process of public-private 
partnership in the national roads is perceived as a catalyst for the creation of 
work in road construction (N3 Project Information Memorandum, 1998). There is 
therefore a need to ensure that the regulation of entrepreneurial and socio-
economic compliance by concession companies is discharged by an 
autonomous regulatory body. 
 
1.5 CATEGORIES OF ROADS 
According to Flaherty et al. (1997:2), the establishment of permanent settlements 
and the domestication of animals some 9 000 years ago left trails that were 
deliberately chosen by the people and their animals. These trails were the 
forerunner of the first recognised travel ways which, in turn, evolved into today’s 
streets, roads and highways. This may be regarded as the starting point for the 
categorisation of roads as we find it today.  
Roads and streets play a vital role in the circulation of people and commerce 
among and within centres of habitation (Jacobson and Tarr, 1994:5). In an 
attempt to move everyone or almost everything economically to everywhere in 
any country around the world, an integration of various categories of roads, rail, 
air and sea routes is an absolute necessity. Roads that need to be considered in 
effecting an integrated transport system can be categorised into the 
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following: local, arterial and national roads. The attention in this study is to 
explore Public-Private Partnership initiatives as applicable to toll roads in South 
Africa. However, a brief discussion of local and arterial roads is necessary to put 
these in perspective with regard to the national roads. This is done solely to 
enhance the reader's understanding of transport issues in the Republic of South 
Africa. 
1.5.1 Local roads 
According to Shaw (1982:10), local roads are a group of great diversity, primarily 
serving as feeder or distributor network for the arterial roads, and providing 
property access. Private ownership of local roads is a common phenomenon in 
St Louis (Missouri) and in commercial and residential new developments. Streets 
in shopping centres in the United States are often owned by private developers. 
Many rural access roads in Sweden are privately owned by property owners’ 
associations. This strategy may not be appropriate in South Africa, as the 
ownership of infrastructure needs to remain with the state.  
Shaw (1982:10) further states that the main issues with local streets are 
maintenance rather than new construction. In South Africa as in the United 
States, private contractors can be engaged in maintenance. Since the South 
African government strives to engage the private sector by all possible means, 
embarking on a similar strategy could reflect a considerable move towards 
Public-Private Partnerships within the local government. 
1.5.2 Arterial roads 
Arterial roads may be defined as the denser backup feeder or distribution 
network for the national highways. These roads provide the main means of intra- 
and inter-regional travel and are typically used by traffic having lower than 
average journey lengths than journeys on the national highway (Shaw, 1982:12). 
From Argentina to Thailand, Australia to Canada, major arterial roads are being 
built under the toll road concession schemes. In many of these countries, 
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governments are increasingly finding it difficult to finance the costs up-front, they 
are therefore giving the private sector concession to construct and operate these 
urban roads for specified period of time (Estache and De Rus, 2000:236). 
Practically and commonly, one could argue that, based on the experience 
gathered from these countries in respect of the commercial management of 
arterial roads, the same strategy could be considered in South Africa as a Public-
Private Partnership initiative.  
1.5.3 National roads other than highways 
There are also national roads that are neither highways nor toll roads and for 
these, the National Roads Agency receives a variable annual allocation from the 
National Treasury. The non-toll network constitutes 74 percent of the national 
road network of 7 200 km (Department of Transport, 2001b:9). 
1.5.4 National highways 
National highways may be defined as principal roads linking the major centres of 
the population and industry. They have two or more lanes for the exclusive use of 
the through traffic in each direction and full control of access and exit. These 
roads comprise three different kinds of components, namely, basic freeway 
segments, weaving areas and rump junction. Of all non-urban roads, these roads 
are usually the most heavily used with the longest average journey lengths and 
highest volume capacities (Shaw, 1982:11).  
National highways are the most important and costly form of transportation 
infrastructure in both developed and developing countries. In the majority of the 
developed countries, most of the domestic passengers and freight traffic are 
being transported on arterial roads. Almost everywhere highway traffic is 
therefore increasing faster than other elements of the transport system (Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer, 1993:97). National roads are the responsibility of the national 
government in respect of the financing, development and maintenance. The 
South African government has its road authority that undertakes the 
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management of the road system within its borders. 
In transport economics terms, roads constitute the supply side of the economic 
system and are viewed as public commodities used by the travelling public. It is 
therefore imperative that the state still intervenes through various means such as 
safety regulations. The safety of the travelling public is reliant on effective law 
enforcement. This means that safety regulations are still essential even though 
economic deregulation is seen to be one of the preferred options during the 
Public-Private Partnership process (Shaw, 1982:1). 
1.5.5 Toll roads 
Toll roads refer to the roads with high capacity access control and grade-
separated expressway systems. These roads represent a high proportion of the 
high traffic highway systems (Estache and De Rus, 2000: 236). It is a 
requirement in many countries that when a toll road is opened there should be a 
parallel un-tolled route. Such an alternative is made available to motorists who 
have no willingness and/or ability to pay for the toll road. The alternative route 
need not necessarily be built to toll road standards (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 
1993:98).  
In the broader sense, a toll road can be viewed as a mechanism that provides a 
public facility to the general public at significant capital outlay. Every attempt is 
made to recoup the capital and other operating expenditure by imposing a 
charge for the use of such a facility. In contrast with the provision of public 
infrastructure from general taxes, a toll road is based on the principle of user 
charging which is a more equitable form of taxation. 
 
1.6 A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TOLL ROADS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The concept of toll roads is not new in South Africa. These types of roads have 
existed since the 1880s. An example of such a road is the Garcia Pass, which 
stretches approximately 20 km in length. It is found between Riversdale and 
Ladysmith in the Cape and it became operational since then up to the 1930s. 
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The old tollhouse is still there and has been declared a national monument. The 
tariff at the time was three pennies for a complete wagon and one penny for a 
bicycle. The tollhouse also had "uitspan" facilities. 
While toll roads in specific settings seem to be in demand, the problems that 
many of this first generation of road concession had, have already been 
experienced by Mexico and Thailand, and this has given toll projects a poor 
reputation. It should however be stated that the process of tolling of roads is not 
received positively by the public because it is often seen as being insensitive to 
the needs of the poor who cannot afford to pay for these costly services. Estache 
(2000:237) argues that one can design a project in many ways to get the private 
sector involved without having to toll the road. 
Public-Private Partnerships should serve as a means by which private 
entrepreneurs and other economic subjects can free themselves and therefore 
be in an advantageous position to develop their own economic welfare and 
prosperity. Presently, the system is offered to companies such as the N3TC, 
TRAC and Bakwena in this country, and perhaps it is time for its efficacy needs 
to be assessed. Nevertheless, this arrangement aims at ensuring that 
entrepreneurs would be fully involved in economic activities and thus contribute 
to development of a stronger economy. The approach proposed was that of 
ensuring that the full participation in projects should precipitate the enrichment of 
skills and eventually such skilled individuals should be able to sustain themselves 
financially. Despite the above trend, subsequently, a number of toll roads such as 
the Tsitsikamma, Marianhill and Kranskop are established and operated by the 
Department of Transport and are not based on the above-mentioned principles 
(N3 Project Information Memorandum, 1998).  
1.6.1 The provision of toll roads in selected countries 
International experience shows that toll road projects had been established with 
each having its own design and investment demands and political and 
organisational arrangements. Furthermore, it appears that Toll roads 
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were also been negotiated loosely and have often been the outcome of informal 
agreements between governments and construction companies. This way of 
making fundamental and critical deals need to be examined and corrected if 
found wanting. 
What follows is an exposition on what is happening in other sample countries and 
it is primarily intended to enhance the reader's understanding of the issues 
involved in road tolling. Thus, on the basis of the information derived from 
Estache and De Rus (2000), Table 1.3:  has been developed to summarise the 
scope of toll roads provision in selected countries. While toll roads are typically 
only a small part of the total road network, they tend to be located in the most 
densely travelled corridors and thus have the potential to play a major role in the 
transport network. Toll roads comprise a dominant share of the national road 
network and thus may play particularly important roles in urban areas and the 
intercity trade. 
Table 1.3: Toll road provision in selected countries (km) 
Country 
Total 
road 
network 
Total  
national 
road 
network 
Tolled 
roads 
Tolled 
roads 
(percent of 
total) 
Tolled roads 
(percent of 
national 
roads) 
Argentina 500 000 10 400 9 800 1,96 94 
Brazil 1 980 000 - 856 0,04 - 
Chile 79 800 - 3 0,00 - 
France 966 000 14 886 6 305 0,65 42 
Hungary 158 600 435 57 0,04 13 
Indonesia 260 000 530 530 0,20 100 
Italy 314 360 6 444 5 550 1,77 86 
Japan 1 144 360 15 079 9 219 0,81 61 
Korea 77 000 1 880 1 880 2,44 100 
Rep of Malaysia 94 000 1 702 1 127 1,20 66 
Mexico 303 262 5 683 5 683 1,87 100 
South Africa 525 000 1 440 825 0,16 57 
Spain 343 200 7 194 2 255 0.66 31 
 
Source: Estache and De Rus (2000)  
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According to Celasun (2001:40), Public-Private Partnership programmes have 
been overly ambitious internationally as indicated by countries such as Hungary. 
In support of Celesun’s statement, Sader (2000:140) confirms that the Hungarian 
government established the Bureau for Motorways Concessions under the 
Ministry of Transport and this aimed at finding private financing solutions. 
Sader (2000:140) stresses the importance of strategic planning in the execution 
of toll road projects. In the South African situation, toll roads need to support  the 
aims and objectives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme and this 
is a fundamental consideration underlying the National Roads Agency’s strategic 
planning process (Department of Transport, 2001b:16). Government, through its 
agency and private sector involvement, should accept the challenge of 
expanding and maintaining a state-of-the-art road network with limited financial 
resources in a manner that is consistent with the socio-economic aims of 
government (Department of Transport, 2001:16).  
1.6.2 Non-toll parallel roads as a requirement 
International experience suggests that while the idea of having competition 
between roads is good in principle, the evidence gathered so far suggests that 
traffic levels in most developing countries cannot sustain duplication from free 
alternative routes. Toll road traffic in such cases has generally fallen well below 
projections. The Mexican toll road programme illustrates the challenges imposed 
by parallel roads launched in 1985. This programme introduced a toll road 
development plan with a range of conditions, one of which was the provision of a 
free alternative parallel route (Estache and De Rus, 2000).  
The provision of non-toll parallel roads, although it was initially applicable in 
South Africa, is currently not applicable. The best argument in favour of free 
parallel roads is one of social equity, to ensure that the poor can still have access 
to roads. One way of enabling the poor to get access to toll roads could be by 
way of introducing a tariff differentiation strategy. 
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According to the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa 
(Department of Transport, 2002:98), the Minister of Transport has become 
increasingly concerned about the impact of road tolls on poorer communities. 
The Minister thus requested a critical re-examination of the tolling strategy. 
Furthermore, the Minister is also concerned about the principle, now legislated, 
of toll roads not being required to offer alternate routes and the placing of toll 
plazas at points where there are no alternative routes available. The Minister has 
enquired as to the possibility of a mechanism to exempt certain categories of 
users from the payment of tolls.  
1.7 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH IN THE TOLL ROAD 
INDUSTRY 
There is as much in management outside the business environment as there is in 
the business itself (Drucker, 1986:168). This simply shows the importance of 
strategic management; and Hunger (1989:10) defines it as a process that 
involves four basic elements, namely environmental scanning, strategy 
formulation, strategy implementation, evaluation and control. Figure 1.4 shows 
how the strategic management process can be applicable to the road network 
industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Strategic management process 
Hunger, 1989:12 
This model might be of use to augment the current strategic management of 
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national roads in South Africa. Managing the external environment has become 
critically important in almost every organisation precisely because of the drastic 
rate of change in macro-environmental factors. One of the critical factors to be 
taken into consideration in the toll road industry as derived from the interview 
with the N3TC Management (2005), is the Consumer Price Index as it is used as 
a determining factor in the adjustment of toll tariffs and the correct ratio between 
users in terms of using or damaging the toll road. The critical challenge in the 
management of road network is to ensure that the expectations of three parties 
are satisfied and these are the government, concessionaires and users. 
In as far as government’s aspirations are concerned, the road network project 
needs to play a role in the socio-economic development of South Africa. For 
example, the creation of work is to be seen as part of what the project should 
provide to the community residing along the corridor. The expectations of 
concessionaire on the other hand, are those of ensuring that the concession 
company is managed profitably. It is natural that the users of roads would expect 
a high quality road network that would provide comfort and convenience. 
1.7.1 Environmental scanning 
Environmental scanning has to do with intelligence gathering on the general 
environment or industry (Miller, 1998:91). When environmental scanning is to be 
applied in the toll roads industry; then it is advisable that the focus should be 
directed at variables that would potentially affect the operation. The variables to 
be given attention are stakeholders; government at all levels, communities along 
the transport corridor, road users, special interest groups such as the automobile 
and road freight associations. These variables pose a substantial challenge to 
the management of the concession companies. Figure 1.5 shows an outline of 
the variables. 
On the external environment, there are forces, which constantly exert pressure 
on both the toll road industry and the individual concession company. These are 
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Socio-cultural, Political-legal, Economic, Technological and Physical forces. See 
Figure 1.5. 
According to the Treasury guidelines on PPP (2000), the process entails 
assessing the potential for engaging the private sector. This is called pre-
feasibility, and it is followed by a full feasibility assessment. In strategic 
management language, this is referred to as environmental scanning (Hunger, 
1989:12). This phase is characterised by searching for Public-Private Partnership 
opportunities by government as evidenced by the Gauteng Department of Public 
Transport Roads and Works. In the late 1990s, a delegation from the Gauteng 
Provincial Government visited Germany and France with the intention of 
exploring Public-Private Partnership opportunities in the rail industry (Gautrain 
Technical Team 2004). 
In the event where the Public-Private Partnership opportunities have been 
identified by government, consultants are commissioned to do a full feasibility 
study (Gautrain Technical Reports, 2000). This phase entails various aspects 
such as assessing whether the project will be feasible with due consideration to 
the environmental sensitivity as well as technical, financial and economic 
aspects.  
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Figure 1.5: Environmental variables 
Source: Adapted from Hunger 1989:13 
 
The major task in intelligence information gathering is to ensure that such 
information is correctly interpreted to inform the strategists and to guide the 
process of strategy formulation. The application of Intelligent Transportation 
Systems can help in the collection of relevant data for Toll Concession 
companies. Miller (1998:97) is of the opinion that “the forecasting of future 
economic developments in the competitive environment forms the cornerstone in 
the planning of concessioning of toll roads”, and this is what needs to be adopted 
by concession companies. 
1.7.2 Strategy formulation 
Strategy formulation is a process of developing long-range plans for the effective 
management of environmental opportunities and threats in the light of 
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corporate strengths and weaknesses (Hunger, 1989:14). After a company has 
developed a mission and vision which set out the company’s purpose and 
values, and having undertaken a review of the current position in the industry, it 
is crucial to ensure that the right strategy is set in place. According to Cook 
(1994:59), the right strategy should be responsive and flexible and able to 
address the structure and size of the organisation. This is an advice to be 
heeded if South Africa is to avoid similar pitfalls that were experienced 
elsewhere. 
Among the strategies to be considered in a Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement are issues of strategic partnership, joint venture and growth 
strategies. Accordingly, Geddes (2005:124) points out that "strategic partners in 
the consortium should have precise objectives". This means that there should be 
a clear idea of the outcomes that the consortium hopes to achieve. Such 
outcomes have to be understood and supported by all the partners if their 
commitment is to be secured. In South Africa, strategic partnership is mainly 
done by bidding companies, particularly during the request for proposals phase. 
This phase is also referred to by Basanes et al. (1999) as "competition for the 
market". This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this study. 
During the strategy formulation phase, strategic partners should also adopt an 
appropriate strategy to enable them to function in the event of becoming 
successful bidders. Various strategies, such as joint venture and growth 
strategies, are considered for execution during the operation phase. 
1.7.3 Strategy implementation 
Strategy implementation is the process by which strategies and policies are put 
into action through the development of programmes, budgets, and procedures 
(Hunger, 1989:15). The first rule in the implementation of any strategy is to know 
the industry, the market, and the competitors being attacked. If the weak points 
of the competitors are known and their likely reactions can be predicted, then the 
attacker is more likely to arrive at a successful strategy. In the rational analysis of 
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possible outcomes, one needs to evaluate the rewards of success and outweigh 
such rewards against the costs to be incurred. If the chances of success are high 
enough to justify the move, then the strategy should be implemented (Hussey 
and Jenster, 2000:29). 
The implementation of a strategy means that the hard work of planning is set in 
action. It is during the implementation phase when the actual bidding is done that 
the construction work is executed in the case of where the bidder wins the bid. 
The execution of various labour-based models are done with due consideration 
to the regulatory requirements such as the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, Act No. 53 of 2003 (Republic of South Africa, 2003).  
1.7.4 Evaluation and control 
Evaluation and control is the process during which corporate activities and 
performance results are monitored so that actual performance can be compared 
with desired performance (Hunger, 1989:17). For evaluation and control to be 
effective in the toll roads industry, toll concession companies need to give 
unbiased feedback to the shareholders as well as to role players like road users. 
This involves inter alia compiling reports about the statistics of traffic flow and the 
number of incidents within a specific time period. It is important to note that the 
evaluation function can best be done by means of an independent regulatory 
authority as it would give an unbiased judgement in dealing with socio-economic 
related issues. 
1.8 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
An effective transport system is vital for South Africa in order to provide mobility 
to all people and to stimulate economic growth and development in the Southern 
African region. The introduction of Public-Private Partnerships in the road 
network has come as a part of South Africa’s procurement landscape. This 
development consists of complex arrangements and long-term contracts that 
require private finance to succeed if their contribution is to be realised because 
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such contracts indeed have the potential to yield useful service delivery from both 
an operational and a strategic perspective (Department of Finance, 2000:2).  
Entering into a Public-Private Partnership agreement in the construction of toll 
roads should precipitate benefits to stakeholders like the general public, state 
and the road users. The general public perceives Public-Private Partnerships as 
a means devised to promote goals such as social equity, economic 
empowerment, efficient utilisation of scarce resources, and protection of the 
environment. For the state, however, the concept should mean the realisation of 
a mechanism that would make it possible to achieve accessibility, relevancy, 
viability and a beneficial service delivery option plus possible international 
investment. For the users of services, Public-Private Partnerships should 
preferably result in accessible, affordable and safe services that meet acceptable 
quality standards (Department of Finance 2000:2). 
The introduction of toll roads virtually affects the lives of all residents in the 
relevant country. Toll roads affect road users directly in their daily journeys and 
also affect all residents of the country indirectly by means of an influence on the 
economic activity and prosperity of the country. It is therefore imperative to 
ensure that public consultation and participation are carried out in any project 
that might be contemplated or is seen as a requirement in terms of the National 
Land Transport Transition Act No. 22 of 2000. It goes without saying that an 
environmental impact assessment is an indispensable requirement to ensure that 
the developments of an effective transport system become a reality. From the 
government point of view, toll roads should be put where there is high 
commercial traffic. This is done with a view to promote the use of this mode of 
public transport.  
The biggest challenge is to find ways and means of achieving a sustainable 
platform of funding for the existing national roads network. The problem that 
arises is that the development and maintenance of roads is a costly exercise that 
needs a substantial amount of investment. Since investment in national 
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infrastructure expresses the economic, social, political and cultural vision of a 
nation, this calls for a critical evaluation of different investment alternatives, and 
the current study intends, among other things, to strive towards proposing a 
rational model for the selection of investment alternatives.  
The successful exploitation of opportunities available in this dynamic industry 
requires a concerted effort from those who manage the toll roads, in other words, 
a strategic management model is required to ensure that transport matters are 
well managed. The White Paper on National Transport Policy (Republic of South 
Africa, 1996c:12) states "as part of the overall long-term vision for the South 
African transport system, transport infrastructure will be put in place to enable 
South Africa to be the hub of transport within the Southern African Development 
Community region. The system should be structured in such a way that public 
transport and freight are encouraged and allow for seamless inter-modalism. It 
should be financed through a combination of user charges and public private 
sector investments". 
In his research, Botha (2005:2) referred to the recently published State of 
Logistics Survey for South Africa, conducted by the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research, which states, “South Africa’s transport problems are far 
worse than expected”. Successive Ministers of Transport have referred to the 
performance of South Africa’s transport system as “poor” and various official 
documents have warned about the negative effects that inadequate transport 
infrastructure exert on the country’s ability to generate sustained and high 
economic growth.  
Basanes et al. (1999:16) point out that there is a need for regulatory institutions 
to protect users whose services are provided by a natural monopoly. The view 
Basanes et al. hold is in support of the White Paper on National Transport Policy 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996c:16), where it is explicitly stated that "regulatory 
structures will be established where they are appropriate but do not exist, 
infrastructure will be regulated where monopoly situations could occur". The 
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setting up of a regulatory authority is therefore backed by the White Paper on 
National Transport Policy. 
In support of this argument by Basanes et al., the independent regulatory 
institutions are now compelled by law to guarantee that the public-private 
partnership commitments would definitely protect the various stakeholders, such 
as road users and residents associations, as these are often subjected to 
unilateral expropriation. Finally, what matters most is that whatever the 
circumstances, a transport economic regulatory authority should ensure that it 
succeeds in guaranteeing the long-term financial sustainability of private 
investment in the transport infrastructure.  
1.9 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As already indicated in the previous paragraphs, the Minister of Transport is 
highly involved in strategic policy decisions related to transportation. Hence, he 
has shown an increasing interest and concern about the impact of road tolls on 
poorer communities and has requested that a critical re-examination of the tolling 
strategy be done because the existing ones seem to be insensitive to the social 
situation in the country. This is in the context of the fact that toll roads are no 
longer required to offer alternate routes, which has heightened the Minister's 
concern, hence the need to investigate prevailing and potential problems around 
the provision of toll roads.  
On the basis of these concerns, the problem central to this study is that there is a 
need to explore various regulatory regimes that would serve as an intervention. 
The intervention of such regulatory authority is the result of the concerns of 
legitimate toll road users who cannot see any value for the money they pay for 
the use of toll roads. The ultimate adoption of a particular regulatory authority 
would require it to exercise its oversight role to various modes of transport. 
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1.10 MAIN OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of the study is to assess the validity of introducing the 
overarching transport economic regulatory authority as an intervention in the 
management and operation of the transport infrastructure. When viewed from the 
perspective of the road infrastructure, such a transport economic regulatory 
authority should be able to promote the interest of government, the toll road 
industry and of the road users at large. 
1.10.1 Secondary objectives 
The study firstly wants to examine the effects of the ongoing rollout processes of 
Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa and in other countries. This is done in 
order to be in a position to analyse and to assess the kind of model that will best 
suit the South African situation after the necessary adaptations had been made. 
In the second place the study will examine the efficacy of the concept of 
competition for and in the market should it be ultimately adopted for application in 
the toll roads industry and will furthermore assess how the regulatory intervention 
mechanism would operate in the entire transport infrastructure. 
1.11 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methods used in this study are empirical by nature and derive their 
authority from various books, articles, newspapers, theses, dissertations, 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, circulars and reports issued by the National Roads 
Agency. This is also coupled with experiences gained from other countries visited 
for the purposes of attending conferences, workshops, research studies and 
reading of papers. Finally, data was collected through interviews with various 
directors from the National Roads Agency, members of the existing toll 
concession companies in South Africa, namely N3 Toll Concession (Pty) Ltd and 
Trans African Concession (TRAC). In conclusion, the researcher has pilot tested 
many strategies, models and paradigms to empirically determine their 
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effectiveness. Annexure 2 is attached to serve as evidence of pilot studies 
conducted to explore the type of regulatory authorities formed during the 
unfolding of Public-Private Partnership projects in other countries. This will afford 
the researcher the opportunity to make reliable recommendations at the 
appropriate time.  
1.12 CHAPTER LAYOUT 
The layout of the chapters is as follows: 
Chapter one gives a comprehensive background to the study. Furthermore, it 
provides fundamental principles and values underpinning the processes 
necessary for the establishment of Public-Private Partnerships in the provision of 
road infrastructure. This presentation covers, amongst other things, definitions of 
the concept commercialisation and the examination of strategic management 
approaches needed to enhance transport delivery in a competitive environment. 
Chapter two deals at length with the creation of awareness regarding the role the 
different role players are expected to execute in the context of public-private 
partnerships with respect to the South African national roads and also with 
regard to foreign countries. 
Chapter three examines the effects of macro-environmental factors on issues 
that necessitate the development of toll roads. 
Chapter four handles matters dealing with competition in the toll road 
infrastructure. This chapter covers issues of how to prepare for the bidding 
process through to the stage when the concession contract is awarded to a 
successful bidder. 
Chapter five deals with matters that are involved with issues that usually arise 
after the award of a bid has taken place, and this is sometime referred to as 
competition in the market. The chapter ends with an argument that favours the 
establishment of an economic regulatory authority. 
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Chapter six assesses the validity of various regulatory interventions in a Public-
Private Partnership arrangement. 
Chapter seven concludes by suggesting a number of recommendations on how 
to manage the Public-Private Partnership agreements effectively and efficiently 
through the adoption of a transport economic regulatory authority established for 
such agreements. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of Public-Private Partnerships was defined in Chapter one as a 
process whereby the state entrusts certain functions or activities to the private 
sector to perform at their own risk. However, when examined within the South 
African context, it seems appropriate to define it as referring to "a contractual 
arrangement between a public sector entity and a private sector entity whereby 
the private sector performs a departmental function in accordance with output-
based specifications for a specified significant period of time in return for a 
benefit which is normally in the form of a financial remuneration" (Republic of 
South Africa: National Treasury, 2002:3).  
In the same context, "It furthermore involves a substantial transfer of all forms of 
project life cycle risk to the private sector. The public sector retains a significant 
role in the partnership project either as the main purchaser of the services 
provided or as the main enabler of the project" (Republic of South Africa: 
National Treasury, 2002:3). Having said the above, care should be exercised 
because the provision of service by a private business concern or non-
governmental organisation may fail to fulfil the requirements of a Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP). 
Seen as such, Chapter two now aims to advance reasons for a rationale for the 
establishment of Public-Private Partnerships and also to suggest a workable and 
viable procedure that would form a transition path through which Public-Private 
Partnerships could be brought into being. In addition, the chapter aims to cover 
the different forms of Public-Private Partnerships as well as opportunities that 
may accrue to potential investors. 
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2.2 RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
This section investigates in detail the rationale for the establishment of Public-
Private Partnerships in South Africa, particularly in the road infrastructure 
because the study is undertaken within the discipline of transport economics of 
which road infrastructure constitutes an element of the road transport system. As 
already mentioned in Chapter one, this chapter draws lessons from the research 
done in other countries and on the basis of that it rigorously assesses the 
appropriateness of the ability and capacity of such approaches to assist in 
designing as well as structuring Public-Private Partnerships that are user-friendly 
but also economically viable as phenomena to be applied across the board. 
2.2.1 The rationale 
To handle this topic reasonably it makes sense to quote Ramanadham (1988:19) 
who advances the rationale that argues the fact that "government needs capital 
injection and this circumstance has repeated itself in many countries”. Stacey 
(1997:41) supports this by pointing out that "the driving force behind the 
establishment of a Public-Private Partnership is partly based on the conception 
that the public sector tends not to be efficient and effective when it delivers 
alone". This view is indirectly also confirmed by Birch and Haar (2000:2), who 
maintain that "much of the faith in the salutary effect of Public-Private Partnership 
derives from a belief that private ownership of assets and the removal of 
government from business decision-making results in efficiency gains". In other 
words, what is submitted here is the view that says government often lacks the 
necessary resources or new technological innovations to improve the delivery of 
services.  
Again, Birch and Haar (2000:2) argue in favour of the public sector when they 
state that "more often than not, when government delivers a service alone, it is 
more likely to pursue multiple objectives in its management of public sector 
enterprises". This is evident when government strives simultaneously at 
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accomplishing more than one objective by attempting to create employment 
while also trying to provide services to areas that are not commercially profitable. 
This has the potential to create a series of disincentives that in the end may 
reduce the efficiency and therefore the profitability of the enterprise.  
Importantly, in their critical review of public enterprise performance in developing 
countries, Birch and Haar (2000:3) point out that "Bureaucrats typically perform 
poorly in business not because they are incompetent, but because they face 
contradictory goals and pervasive incentives that can distract and discourage 
even very able and dedicated public servants". This advice is very crucial and 
needs to be borne in mind at all critical times when the public sector is expected 
to deliver services, and fails to do so. In this respect, there is no doubt that the 
Public-Private Partnership initiatives can do much better by far than government 
when it comes to service delivery albeit on the basis of a different motive. 
Therefore it makes sense to establish Public-Private Partnerships to develop the 
infrastructure that is necessary for bringing about the needed economic 
development essential to create employment and bring about service delivery. 
Public-Private Partnerships should be seen as a means to acquire resources or 
technological skills from the private sector in order to assist in the implementation 
of strategies for the accomplishment of the national objectives in general and 
those of the transport sector in particular. For the purposes of exposing the 
workings of the Public-Private Partnerships in concrete terms, it is advisable to 
take a look at an approach that is presently applied by the South African toll road 
industry. In this situation, the public sector has invited the private sector by giving 
it flexibility in the acquisition of technological innovations, such as the introduction 
of an electronic toll collection system for the benefit of the transport industry in 
particular and the country in general.  
In addition, Ramanadham (1988:19) is of the opinion that "failing to let in private 
capital participation would amount to perpetuating the inefficiency of the public 
sector enterprise and thus destroying its opportunities for expansion". To make 
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the establishment of Public-Private Partnership attractive government has 
persuaded some countries to formulate joint ventures or management contracts 
in which the private sector is enticed by lucrative concessions. This may be clear 
in the joint venture agreement formed by construction companies such as Murray 
and Roberts, Grinaker LTA and Infra Africa (N3TC Project Information 
Memorandum, 1999). 
The engagement of Public-Private Partnership entities should offer quality 
service in the sense of practising the dictum of value for money while at the same 
time providing services at an affordable cost. However, the other important issue 
to bear in mind is that the private sector should be assisted in the event of there 
being limited experience when it comes to issues that involve purely Public-
Private Partnership arrangements. In trying to ensure that value for money is 
achieved, the Department of Finance’s National Treasury has drafted a 
framework for the purposes of guiding the process involving the supply chain 
management that needs to be followed by Public-Private Partnership operations. 
In other words, supply chain management has to be run in accordance with the 
requirements as contained in Section 78 of the Public Finance Management Act, 
Act No. 1 of 1999. The focus of the framework is to give guidelines on optimum 
monitoring so as to ensure that the private party is achieving the outcome 
specified in the contract. The SA National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) 
already had its own guidelines with regard to the concessioning of toll roads by 
the time National Treasury prepared comprehensive guidelines on 
concessioning. It needs, however, to be stated that all concession contracts are 
expected to fall within the ambit of the National Treasury guidelines. 
In his research, Stacey (1997:10) discovered that for many years, road 
infrastructure provision and public service delivery in South Africa had been the 
preserve of the public sector. The reason had been the perceived strategic 
importance of road infrastructure and land use to the economy. Until recently, the 
delivery of infrastructure by government was and is still based on political, social 
and economic responsibilities and particular constellation of ideas leading 
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to particular social impact. Infrastructure providers, as part of their social 
responsibility, are required to undertake several obligations, such as creating 
work opportunities for the local residents where the project is being carried out. 
Part of what would prompt public authorities to adopt a Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement is to break the monopoly model that had been known for many 
years in the public sector. The model is known for its operational inefficiency and 
poor response to technology and consumer needs and preferences (Stacey, 
1997). As stated in a strategy for broad-based black economic empowerment Act 
No. 53 (2003:4), government’s objective is to achieve the vision of an adaptive 
economy characterised by growth, employment and equity by 2014. The 
monopoly model that excluded the vast majority of South Africans should be 
transformed. However, this monopoly should not be replaced by a private 
monopoly.  
In the opinion of Davids, Theron and Maphunye (2005:61), South Africa is in the 
era of the Batho Pele principles, which means that the needs of people comes 
first. Therefore a model that does not respond to the needs of the people is not 
appropriate as it does not accord with the principles of “batho pele”. To this end 
Stacey (1997:11) points out that "public monopolists are often characterised by 
low productivity of labour, weak incentive structures and lack of sufficient links 
between demands and supply". To avoid these shortcomings it is crucial that a 
concerted effort be undertaken to make sure that the needs of the people are 
met. This important step could be realised simply by introducing an appropriate 
regulatory authority designed to guard specifically against any possible 
emergence of a private monopoly. 
2.3 THE TRANSITION PATH IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
The whole move towards the establishment of Public-Private Partnership 
arrangements is not a new phenomenon. Kessides (2004:183-184) confirms this 
trend by asserting that "after airlines, trucking, and freight railroads were 
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deregulated in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many other 
industrial countries reviewed their transportation policies and liberalised their 
transportation systems". Many developing and transition economies, facing huge 
fiscal pressures and poorly performing state enterprises, have also introduced 
wide-ranging policy reforms aimed at rearranging and also restructuring the roles 
of the private and public sectors in the area of transportation.  
Furthermore, Kessides (2004:199) states that "in the United Kingdom, monolithic, 
vertically integrated state owned entities had become outdated and were no 
longer the preferred option for government". This offered a good lesson to South 
Africa; hence the country has crafted a different approach, which ensures that 
services such as the management of toll roads are provided by a private sector in 
partnership with public authorities in the form of the National Road Agency.  
To do justice to the transport industry it is imperative to describe the concept of 
Public-Private Partnerships by way of a rigorous analysis because the concept is 
invariably found to have different meanings to different people. The problem 
seems to be exacerbated by the fact that the concept covers a range of different 
policy options that inter alia involves the relationship between government and 
private sectors. To compound the problem even further, Kessides (2004:262) 
makes the suggestion that "there is no sufficient evidence that in a given utility, a 
certain structural configuration is more likely to attract long term private 
investment and improve performance". 
As a form of advice, Kessides (2004:262) remarks that "if the relationship 
between structural reform and industry performance are to be correlated, there 
should be an analysis prior and after the restructuring process". Lindback 
(1996:46) affirms this by giving us a model that would guide the introduction of 
Public-Private Partnerships arrangements, see Figure 2.1 and it shows clearly 
the transition paths to follow in order to realise effective Public-Private 
Partnerships. The figure comprises of three paths, namely the unbundling and 
deregulation path, the divestiture path plus the private entry path and the profile 
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of what needs to be done from the start to the end.  
The figure shows a move by means of arrows or paths from the public policy-
owned monopoly to a point where competitive or contestable private 
infrastructure provision is reached. According to Lindback (1996:46), this can still 
be approached in different ways, for example Path 1 intends to enable the policy-
owned monopoly or state-owned enterprise (referred to in this text as SOE) to 
un-bundle and to deregulate after which private entities would be allowed to join 
as partners. Kessides (2004:5) maintains that unbundling creates a platform for 
the promotion of competition and ensures that firms provide their services at 
efficient prices.  
Having said the above, it is worthy to note that different situations and 
circumstances call for different approaches, methods, models, paradigms, policy 
frameworks and philosophical justifications as to why things are done the way 
they are done. South Africa is unique, and therefore whatever works in other 
countries may not necessarily address the problems we have in South Africa. 
This implies that South Africa should borrow selectively from other countries if 
the country does not want to embarrass itself. It often happens that 
underdeveloped and developing countries simply rush into copying models in 
operation in the developed countries without first determining or even finding out 
what would suit their conditions and circumstances. Hopefully, South Africa will 
not make the same mistake. 
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Figure 2.1: The transition path in the process of Public-Private Partnership 
Adapted from Lindback 1996:46 
 
2.3.1 Unbundling and deregulation (Path 1) 
The three paths pointed out by Lindback, as mentioned above, are further 
discussed in this section with the goal of determining their validity and relevancy 
in involving the private sector in a public owned regulated entity. A closer look at 
the figure shows that the path dealing with issues of unbundling and deregulation 
is, according to Lawther (2000:38), a time to request for proposals from the 
private sector. In other words, private companies are invited to submit their bids. 
Sader (2000:30) maintains that prior to following private entry, project preparation 
should be done and this entails: 
• establishing whether and under which circumstances a project has potential 
Public-owned 
regulated 
Private entry Divestiture 
Competitive/ contestable private infrastructure provision 
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Unbundle, deregulate
Path 3 
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for job creation; 
• identifying the relevant applicable procedures to shepherd a project through 
the approval process; 
• conducting economic, legal, financial, and engineering studies; 
• assembling the consortium; and 
• negotiating with lenders, insurers, and contractors. 
It needs to be pointed out that when a project is successfully implemented and 
reaches financial closure, it is important to realise that the project development 
costs would form part of the project costs. The implication is that the final user 
should pay for this work through tariffs and user charges that need to be 
determined. Sader (2000:30-31) is of the opinion that a laborious approval 
process would result in a more expensive project at the end.  
2.3.2 Divestiture (Path 2) 
The second path suggests that a state-owned enterprise adopts a divestiture 
strategy without undergoing an unbundling route. Gildenhuys (1993:47) defines 
divestiture strategy as “the sale of public enterprises with a view to reducing 
public spending and thus allocating limited resources more productively”. In this 
regard, Kessides (2004:104) proposes that during the restructuring of public 
sector entities, ownership be transferred to the private sector through outright 
divestiture. Wheelen and Hunger (2004:150) are however of the opinion that a 
divestiture strategy could be followed when a corporation or a division has a low 
growth. Miller (1998:254) concurs and emphasises the fact that organisations 
divest their businesses, not merely based on poor performance, but also as their 
assets have more value in some other applications. 
In a quest to increase the range of options, Birch and Haar (2000:116) suggest 
various ways in which a divestiture strategy could be crafted and eventually 
implemented. Firstly, it is suggested that services that were traditionally provided 
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by government could be contracted out to the private sector. Secondly, worker-
owned enterprises could also be established, either through the employee share 
ownership programmes or companies formed by government employees to 
purchase the public sector enterprise. Lastly, an entire public sector enterprise or 
parts of it could be leased to the private sector, or the government could enter 
into a joint venture with private sector partners or with workers as partners. This 
would simply result in giving an opportunity to the private sector to get involved in 
the provision of infrastructure and the development of various processes for land 
use along the road transport corridor. 
2.3.3 Private entry from the project’s onset (Path 3) 
Path 3 shows how a state-owned enterprise could be transferred directly to the 
private sector without undergoing the unbundling route. This process is mainly 
characterised by activities that are directly involved with the provision of 
infrastructure, such as roads. The level at which Public-Private Partnerships take 
place is denoted by Low where a state-owned enterprise is dominant and High 
where the private sector is fully operational. 
2.3.4 Provisions offered by the competitive/contestable sector 
The last block discusses the competitive/contestable private sector role in the 
provision of the essential infrastructure. It is at this phase that the role of the 
concept Public-Private Partnership should be clarified because among other 
things this phase should also explain how measures that involve the expansion 
or decentralisation of decision-making should be extended to individual 
entrepreneurs as opposed to political bureaucratic control. The arrow that shows 
a direct line from the government-owned regulated monopoly to the private 
sector indicates how the private sector is granted the right by government to 
utilise assets, like roads. 
In their analysis, Ibanez and Meyer (1993:1) came to the conclusion that the 
concept of Public-Private Partnerships signifies "a system of tendering or the 
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sub-contracting of public provision to private firms". This study prefers to define 
the concept of Public-Private Partnerships as the management of the transport 
infrastructure by a private firm or consortium of private firms in partnership with 
the public sector (National Roads Agency) for a period of thirty years. However, 
Fayard (1999:20) warns that "Public-Private Partnership should not be seen as a 
magical recipe for the creation of resources and markets. It should rather be 
seen as a means of achieving an overall optimum result by striking a balance 
between competition and cooperation and also by providing not only construction 
but maintenance and operation as well”. 
The area in Figure 2.1 that indicates Path 1 represents the unbundling processes 
that should correctly lead to the entry of the private sector into sectors that were 
formally controlled by the public sector. In practical terms this process could be 
likened to the unbundling phase that took place in South Africa during the 
transformation of the Department of Transport when the South African National 
Roads Agency was formed. The private sector entry phase shows the entry of 
private companies into public sectors like the N3TC, TRAC and Bakwena who 
were awarded concessions to serve as concessionaires.  
 
2.4 ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
The analytical approach is used to interrogate and clarify the concept of Public-
Private Partnership further, because services that do not fall within the spectrum 
of partnership are often confused in the daily spoken language. For example, the 
delivery of service by a corporative entity such as the South African National 
Roads Agency Limited within the Department of Transport would not be regarded 
as a Public-Private Partnership arrangement even though such an agency has 
some characteristics of the private sector. This is so despite the fact that a 
corporative agency is an agency that behaves like a business entity because it 
has acquired an independent status that subjects it to the same legal regime as 
private firms. Therefore, its provision of service in partnership with national 
government falls outside the context of Public-Private Partnerships. This 
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relationship could rather be described as Public-Public Partnership where the 
South African National Roads Agency is regarded as a public entity in this study.  
An effective partnership should ensure that both sectors (public and private) are 
fully involved in service delivery based on each party’s distinctive competency in 
the area of involvement. For example, in the management of toll roads, the 
concessionaire should ensure that the maintenance of the road is done in 
accordance with the specifications as laid down by the Department of Transport. 
This should be done by way of appointment of an independent engineer by the 
National Roads Agency to perform an oversight on a variety of issues and 
processes. In other words, the engineer would serve as an ombudsman to 
ensure that each party delivers as per specifications contained in the concession 
contract. Accordingly, Stacey (1997:8) points out that "every party to the 
partnership must perform its part". This simply shows the importance of each 
party’s involvement in a Public-Private Partnership arrangement and could 
perform better if well monitored.  
A feature that is worth remembering in a Public-Private Partnership arrangement, 
particularly in the development of infrastructure, is that a private firm should be 
allowed an opportunity to invest its own resources. In as far as South Africa is 
concerned, private parties are responsible for ensuring that the project is 
sustainable by identifying more business opportunities within the given road 
network reserve. In addition, it should also be noted that in a partnership 
arrangement, the risk factor pertaining to the management of a project becomes 
the central theme of discussion before any commencement can take place 
(Gautrain Project Team, 2005). 
Fayard (1999:8) is of the opinion that the risks entailed in a given project vary 
according to how far the project has advanced, and as a rule, such risks become 
smaller over time. Fayard also maintains that all the risks entailed in a project 
should be analysed as closely as possible before the project is started. The 
dictates of efficiency and fairness require that the risk be allocated to those who 
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would benefit most from the operation. The bidding partner who is best able to 
manage a particular form of risk should therefore be elected as a partner. 
2.4.1 Elements to be considered 
There are various elements to be considered if a partnership is to be managed 
successfully. These elements consist of the intention to genuinely participate in 
the project, the desire to strive towards the attainment of a common objective, 
the ability to design an appropriate organisational structure, the capacity to 
demonstrate sensitivity to issues and the ability to assess environmental factors 
(Fayard, 1999:8). 
2.4.1.1 The theory of genuine participation 
There should be genuine participation by both the public and the private sectors 
in the project in order to ensure progress and success. Gildenhuys and Knipe 
(2000:84) emphasise the need for genuine participation by saying "the capacity 
of new employees to undertake the relevant tasks must be built to create 
competency". Genuine participation is important in the sense that it forms one of 
the fundamental pillars of motive forces that makes sure that the transport 
infrastructure project guarantees the creation of employment opportunities. 
Striving towards the attainment of economic development forms another pillar of 
ground motive forces that should ensure that the transport infrastructure project 
becomes a success.  
2.4.1.2 Theory of striving towards a common set of primary objectives 
According to this theory, partners are expected above all else to strive 
purposefully towards the accomplishment of a common set of primary objectives. 
In the case of South Africa, the prevailing primary set of common goals is 
embodied in the theory of Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South 
Africa (ASGISA). This theory is currently implemented under the stewardship of 
the Deputy President (P.M Nqcuka). The philosophy of ASGISA is contained in 
these words, "to halve unemployment and poverty by the year 2014" 
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(Parliamentary Speech delivered by Deputy President P.M Nqcuka, 2006.02.06). 
The implication is that any contracted private sector, for example the 
concessionaire dealing with a road project such as the N3 toll road, should strive 
purposefully and deliberately at maximising employment opportunities during the 
construction and operation phase of the project.  
2.4.1.3 The designing of an appropriate organisational structure 
The design of an appropriate organisational structure philosophy is based on the 
rationale that says, “irrespective of whether it is in the public or private sector, the 
organisation providing the service should be accountable to the people who are 
being served. Mechanisms that enhance accountability to the end user should be 
developed” (Gildenhuys and Knipe 2000:84). Accordingly, it is the strong view of 
the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998:27) that an 
appropriate organisational structure should be put in place prior to the 
commencement of a Public-Private Partnership project that indicates clearly who 
is to be responsible for what type of risk, should the project become stuck. 
2.4.1.4 The need to demonstrate sensitivity 
With respect to experience gained from Hungary, Szabo (1999:11) points out, 
"when a Public-Private Partnership project is implemented on an existing 
motorway section, one has to treat it with the utmost sensitivity and should deal 
with it in an acceptable fashion”. This actually means that there has to be a 
massive public information campaign well in advance of starting toll collection to 
gauge the public mood. The main reason is to sell the idea so as to gauge or to 
minimise any potential resistance to the project as it unfolds. Gildenhuys and 
Knipe (2000:85) support this approach by arguing that “the steps to engage the 
private sector should be taken in such a way that all the stakeholders are aware 
of how it is being done and why. Most importantly, they need to be aware of how 
it is being done and what the benefits will be”. South Africa has applied this 
approach when it executed the N3 Toll Concession as a Public-Private 
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Partnership project (N3TC Technical Report, 1999:13). 
2.4.1.5   The process of environmental impact assessment  
In this context, Szabo (1999:11) points out that "there has to be reliable 
environmental impact studies if a road infrastructure project is to be successfully 
executed". To this end, South Africa adopted the Hungarian approach that 
regards "the environmental impact assessment study as being absolutely 
essential and a project may not commence if that is not done". However, to do 
this rationally and sensitively, it requires an integrated approach by different 
departments so that they all could positively contribute to the successful 
management of the project as pointed out by Flaherty et al. (1997:21).  
Following the adoption of the Hungarian model, South Africa, through the 
provincial government of Gauteng made use of this method when executing "the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the R21 billion 80 km Gautrain rapid 
rail project”. This project forms part of the Gauteng provincial government’s 
ambitious Blue IQ initiative and had to be approved by the Gauteng Department 
of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs (GDACEL) (Media 
Monitoring Service, 2003). 
In Hungary, the local governments are involved from the early phase of a project, 
and South Africa went on to make this legal requirements that are prescribed in 
the National Land Transport Transition Act, Act No. 22 of 2000. Section 10 (13) 
(e) of this Act requires, subject to legislation applicable to local government, that 
transport authorities or governmental structures dealing with transport projects 
“encourage, promote and facilitate public consultation, participation or 
involvement through hearings, seminars and workshops and any other means 
that are appropriate to ensure effective communication with customers, 
communities, organised labour and transport operators”. The Minister may even 
prescribe requirements and procedures in this regard whereby the private party 
is compelled to involve various stakeholders in the execution of projects.  
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2.4.2 Difference in emphasis 
Stacey (1997) outlines the significant difference in emphasis between public and 
the private sector business in respect of the achievement of their primary goals. 
The primary goal of the public authority is to provide services while that of the 
private sector is maximisation of profitability in the long term. It is essential that 
partnership arrangements manage these two conflicting primary goals so that 
business stands a chance of making a profit while the public sector discharges its 
service delivery obligations. If a partnership is to be effective, the objectives of 
both the private sector and public authority need to be integrated. This may be 
made possible by providing an excellent quality service at an affordable cost that 
is also able to generate favourable returns on investment. 
In their research regarding public versus private sector enterprises, Bishop, Kay 
and Meyer, (1994:35-39) advance a theoretical case in this fashion. They 
actually argue that in as far as ownership is concerned, a public sector enterprise 
has traditionally rested on considerations of allocative efficiency while the private 
sector basis its objectives on profit-making tactics. This dichotomy indicates how 
resources are allocated by the two sectors in the economy as a whole. 
Furthermore, what makes sense is the fact that, by contrast, the case for private 
sector ownership rests on the incentives and constraints that the market provides 
to promote efficiency within the firm. This type of efficiency, which is known as 
“technical” or “productive” efficiency, is synonymous with cost minimisation for a 
given level of output.  
Bishop et al. (1994:36) maintain that the traditional approach to public sector 
economics has tacitly assumed that the productive efficiency would be satisfied 
irrespective of the conditions of ownership or competition. Whether this 
assumption actually holds in practice is of crucial importance for two reasons. 
First, allocative efficiency would automatically be violated in the absence of 
productive efficiency. In other words, the latter is a necessary condition for the 
former, whereas the converse is not the case. Second, much of the impetus for 
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Public-Private Partnerships has come from a perception that the public assumes 
that enterprises do not behave in a cost-minimising manner. 
This perception has not been researched in South Africa, thus it would be unwise 
to make conclusive generalisations on it. Some of the reasons suggested by 
Bishop et al. (1994:36-37) as to why a public-sector enterprise might not behave 
in a way which is consistent with cost minimisation are the following:  
• Firstly, there is an absence of a clear-cut profit objective which is the 
overriding goal of private sector enterprise; and 
• Secondly, profit maximisation implies cost minimisation and in the absence 
of the former objective the incentives to pursue the latter will be severely 
blunted.  
While the research conducted by Bishop et al. (1994:83) carries some truth with 
regard to the behaviour of public sector enterprises, particularly as regards failure 
to adhere to cost minimisation, it needs to be pointed out that South Africa has 
taken a giant step in ensuring that public institutions are more efficient and 
effective in minimising the input costs. In terms of the White Paper on Human 
Resource Management in the Public Sector (1997:14), “every employee’s 
performance should be assessed at least once annually against mutually agreed 
objectives. The assessment process should be aimed at identifying strengths and 
weaknesses, in order to recognise and reward good performance, and manage 
poor performance”. This simply shows the narrowing of a gap between the public 
and private sector enterprises in terms of their values and ethics (Department of 
Public Service and Administration, 1997:11). 
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2.5 FORMS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
2.5.1 Introduction 
There are several ways and means by which the private sector could be engaged 
in the public service. In the process of engaging the private sector in any public 
service, the first logical step followed in South Africa was to form the South 
African National Roads Agency Limited. This body was intended as an 
intermediary between the Department of Transport and the Concession 
Company. It should be noted that the public service in this context should not be 
commercialised as a way of freeing it from public accountability and control by 
the legislature. In fact, the public service should remain under control and be 
subjected to public accountability until it can prove itself as a suitable partner to 
enter into Public-Private Partnership agreements within the competitive world of 
the open market system (Gildenhuys, 1993:44). 
2.5.2 Liberalisation and concession agreements 
Control and regulations such as economic regulations (barrier to entry in the 
infrastructure provisioning by the private sector) are adapted or liberalised so as 
to permit more private sector participation. Concession refers to a right granted to 
a contractor for the supply of a public service on behalf of government at a fixed 
price as specified by government in the bidding process (Gildenhuys, 1993:604). 
The World Bank (2002:95), defines a concession as “the granting of an exclusive 
right to provide a service without payment by the authority”. The authority 
referred to in this regard is the South African National Roads Agency Ltd 
(SANRAL) that is currently dealing with making conditions like those of fixing 
tariffs or imposing minimum service requirements. 
However, for the purposes of achieving the main objective of this study, the 
authority sought for dealing with aspects such as tariffs and other service 
requirements should ideally be an economic regulatory authority. In a 
concession, the private firm or concessionaire assumes overall responsibility for 
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service delivery in the form of; inter alia, operation, maintenance, management 
and capital investment for infrastructural extension. The fixed assets associated 
with the service are entrusted to the concessionaire, but remain the property of 
the public authority and have to be returned to it in the same condition at the end 
of a concession period (Stacey 1997:19). This view is supported by the Horizon 
Twenty Ten Strategy (Department of Transport, 1999:26) which states “during 
the concession period the roads are both built and maintained at no cost to the 
State and at the end of the concession period, the State is therefore left with an 
improved asset that is not only of greater value, but also entirely debt free”. 
Concession contracts make provision for concessionaires to be technologically 
innovative as they place more emphasis on output specifications than on input. 
Adding value into the concession contract value chain during the implementation 
phase would mean added benefits or a bonus on the part of the concessionaire. 
Concession contracts usually run for twenty to thirty years (Sader, 2000:21). The 
duration partly depends on the level of investment as well as the payback period 
for the private firm to recoup its investment capital and to make profit on its 
invested money. 
A project such as the Gautrain would have a longer payback period due to its 
considerable size compared to a Public-Private Partnership prison project in 
Louis Trichardt. At the end of a contract, when all works and equipment are 
returned to the public authority, any expense that exceeds income ought to be 
viewed as losses to be incurred by the concessionaire. Penalties in the form of 
fines are imposed if a contractor fails to meet the targets for service coverage or 
quality in the contract. Penalties should be explicitly linked to their causes, and 
should escalate as the breach of contract becomes more serious, Generally, 
penalties are paid not to the public authority but to a regulatory agency, which 
may then use them to redress the deficiencies in question (Gautrain Project 
Team, 2005).  
According to the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa, 
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(Department of Transport, 2002), there has been an effort to transfer some of the 
public risk in road infrastructure development to the private sector. A variety of 
concession contracts are designed in such a way that the risk is eventually 
transferred to the private sector. Such concession contracts involve the Build 
Own Operate (BOO), Build Operate Transfer (BOT), Build Transfer Operate 
(BTO), Rehabilitate Operate Transfer (ROT) and Build Own Operate Transfer 
(BOOT) arrangements or agreements. 
2.5.2.1 Build Own Operate (BOO) 
According to this concession contract, the concessionaire is required to build, 
own and operate the infrastructure. Such concessions typically are on a fixed 
term basis, after which the operating rights can be transferred to other private 
service providers (Sader, (2000:3). The build own operate does not involve the 
transfer of assets back to government (World Bank, 1997:21). This means that 
the assets remain private and this may give investors more protection and 
facilitate the financing of the concession by making these assets available as 
collateral (World Bank, 1997:22)  
In monopolistic sectors, BOOs do not in any way imply permanence. The private 
company has indefinite ownership rights to the assets. To be allowed to provide 
service, it typically needs an operating license, which the government may 
withdraw, revoke or not renew at any time. When a license is terminated, ten 
year’s notice is given to the license holder. A license can be revoked at any time 
for non-compliance (World Bank, 1997:22). 
2.5.2.2 Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
Yescombe (2007:8) asserts that the concept of Build Operate and Transfer 
contract was first developed in Turkey. Under this contract, private investors 
finance and build roads at their own risk, operate them for an agreed period, and 
then transfer ownership to the public sector (Hakim, Seidenstat and Bowman, 
1996). According to Sader (2000:3), Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) contracts 
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are the most common form of private greenfield investments in infrastructure. 
Under such an arrangement, a private company or consortium typically forms a 
project company based on the right to build or rebuild a facility and to operate it 
for a fixed time period. This view is confirmed by Delmon, (2005) whose opinion 
is that the concessionaire enters into a contract with a construction entity to 
construct and operate the infrastructure. Estache and De Rus (2000:253) 
stresses that the public sector retains legal ownership and regulatory oversight of 
the concession contract. Based on Estache and De Rus’s thinking, it would be 
justified to have a transport economic regulatory authority to have regulatory 
oversight on concession contracts.  
According to the view of Binnington (1998:36) as noted in Construction World, 
February 1998, the Build Operate Transfer projects are currently fashionable in 
South Africa, and an added dimension is government’s drive to develop 
previously disadvantaged individuals (PDI). Binnington further mentions that 
public sector departments are increasingly awarding contracts to companies that 
have a PDI component in an attempt to expose this sector to public income. The 
system offers an opportunity for entrepreneurs to get involved in the 
infrastructure growth of the country. 
An appropriate example where BOT is applied is the N3 corridor where the Toll 
Concession Company, that is N3TC, has signed a 30-year concession contract 
with the South African National Roads Agency Ltd. The contractual agreement 
allows the concessionaire to build, operate and transfer the road infrastructure 
back to government after a period of 30 years (N3 Project Information 
Memorandum, 1998). A concession agreement that applies the Build Operate 
and Transfer appears to be the right option to be applied in South Africa, simply 
because it is long term and would have the potential to attract long-term 
investors. When the infrastructure is transferred back to government after a 
period of 30 years, it shall have appreciated and would reflect favourably on 
government’s asset register. 
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The expected condition of the project assets on expiry of the Public-Private 
Partnership agreement must be agreed with the private party and provided for in 
the agreement. Should the public sector require using the project assets even 
after the expiry of the contract then provision should be made for transfer of 
possession. At the signature date, the parties should agree which project assets 
will be required by the agency at the end of the project term. If the project assets 
are to be transferred to the Agency on the expiry date, they should be in a 
condition where they have some remaining useful life. This is intended to enable 
the Agency to provide the services. The assets therefore should have some 
residual value at the expiry date. 
Residual value refers to the market value of the project assets or the duration for 
which those assets can still be used after expiry date of the agreement. The 
residual value required will vary from project to project. It is also often not 
feasible or practical to have one standard that applies to all the project assets as 
a result of their varying nature and purpose.  
The PPP agreement should accordingly provide for a procedure to be followed 
prior to the expiry date in order to determine the condition of the project assets 
and to establish whether the private party has complied with the obligations in 
relation to the condition of the assets. A procedure has to be agreed upon 
whereby a survey is conducted to examine the assets.  
2.5.2.3    Build Transfer and Operate (BTO) 
According to Sader (2000:3), a new facility is built on a turnkey basis with private 
capital, and the ownership title is transferred to the host government after 
completion of construction. The private contractor operates the facility for a fixed 
term under a separate agreement. A build Transfer Operate (BTO) is used in 
California, where its aim is to reduce the risk to private operators of public liability 
claims. Under BTO, the state takes formal title to the privately built facility and 
then leases it back for private sector operation. 
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2.5.2.4    Rehabilitate Operate and Transfer (ROT) 
This is the same contractual arrangement as a BOT, but is used for the 
rehabilitation of an existing facility rather than the construction of a new one 
(Sader, 2000:4). A Rehabilitate Operate and Transfer (ROT) require a contractor 
to repair and operate a public owned facility, which is transferred back to the 
public sector (Stacey, 1997: 20). It is sometimes used to describe concessions in 
which investment entail primarily rehabilitation rather than construction (World 
Bank, 1997:21). 
2.5.2.5    Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT) 
Sader (2000:3) argues that Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) provides that a 
project company finances the building of an infrastructure facility and operates it 
for a fixed period, after which the ownership of the assets is transferred to the 
host government. Stacey (1997:2) is of the view that BOOT entails a 
comparatively long period of ownership before transfer. In all these cases, the 
duration of the contract is almost exactly the period needed to retire the debts 
that the contract incurs, and to provide a return to quality investors.  
2.5.3 Lease contracts 
A lease is a contract that provides a right to the use of the assets, legally owned 
by the lessor, in exchange for a specified rental paid by the lessee (Correia, 
Flynn, Uliana and Wormald, 1993:663). According to Stacey (1997:18), a lessee 
rents state-owned facilities for a period, and is responsible for its own expense 
for the operation, maintenance and management functions associated with such 
functions. The lessee derives its revenue from the tariffs, which is also charged 
with the collecting, and apart from contractually specified maintenance 
commitments, has no obligation to invest in the infrastructure. The public 
authority, who remains the sole owner of the assets, is responsible for capital 
expenditure for a new project, replacement of major works, any debts servicing, 
as well as setting tariffs and cost recovery policies. The lease and operator 
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contracts are shorter than the greenfield BOTs or concessions. The government 
reserves the right to terminate the contract before the end of its normal term 
(World Bank, 1997:22). 
The problem with the lease contract is that while they confer responsibilities for 
the operation and maintenance on the one hand, and for investment on the other, 
on different entities. These responsibilities are sometimes hard to distinguish 
(Sader, 2000:3). Difficulties may therefore arise in co-coordinating investment 
decisions and operating needs, prompting a fractious relationship between 
lessee and public authorities over performance problems. To mitigate these 
problems, lessees should be involved as much as possible in planning capital 
expenditure. Furthermore, such involvement is necessary, because budget cuts 
can lead to deterioration in the quality of infrastructure, with implications for the 
performance efficiency for the operator. 
Lease contracts usually entail public authority commitment to a tariff structure 
that least covers the cost of operation and maintenance, and private sector 
consent to a rental fee sufficient to service debts and finance part of investment 
programmes. Lease contracts usually provide automatic periodic revisions of 
rental, but with a certain price index formula to protect consumers. 
Lease contracts can be medium or long-term lasting from five to twenty years. 
These contracts also set penalties for poor performance. Contractors put up 
security deposits that the public authority can call in if performance is 
unacceptable. Apart from this, private firms assume quite limited risk under lease 
contracts. As a low risk option, leases often attract stiff competition from 
interested partners, which benefit the public authority (Stacey, 1997). 
Kerf et al., (1998:17) argue that in a lease, as we use the term, the 
concessionaire is paid no fee by the government. The concessionaire’s profits 
depend directly on the operating profits of the firm. Operating risk is thus fully 
transferred to the concessionaire. The government still maintains responsibility 
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for investment and thus bears investment risk. Based on Kerf’s argument, a 
lease agreement could be the right contractual agreement to be applied in South 
Africa in the sense that it encourages the concessionaire to adopt an 
entrepreneurial approach in the management of toll roads. This is evidenced by 
the fact that government does not pay any concession fee and the operating risk 
is completely transferred to the concessionaire. The implementation of this 
strategy in the toll roads industry would need government to build capacity in the 
field of entrepreneurship so as to enable concessionaires to manage all types of 
risks. 
2.6 OPPORTUNITIES IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
According to Sader (2000), the South African government, just like any other 
government, is showing increasing interest in concessions or build operate and 
transfer mechanisms in the national road network. The aim is that this could give 
rise to opportunities particularly where the National Roads Agency plans a route, 
which would then be offered to a construction or financing group to do the 
construction and operation. The experience learned from other countries such as 
Rwanda is that it becomes advantageous to government if the initial project cost 
is being funded completely from revenue subsequently generated by tolls applied 
to the roads (World Bank, 2005:16). This confirms the research study conducted 
by Noulton (1999:4), who asserts that the concessionaire needs to repay his/her 
costs, achieve his/her allowed profit and hand the project over to the public 
sector six years before the end of the concession period. By so doing, the 
government thus gains income that would be spent on motorway improvements.  
The main thrust of triggering opportunities in the Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement involves what may be termed the sharing of productive resources 
between the public and private sectors. Currently, South Africa has a variety of 
activities falling under the public sector on all three levels of government. This 
refers to activities, such as law enforcement, which could be done better if 
members of the community along the road infrastructure corridor are involved. If 
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combating crimes, such as fighting against car hijackers, could be shared by both 
public and private sectors, then there is no doubt that government could 
gradually reduce the negative publicity that is currently marring the image of the 
toll roads. 
2.7 POTENTIAL INVESTORS’ EXPECTATIONS 
Investors are keen to know what entities are responsible for providing approvals 
and against which criteria. This knowledge is essential for effective co-ordination 
within government, but it is also important to guide and give confidence to 
potential investors (Kerf et al., 1998:24) In his research, Sader (2000:24), 
identified potential investors’ expectations in terms of operating profitably, finding 
reliable partners, diversifying risk, reducing uncertainty, existence of a stable 
legal framework and avoiding contingent liabilities. 
2.7.1 Operating profitably 
The main sponsors of private sector infrastructure projects are typically large 
consortia of companies with proven experience in the operation of such projects. 
The primary goal of the consortium is to establish an infrastructure operation that 
will allow such a consortium to generate profit by providing services in a 
reasonably predictable environment. If conditions appear to be favourable, then 
potential investors would be quite willing to invest. Driven by commercial 
principles, they have a strong incentive to provide the agreed upon services as 
efficiently as possible (Sader, 2000:24-25). 
2.7.2 Finding reliable partners 
Infrastructure projects tend to be too big to be financed by one investing firm 
alone. In addition, because of the unique political nature and technical complexity 
of such projects, investors typically want to share the risk rather than carry it 
alone. The main sponsor will have to identify partners who can furnish additional 
technical expertise and support for financing, construction and maintenance. 
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Project completion and future operation are critically dependent on the reliability 
of all partners involved. Rules that impose limitations on the types of potential 
partners, such as a requirement to find a domestic partner or to integrate a state-
owned enterprise, are often a matter of concern to sponsors and can damage the 
viability of the project (Sader, 2000:25). 
2.7.3 Diversifying risk 
Infrastructure projects present unusual risks. Commercial risks include the timely 
construction and technical performance of the facilities, as well as the quantity 
and quality of the service provided. Political risks may result from decisions taken 
by public authorities that shape the business environment. Sponsors are keen on 
distributing these risks to the parties best equipped to deal with them. Sponsors 
want to insulate themselves from risks that are independent of their own 
performance and beyond their control (Sader, 2000:25). Based on the 
experience learned from the concessioning process underwent by the N3TC, it is 
evident that lenders want to be comfortable that any potential risk that would face 
shareholders need to be diversified if possible.  
2.7.4 Reducing uncertainty 
The profitability of a project is critically dependent upon the future environment 
for the private enterprise. Uncertainty about entry or market rights will affect 
sponsor expectations about profitability. In some cases, investors will want 
specific exclusivity periods that will allow them to recoup their initial investment, 
and the government will have to determine whether such an extraordinary 
measure is warranted. Similarly, the pricing of services is a key issue, particularly 
when service provisions involve retail customers or where direct competition is 
not feasible. Investors are looking for a clear and sensible regulatory and 
contractual framework, with specific rules on adjusting tariff rates (Sader, 
2000:25). According to Kessides (2004:3), investors demand cost-reflective 
tariffs before they will commit their capital in a toll road project. 
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In trying to meet the demands of investors, the N3TC had to change its toll 
strategy by moving away from the concept of a fixed rate per kilometre and a 
fixed ratio between vehicle classes to the concept of toll rates based upon the 
perceived benefit of using the toll road. According to this strategy, a toll rate or 
tariff is set for each vehicle class at each toll plaza based upon the perceived 
benefit which takes into account the cost savings. 
2.7.5 The existence of a stable legal framework 
A legal framework is referred by Yescombe (2007:31) as a specific law relating to 
the project or to concessions in general and would allow a private sector 
company to charge and collect revenues from users for providing a public-sector 
service. This framework is essential because the private infrastructure projects 
are too contract-intensive, and the long term horizon of most of these projects 
increases the danger of contractual disputes. Sponsors want to be reasonably 
confident that any such dispute can be solved fairly, whether through the 
domestic judicial system or by means of arbitration (Sader, 2000:26). With regard 
to the N3 toll concession contract, the lenders had to make sure that there is 
sufficient comfort regarding the existence of a legal framework pertaining to the 
monitoring of overloading. It was therefore a requirement that the concessionaire 
provide a plan for providing weigh-in motion stations or roving weigh stations 
along the highway at locations to be agreed with the National Roads Agency. 
According to Fayard (2001:6), Public-Private Partnership initiatives in countries 
such as Austria, Spain, France and Italy have made investors to assess various 
alternatives before coming with a well thought rational decision of choice. Sader 
(2000) argues that it is important for investors to assess their government’s 
attitude in terms of real commitment for promoting the philosophy of Public-
Private Partnerships. French Public-Private Partnerships are in support of the 
fact that government still retains control after the asset had been sold. 
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2.8 PRINCIPLES FOR ROAD CONCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Kerf et al. (1998:21) argue that the interface between government and the private 
sector is the key to the success of private infrastructure arrangements. 
Governments need to perform numerous tasks when planning, designing, 
implementing and regulating concessions. Guiding principles for improved 
operations in a concession arrangement are outlined by Kerf et al. (1998:21), as 
transparency in government processes. It is strongly felt that lack of transparency 
would increase uncertainty for investors and developers and thus multiply costs 
or stop projects from going ahead. 
Governments should try to implement the following principles in order to improve 
the way they manage concessions. 
• Effective co-ordination of relevant government policies and approvals. For 
example, there should be effective inter and intra-governmental 
communication. The road project should involve all affected provinces and 
municipalities; 
• Clarification of roles and responsibilities with respect to private investors. It 
is important to make sure that the private sector is given explicit terms of 
reference regarding their responsibilities to be executed; and 
• Acquiring access to the expertise needed to design and implement complex 
transactions. It is advantageous to ensure that access to innovative skills is 
unhindered throughout the concession period. An interview with National 
Roads Agency officials in 2002 revealed that there is a critical need to 
engage diverse skills in the road infrastructure strategic management.  
The design and implementation of concessions require the co-ordination of 
several governmental actors precisely because the necessary approval or the 
granting of guarantees is required before the project could proceed. When 
government does not co-ordinate all relevant factors effectively, it risks sending 
mixed signals to private investors and causing delays, either of which can deter 
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investors or increase development costs substantially. Investors are naturally 
expected to want to know what entities are responsible for providing approvals 
and against which criteria. This knowledge is essential for effective co-ordination 
within government, but it is also important to guide and give confidence to 
potential investors. In addition, it is a prerequisite for transparent approval and 
bidding procedures. 
Governments need expertise in a range of new areas to design and implement 
concessions. In addition to the technical engineering requirements of particular 
projects, new skills need to be acquired in the areas of financing, regulating, and 
marketing to potential investors and consumers. Inadequate expertise in these 
areas can prevent the establishment of mutually beneficial and sustainable 
private infrastructure arrangements. 
In most cases, private ownership may be expected to produce better 
performance than the public ownership of a commercialised entity. Private 
ownership would be likely to provide more effective monitoring and commercial 
incentive for the firm because its operations are based on the principles of 
efficiency and effectiveness as a means of making profit. 
European countries such as Spain, Australia, Portugal, France, Norway, and Italy 
consider it impossible and inappropriate to provide a motorway expansion 
without the involvement of the private sector. The private sector was sought in 
the area of financing, construction and operation. During the search for an 
appropriate method of financing, design, construction and maintenance, certain 
basic principles had to be formulated for use in a quest to realise Public-Private 
Partnership participation eventually. The committee of ministers responsible for 
the introduction of Public-Private Partnerships into the South African economic 
milieu formulated the following principles (Kerf et al., 1998:22). 
i) The National Roads Agency needs to receive a request before awarding 
the actual concession to the winning private entrepreneurs. Such a 
concession should cover a specific section of a national road to do 
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activities such as the following: 
• financing; 
• construction; 
• maintenance; 
• rehabilitation; and 
• operation. 
ii) The concessionaires’ rewards for the financing, construction, 
maintenance, rehabilitation and operation of the road should be in the 
form of the right to collect toll fees on these roads. 
iii) The concession should be granted a period of 25 years, renewable for a 
period of 25 years following the original period by way of negotiation and 
the payment of a certain fee determined according to a formula. 
iv) The state should use its expropriation right in order to secure for the 
concessionaire free access to and right over the land and the air space 
above it. Free access may be required to enable the concessionaire to 
discharge its obligation and to exploit its right fully as contemplated in the 
agreement between the parties. 
v) The state should continue to provide social services such as ambulance, 
fire and police services. The concessionaire should provide assistance 
with regard to the implementation of all traffic laws and regulations and 
should make available proper facilities to police and traffic officers 
required for implementing such laws and regulations. 
vi) The state should undertake that no new major alternative roads are 
constructed that would adversely affect the toll revenue of the road or any 
section thereof unless the need for such roads arises and the 
concessionaire is unable to satisfy such need. 
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vii) In addition to the financing, construction, maintenance, rehabilitation and 
operation of the road, the concessionaire should also provide reasonable 
amenities such as filling stations, breakdown services, means of 
communication such as telephones, rest of service areas and restaurants 
and other facilities that are required for the operation of the road. 
viii) The toll levied on the road concern should be calculated by way of a 
formula to be stipulated in the agreement between the two parties. 
ix) The state should permit the deduction from the income of the company, of 
certain allowances (Kerf et al., 1998:23). 
 
2.9 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ROADS 
In terms of the roles and responsibilities pertaining to the strategic management 
of the roads infrastructure in South Africa, Figure 2.2 has been designed to give 
a brief illustration. It is clear from Figure 2.2 that the policy formulation, planning 
and ownership of infrastructure fall under the public sector. However, where a 
Public-Private Partnership arrangement is agreed upon, the maintenance, 
funding and operation of the road infrastructure fall under the private sector.  
2.9.1 Policy formulation 
In the policy formulation process pertaining to road infrastructure, it is important 
to note that the Department of Transport, through its South African National 
Roads Agency, takes the responsibility. In compliance with the National Land 
Transport Transition Act, Act No 22 of 2000 (Republic of South Africa, 2000), the 
Department of Transport involves stakeholders such as the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government, the provincial and municipal roads 
departments (Department of Transport, 2002:7). 
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Figure 2.2: Roles and responsibilities in the management of road infrastructure 
Adapted from the World Bank, 2005:17 
♦    Area of responsibility 
    Input from stakeholders 
    Area of influence 
    Returning infrastructure to government 
The policy on toll roads has evolved over an extended period without an 
opportunity for an independent review of its appropriateness and effectiveness in 
the current socio-economic circumstances in South Africa. It is opportune to re-
examine the approach to toll roads, particularly the balance between agency-
managed toll roads and concessioned toll roads (Department of Transport, 
2002:98). This model is intended for application in the transport infrastructure 
and the rationale is to make a distinction of responsibilities assigned to various 
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parties in respect of policy formulation, planning, maintenance, ownership, 
funding and operations. 
2.9.2 Planning 
Prior to the establishment of the National Roads Agency in 1998, the Department 
of Transport’s Road Board had direct responsibility in the maintenance of main 
roads. Under the government’s decentralisation policy, the responsibility for 
maintaining the national road network has been transferred from the Department 
of Transport to the National Roads Agency. The strategic planning of toll roads is 
done by the National Roads Agency with substantial input from various 
stakeholders, such as the community, private sector, municipal government and 
provincial authorities. (See Figure 2.2). 
2.9.3 Maintenance 
According to the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa, 
(Department of Transport, 2002:12), there has been an effort to transfer some of 
the public risk in road infrastructure development to the private sector, as 
evidenced by trends such as Build Operate and Transfer and Design Construct 
and Maintain. In South Africa, maintenance work is outsourced under similar 
contracts.  
Based on the research study conducted by the World Bank (2005:16), the 
maintenance of paved roads in Rwanda is now carried out by the private sector 
under national competitive tender arrangements. Local communities undertake 
simple paved road maintenance activities, such as clearing verges and drains, 
under the supervision of the Directorate of Roads. 
Figure 2.2 shows that road maintenance in South Africa is done by the private 
sector and this should be seen as encompassing members of the community to 
ensure that they benefit from road infrastructure projects. This would also benefit 
the public sector as such community structures would take moral ownership of 
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the project and co-operate in the strategic management of future events. 
2.9.4 Ownership 
According to the World Bank (2005:16), the entire road network in Rwanda is 
state-owned. In the case of South Africa, the ownership of road networks also 
rests with the public sector, i.e. South African National Roads Agency Ltd. The 
private sector only acquires the right to utilise the infrastructure for a specific 
period of time in the form of concession contracts. Concession contracts are 
done on a Build Operate and Transfer basis and this is shown in Figure 2.2 by 
means of arrows pointing towards the public sector side. 
2.9.5 Funding 
In Rwanda, funding for road maintenance is provided through that country’s 
Roads Maintenance Fund (RMF), which was established as a road fund. Income 
to the fund is derived from a charge on fuel, a toll on foreign vehicles, an axle-
load charge, penalties for vehicle overloading, and road damage compensation 
respectively, plus, in principle, a government contribution (World Bank, 2005:17).  
In the case of South Africa, particularly with respect to toll roads, the principle is 
that of providing a road with a superior level of service for users willing to pay 
more for that service. From a user perspective, the normal road user charges 
(i.e. fuel levy, registration and licensing fees, etc) are argued as being for the use 
of non-toll primary and secondary roads. The additional toll fee is said to be for 
the additional level of service provided by the toll road (Department of Transport, 
2002:99). 
2.9.6 Operations 
The re-organisation of government in 1994 has resulted in a greater distinction 
being drawn between policy formulation, planning and operation. The general 
consensus is that operation or service delivery is best provided by the private 
sector, partly in response to governmental reforms and demands 
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for greater cost effectiveness (Department of Transport, 2002:12). From Figure 
2.2, it can be deduced that operation is the exclusive domain of the private 
sector, which characterises the current South African situation. 
2.10 GENERAL POINTS IN CONCESSION AGREEMENTS 
According to the N3 Project Information Memorandum (1997), a concession is 
defined in contractual terms as an agreement, which specifies the responsibility 
and rights of the concessionaire. It generally comprises the following points: 
• motorway construction programme; 
• duration of the concession; 
• technical characteristics of the motorway, such as design, speed, cross 
section, longitudinal slope, minimum horizontal and vertical radii, road signs 
and markings  
• criteria for the design, construction maintenance and operation of the 
motorway; 
• procedure by which the state can control the performance of the 
concessionaire in all phases of the concession period; and  
• toll rates and criteria at all phases of the concession, always taking 
cognisance of the initially approved financial plan. 
The agreement should further provide for the creation of a State Supervisory 
Board, which will have the responsibility of controlling the correct implementation 
of the agreement, and to whom the management of the concessionaire would in 
future present the financial accounts at pre-agreed intervals. Policy decisions 
would be subjected to the approval of such an established control board. The 
board should be constituted in such a way that it would have at least one 
representative from the concessionaire and three or four representatives from 
government departments. 
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2.11 INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
The role of the public sector is paramount in ensuring that basic and essential 
services are accessible to the consumers. Access to essential services 
represents one of the basic fundamental conditions of what is generally regarded 
as a decent life founded on the principle of the respect for the environment. 
Essential services could include inter alia daily public transportation services (La 
Lettre de I’isted 2003:2). However, when taking into consideration the 
international historical experience regarding the issue of toll roads, it is evident 
that toll roads remain the basic infrastructure for the facilitation of daily 
transportation services. Therefore it is reasonable to demand that the system of 
Public-Private Partnerships be introduced and encouraged in the form that is 
usually referred to as turnpike, because it is effective in ensuring high quality 
service. 
Two variations of toll roads exist and these are mainline toll plaza and entry/exit 
tolls. On a mainline toll system, all vehicles stop at various locations along the 
highway to pay a toll. While this may save money from the lack of need to 
construct tolls at every exit, it can also cause traffic congestions, and drivers 
could evade tolls by going around them. With entry/exit tolls, vehicles collect a 
ticket when entering the highway, which displays the fares it will pay when it 
exits. Upon exit, the driver pays the amount listed for the given exit. Should the 
ticket be lost en-route, the driver would then pay the maximum amount possible 
for travel on the particular highway. Modern toll roads often use the combination 
of the two, with various entry and exit tolls supplemented by occasional mainline 
tolls. 
The term turnpiking is an English word derived from the concept stretched spike 
or spear, implying that when constructing roads of this type, one should ensure 
that such roads are efficiently managed so as to satisfy the users willing to pay 
for them. The concept has been used in various countries such as the United 
States of America, Italy, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Japan 
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and Mexico. This in a way proves its popularity, and hopefully South Africa would 
take a closer look into it with the objective of adopting it. 
In as far as the regulatory environment is concerned, it needs to be outlined that 
in any Public-Private Partnership, it becomes imperative that the legal 
environment under which the concessions are granted be clearly structured. This 
may require general enabling legislation or can be achieved through specific 
concession arrangements. Whichever approach is selected, the arrangements 
must make responsibilities of the different parties clear and that is why it is 
important that regulatory intervention be considered. The focus of the study in 
this Public-Private Partnership arrangement is to unearth whether the regulatory 
authority needs to exercise its authority and responsibilities over prices, 
competition rules as well as rules pertaining to concession contract 
specifications. Annexure 2 has been specifically formulated to show how different 
countries went on in the execution of Public –Private Partnerships. 
2.11.1 United States of America 
Kerf et al. (1998:12) are of the view that most of the public transit systems built in 
the late nineteenth century were privately owned as were many roads. The 
privately owned and operated roads supported by user fees came into being 
during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Many roads were built and 
maintained by state-chartered turnpike companies partly as a result of 
competition from canals and railroads. 
The most traditional means of managing toll roads in the United States is through 
semi-autonomous public authorities. New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia manage 
their toll roads in this manner. While most of the toll roads in California, 
Delaware, Florida, Texas, and Virginia are operating under the BOT 
arrangement, a few of the older toll roads in these states are still operated by the 
public authorities.  
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Bell and Head (1994:99) in their discussion, state that "in 1980, the United States 
of America (USA) had already begun with the restructuring of its transport 
sector”. This entailed the reduction of the public sector in operational issues as 
well as the deregulation of the transport industry. In as far as the transport 
industry is concerned, the USA has a strong tradition that road users should pay 
for the use of the roads. Hence, as far back as the 1980s, it was deemed 
essential by the USA government under President Reagan that all the revenues 
from the road user charges should be dedicated to the improvement of the roads.  
The history of the highway system in the United States is characterised by a 
steady flow of research and technological development that derives from and 
also supports the national and local highway needs since the 19th century. With 
such research activity taking place on an ongoing basis, the concept of Public-
Private Partnerships was propounded and eventually adopted by the government 
of the United States of America, a century after Great Britain had already 
commenced.  
Presently, there are more or less 88 turnpikes owned and operated by state or 
local authorities as self-financing entities. The critical point is that the turnpike 
system does not allow government to collect tolls but only allows the private 
sector to do so because it is the private sector that carries out the construction, 
maintenance and operation of toll roads. The private sector does so with its own 
staff and also pays and equips state police seconded to the toll authority. 
Parallel to the concept of Public-Private Partnership gaining momentum in the 
road infrastructure and thus becoming popular, we find that the passenger rail 
sector too was busy making good strides in enticing Public-Private Partnerships 
to its businesses. In this context, an American rail company known as Amtrak 
was able to receive over half of a billion dollars per year in subsidies. Although 
things appeared to become stable at first, Amtrak later on however became 
embroiled in difficulties due to obsolete equipment, strong union opposition, and 
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difficulties in contracting out services (Hakim et al., 1996:20-21). 
Despite the above shortcomings, it should however be emphasised that it would 
be folly if not outright naïve to expect Public-Private Partnerships to operate 
without problems. Even in developed countries such as the USA, there have 
been instances of failure, such as the Dulles Greenway in the USA (Hakim et al., 
1996:21). Based on this experience, South Africa should be wise when designing 
its own Public-Private Partnership arrangements. Any arrangement agreed upon 
should ensure that the financial risk should at all costs be apportioned to the 
party suited to bear such risk. Currently in South Africa as matters stand, the 
concession agreements are based on traffic forecasts over the project's life and 
are rationalised on a scenario of long-term growth. 
While it appears that the majority is always optimistic about future projections, 
the impact of AIDS on population growth as well as exogenous political events on 
the economy most likely cast a shadow of doubt in some instances. Projections 
are not very reliable to give an absolute future scenario because of their fluidity, 
which sometime may result in harsher terms being adopted in order to 
compensate for perceived higher risk (Department of Transport, 2002:98-99). 
When taking the Latin American situation into consideration, it has been 
discovered that regulatory reform has not only implied a new set of rules but an 
in-depth review of the way government traditionally think about regulation. Thus 
the reform effort appears to have not been an easy task because of the fact that 
the traditional role of governments in the area of the provision of infrastructure 
gave ministries and public officials a full discretionary and active role in setting 
regulations. 
Be it as it may, it is still found that regulation is limited to enacting administrative 
and legal rules and procedures, and is viewed as an administrative endeavour 
involving discretion and political will. It implies that the long-term sustainability of 
private sector arrangements would depend on our ability to successfully build 
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new and appropriate regulatory institutions. Importantly, we should be reminded 
that institutional reform does not exclude nor substitute the most important task 
of allowing the markets to promote and preserve competition.  
Consequently, the extent of regulatory risk and the impact of regulatory practices 
in terms of sustainable private involvement in infrastructure should be made to 
revolve around and depend on the modalities of the chosen contractual 
arrangement. In this regard, the structure of the specific sector and the possible 
role the market competition would play should be remembered, as this would 
also influence the choice of regulatory regime, the instruments to be adopted and 
finally the appropriate form of regulatory intervention (Basanes et al., 1999:25). 
 
In the final analysis, what is remarkable about the United States of America is 
that regulatory agencies are much more independent from policy-makers and 
cover all sectors and have their own sources of funding. They also rely on this 
funding to sub-contract activities for which skills are required that they do not 
have in-house. 
2.11.2 Italy 
There are twenty-two concession-holding companies, all of which are majority-
owned by public bodies or local authorities. The largest of these is Austostrada, 
which manages 52 percent of toll freeways. The concession scheme adopted by 
companies is that of Build Operate and Transfer and is valid for a period of 30-35 
years. The loan is guaranteed by the state and the road is handed back to the 
state at the end of the concession period (Nankani, 1993:44). In the opinion of 
Fayard (2001:3), “Italy uses a direct payment system, whereby the user pays for 
using the road in the form of a toll”. 
Estache and De Rus (2000:245) point out that in Italy more than 20 
concessionaires have built more than 5,000 kilometers of toll roads. The largest 
of the Italian concessionaires, Autostrade, operates most of the highway network. 
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A similar toll system like the one in France is in place in Italy. An all inclusive fee 
can be made at the start of the journey or section tolls can be paid at points 
along the way. 
In his study of Public-Private Partnership, Nankani (1993:46) discovered that the 
Institute for Industrial Reconstruction was set up in Italy during the 1930s. The 
Institute became one of the major holding companies for state-owned enterprises 
and controlled more or less 500 companies. It employed 500 000 people 
representing 4 percent of total employment in Italy at the time. Findings from 
Nankani's study show that Public-Private Partnerships have the potential to be 
used as catalysts to generate employment in South Africa. 
2.11.3 France 
At the International Symposium on Road Pricing held in Florida in 2003, Lecoffre 
outlined that France covers a total area of 550,000 square kilometres and has a 
total population of 60 million. The country has more than 50 years of toll road 
concession experience. This is confirmed by Yescombe (2007:43) who alludes to 
the fact that in France, concessions for public infrastructure dates back from the 
middle of the 17th century. Through their research studies, Kerf et al. (1998:11) 
indicate that the transport infrastructure is a private sector's responsibility and it is 
therefore concerned with the construction and operation of national roads in 
France. Furthermore, in this research study, it was found that as early as the 
seventeenth century the king concessioned roads, bridges and canals. The 
approach followed with respect to the concessioning of utilities such as rail and 
electricity had to be preceded by the development of Concession frameworks 
(Yescombe, 2007:43). The entrepreneurs building such roads, bridges and 
canals had to bear the market risk and they were tasked with the collection of 
tolls in return for maintaining the routes. 
In 1955, a law was passed in France authorising the creation of state owned toll 
road companies and the right to levy tolls to finance the construction, 
maintenance and operation of highways. Public control was maintained by 
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granting concessions only to local public organisations, the then chamber of 
commerce or a mixed company in which a public interest held a majority of 
shares. Borrowing from the French experience, South Africa has also drafted a 
legal framework on infrastructure that would serve as a frame of reference in 
issues related to expropriation. In terms of the organisational profile of the 
bidding consortia, it would be advisable to ensure that various stakeholders, such 
as the National Federation Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), are taken on 
board.  
When analysing Public-Private Partnerships within the South African context, 
after having analysed the French approach, it is evident that the concessionaire 
has to bear the market risk. The toll income collected from road users should be 
used to maintain such toll roads so that there would be value accruing to the road 
user in terms of a better quality road infrastructure.  
2.11.3.1 The National Roads Agency (French Experience) 
The French experience shows that there has to be the setting up of an agency to 
facilitate a concession contract with the concessionaire. The main agencies 
involved in France were the Road and Highway Administration under the 
Department of Transportation and Budget and Treasury Administrations under 
the Department of Finance. The role of the French government evolves from 
shareholder to regulatory authority. The French government has an important 
role in setting toll rates. In 2003, the French government had 5,000 miles of toll 
roads concessions and 4,500 miles were operated by 6 mainly publicly owned 
companies while 500 miles were operated by a private company known as Cofiroute  
(International Symposium on Road Pricing 2003). What needs noting is that the 
creation of an agency responsible for acting as a road network operator makes it 
impossible to identify cost and income and to increase efficiency. This is done by 
passing bureaucratic rules and regulations and stimulating a degree of 
competition (Transportation Research Board, 1993:13). 
The provision of public services by an independent body either public or 
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private rather than the government authority offers a number of advantages such 
as the following: 
• it becomes possible to increase the funds available for investment in 
highways by having access to private capital markets;  
• a government policy for toll roads could also use capital markets by issuing 
bonds backed by toll income; 
• it becomes more effective in the event of where a specialised agency is 
used; and 
• the company does not need to be a private company in order to be 
effective.  
The analysis of the French approach to Public-Private Partnership is that both 
the publicly owned and private companies are able to access funds from the 
private capital market. Concessioning has proved itself to be the best means for 
allocating resources, not only for construction but also for maintenance of 
highways. It provides an organisational framework that guarantees highway 
maintenance and operation. The establishment of an agency allows for 
benchmarking. This refers to a comparison of performance across different 
concessionaire firms. This benchmarking process has been implemented in 
France for concessionaires operating in partnership with an agency 
(Transportation Research Board, 1997:13).  
2.11.4 United Kingdom 
When examined closely, the United Kingdom is found to be an urban society with 
around 90 percent of the population living in urban areas. From this perspective, 
rural residents are minority transport users with little consequences on the usage 
of toll roads. From the mid-nineteenth century until the First World War, railways 
continued to dominate the transport scene in Britain although the first motorised 
bus appeared on British roads in 1898. It was not until the First World War that 
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transport began to make a major contribution to the national transport system 
(Barke, 1986:65).  
Barke (1986) goes further to say roads began as trails running from high ground 
to fordable points on river or seaports. The Roman occupation of Britain resulted 
in the construction of four main roads, principally for military communication, and 
numerous minor roads were constructed. In the nineteenth century, toll roads 
were abandoned mainly because of the rioting and burning down of tollgates. 
Subsequently, toll financing, until very recently, has been confined to large 
bridges and tunnels. The construction of these structures was funded from 
government loans and subsidies, as well as capital market loans obtained by 
local authorities. 
According to Fayard (2001:3), in the financing of toll roads, payment could be 
made by the public authority under the name "shadow toll" or Design Build, 
Finance and Operate (DBFO). According to this system, government 
remunerates the company that has concession rights. This is principally done on 
the basis of the traffic realised on the motorway. Portugal and Greece are also 
considering the utilisation of this system. 
In terms of the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa, 
(Department of Transport, 2002:17), roads in the United Kingdom are 
categorised as national or local roads. The national and trunk roads are funded 
by central government (Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
(DETR). The central department is not involved in operations and its 
responsibilities include setting policies and objectives and developing 
performance indicators. The National Roads Policy Directorate (NRPD) provides 
an overview of policy options for the national roads policy and acts as a client for 
the Highways Agency. A Technical Advisors Group provides technical services to 
local and central governments and to the agencies. 
While the above is the case in the United Kingdom, in England, which forms part 
of the United Kingdom, the Highways Agency (HA) which is an executive agency 
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of the DETR, manages, maintains and improves the national road network on 
behalf of the secretary of state. This Agency works closely with local authorities 
in order to integrate the trunk road network with other roads. In the case of South 
Africa, the National Roads Agency is responsible for the overall strategic 
management but does not maintain the road network itself. This Agency, 
however, works closely with the municipal government as part of stakeholder 
involvement in the strategic planning process. 
When roads are being financed in the United Kingdom, the Highway Agency 
takes the lead. This is the policy of Executive Agency of the Department of 
Transport that was established in 1996. The Highway Agency examines the way 
the procurement process is being done as well as the value for money likely to 
be obtained from the contracts. 
According to the agreement between the Highway Agency and the private sector, 
the private sector has to agree to build roads meeting the Highways Agency’s 
technical requirements. Such roads need to be operated and maintained together 
with some existing roads for a period of 30 years. In return, the Agency is 
required to pay the private sector builder/operator according to the number of 
vehicle kilometres driven on the road. The Highway Agency therefore opens 
doors for the concessionaire to come with innovative ideas. Most importantly, the 
contracts provide for the Agency’s safety plus indicating those environmental 
requirements that need to be met in full. Initially, the Department of Transport 
and the Highway Agency incurred costs for internal advice in awarding contracts. 
2.11.5 Japan 
According to Hakim et al. (1996), Japan only began with toll financing in the mid 
1950s when a public highway was created to establish a network of freeways, 
which was financed from private loan capital and government borrowings. 
Initially, the criteria were stipulated for toll rates. This meant that the road had to 
cover all costs and still remain equitable relative to the user’s ability to pay and 
most importantly, they should not exceed the benefit of using the toll road. Japan 
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has more than 6 000 kilometres of toll roads. Remarkably, in 1986, at an 
International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association conference, it was stated 
that Japan’s toll exceeded the combined income from toll roads in the rest of the 
world. 
It is important to note that Japan applies a combination of the franchise and BOT 
system in the management of toll roads. This means that private companies build 
the roads and are given limited franchise. Ownership is transferred to the 
government when the franchise expires and this type of arrangement should 
perhaps be considered in South Africa. 
2.11.6 Mexico 
Estache and de Rus (2000:246) assert that Mexico launched the most ambitious 
program of building more than 5,000 kilometers of new roads between 1989 and 
1994. Kerf et al. (1998:29) stress the fact that Mexico uses a relatively 
decentralised approach to support its infrastructure through that country’s Public-
Private Partnership programme. Sectoral ministries primarily design and 
implement the projects, while the cabinet, supported by an inter-ministerial 
commission, does the high level policy co-ordination processes. The secretariat 
to the inter-ministerial commission, located in the Ministry of Finance, is not 
directly involved with specific concessions but is used as a channel for managing 
concession loans or donor support to the programme. The approach followed by 
Mexico is similar to that adopted by South Africa in the sense that the National 
Treasury has now established a Public-Private Partnership management unit that 
is now in charge of co-coordinating Public-Private Partnership projects. This unit 
is used as a channel for managing PPP projects of various institutions. 
Mexico began with road tolling in 1952, and by 1986 there were 940 kilometres of 
toll roads. In 1963, a toll authority was established by government, which 
however stopped operating in the mid 1980s. In his research studies on Public-
Private Partnerships in toll roads, Sader (2000:38) discovered that in 1989 the 
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Mexican government introduced a policy whose goal was the construction of 
about 6 000 kilometres of toll roads. By the end of 1994 the country’s 
government had granted a total of 52 concessions in a quest to achieve its goal. 
Thirty of these concessions went to the private sector on a BOT basis for the 
construction of a total of 3 500 kilometres. However, the majority of these road 
projects experienced serious difficulties and required substantial restructuring.  
For political reasons, the Mexican government decided to tender these 
concession projects on the basis of the shortest concession period rather than 
the lowest toll rate, with the objective of taking control of these assets as fast as 
possible. The tender documents were based on government specifications for 
the design of the road, including cost estimate, as well as government traffic 
projections. The result was that all concessions were awarded to domestic 
construction companies, which were primarily interested in the construction 
project and less in the operational viability of the toll roads. When completed, 
these roads showed an average cost overrun of 50 percent. At the same time, 
tolls were so high that users preferred the parallel free roads even at the expense 
of longer travel time. This situation offers a living proof of problems associated 
with the tolling of roads. 
In 1997, the Mexican government designed a rescue package to avoid 
bankruptcy for the worst cases. It took over 23 of the private concessions and 
assumed about US$ 7,7 billion in debt. Overall, construction companies seem to 
have suffered the least from this programme, as their returns on the construction 
alone are estimated to lie between 35 and 45 percent, compared to an average 
equity contribution of about 25 percent. The Mexican government now intends to 
privatise these roads again. It now wants to do this because it is influenced by 
the lowered toll structure but also wants to do so on the basis of operation and 
maintenance contracts (Sader, 2000:38-39). Interestingly, the Road 
Infrastructure Strategic Framework in South Africa (Department of Transport, 
2002:98) has acknowledged the fact that the application of Public-Private 
Partnerships in toll roads in Mexico was flawed. This very problem has resulted 
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in the collapse of several companies in that country and the eventual intervention 
by government. 
Through their research, Estache and De Rus (2000:259) found that in 1999, a 
major factor in the restructuring of Mexico’s toll road program was the pressure 
on regulators to cut tolls. This simply shows the importance of regulatory 
intervention in order to bring about solutions with respect to the fairness of toll 
rates. It must be stressed that regulators need to have rules to follow and should 
be independent enough to be able to enforce such rules. 
2.11.7 Austria 
In the early 1980s, Austria went through a change of government that led to 
policies that promoted new ways of doing business in the public sector. This 
movement intensified during the 1990s when the concept of Public-Private 
Partnerships was introduced to the national telecommunication carrier called 
Telstra (Prefontaine, 2000:18). This was followed by a reform policy that 
encouraged decentralisation, the transfer of power from the state to the 
ministries, thus fostering greater autonomy among ministries and other public 
agencies. 
Government organisations were encouraged to take charge of their affairs and to 
compare their performance with those of the private sector. These organisations 
quickly adopted strategic management principles and charters to define the 
services delivered to citizens whom they now perceived as “clients”. The 
government then planned to introduce the concept of accountability when it 
comes to evaluating public servants, which helped promote the efficiency of 
projects generated by the public sector. It needs to be emphasised that efforts 
aimed at diversifying public service delivery in Austria are numerous and the 
country is rated as one of the innovators in the area of Public-Private 
Partnerships (Prefontaine et al, 2000:18).  
The Federal Ministry of Transport Innovation and Technology takes the 
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responsibility of all infrastructure projects in Austria. For some time Austria had 
been working on basic plans for the introduction of a use-oriented system that 
will see users of the country‘s high-level roads assuming a share of road costs. 
The main motivation behind the decision to introduce a road charging system 
was primarily the aspect to involve as much as possible those drivers using the 
network’s toll roads in a fair cost coverage system.  The Federal Highway 
Financing Act of 1996 and several amending statutes pertaining to it provide the 
legal basis for the collection of tolls on motorways and similar roads such as 
expressways. 
The introduction of a kilometer-based electronic toll system in Austria is a 
significant step towards achieving a more just distribution of costs in the road 
transport sector. In addition, the electronics used for the toll system may allow 
Austria to improve traffic information and provide more effective traffic 
management in the future. 
2.11.8 Canada 
Canada’s experience in terms of collaboration with public service delivery, which 
is often referred to as Alternative Service Delivery or ASD, is seen as recent 
when compared to collaboration methods used in other countries. The Canadian 
government officially confirmed its determination to undertake a programme to 
change the management of its activities in 1997. Some of Canada’s toll roads are 
managed under the BOT system. This means that private companies build the 
roads and are given the opportunity to operate and then transfer ownership to the 
government when the franchise expires. 
Canada has opened one of its first open access all electronic toll highways called 
407 Express Toll Route (ETR). The road runs east west just north of Toronto and 
was constructed for the Ontario Provincial Government by Raytheon. Raytheon 
also operated the road for the government during its initial operation from 
October 1997 to 1999. 
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(i) Roadside assistance and safety 
According to www.roadtraffic-technology.com/projects accessed on 2008/01/14, 
in Canada, the Roadside Motorist Assistance team patrols the highway from 
05:00 to 21:00 weekdays and during peak traffic times on weekends. The 
Highway Operations Control Centre monitors and records activities on the 
highway, 24 hours a day, and constantly monitors information from Environment 
Canada to anticipate road conditions and surface temperatures as well as 
moisture and chemical conditions. There are 24 state of the art salt spreaders 
and 23 snow plough trucks stationed at four locations along the highway. If a car 
breaks down when traveling on 407 ETR the free Road Assistance Patrol will 
provide a boost, tire change, free 5 litre of fuel or call a tow truck. 
In its action for the years 1999 to 2002, the Canadian Treasury Board Secretariat 
(TBS) indicated that promoting innovation at the service level was one of its 
priorities. To achieve this goal, the TBS planned to diversify service delivery 
methods and to integrate approaches to service delivery, including partnerships 
with other ministries and levels of government or between the public, private and 
community sectors. In addition to motivations linked to its difficult financial 
situation, the Canadian government recognises the need to develop collaboration 
as a means of allowing its foothold on the global market scene. This collaboration 
strategy forms an important lesson for South Africa as it makes service delivery 
visible to the community. 
Prefontaine et al. (2000:26) are of the opinion that even though citizens may be 
somewhat satisfied with public service delivery in general, market liberalisation 
and further development of new technologies are exerting growing pressure on 
the public to demand change. Moreover, e-commerce, which is in full-scale 
expansion in the private sector, is also likely to influence the way of doing things 
in government. With regard to the South African situation, the Department of 
Transport has recently announced its intention to introduce an intelligent 
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transport system on the Ben Schoeman Highway. 
The rationale behind this strategy is "to deal with the growing congestion on 
South Africa’s urban roads and drastically improve public transport ahead of the 
2010 Soccer World Cup" (Business Report, 2004.12.10). This serves as an 
opportunity for the private sector to invest in the road infrastructure through the 
introduction of new technology. 
2.11.9 The Philippines 
In Kerf et al. (1998:29), opinion, "the government of the Philippines created a 
novel institutional structure to support the country’s large infrastructure 
programme". Each sectoral agency has a specialist BOT unit responsible for 
coordinating the design and implementation of its projects. National, provincial 
and municipal authorities select and award the project under the framework that 
the country’s government has created. The authorities prepare a list of priority 
projects, which must be approved by either the Investment Coordination 
Committee (ICC) of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the 
NEDA Board, or by local or regional councils, depending on the conceding 
jurisdiction and the cost of proposed projects, as specified in the Implementing 
Regulations to the law. Projects undertaken on a Build Own Operate (BOO) 
basis, or through contractual arrangements other than those defined under the 
law, require presidential approval.  
As part of its programmes, the Philippine government created a BOT centre. The 
centre has about 14 professional staff members and performs the following 
tasks: 
• keeping an updated national inventory of all nominated projects that are 
eligible for development under the BOT framework; 
• providing general advice to foreign investors doing business in the 
Philippines; 
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• developing infrastructure projects; 
• providing technical assistance and training to central and local government 
officials on the design and implementation of projects; and 
• spearheading promotional activities for the Philippine BOT programme.  
Initially, the Centre was mainly involved in marketing the BOT concept to private 
investors. As the concept became better known, most marketing and similar 
tasks have been devolved to the BOT units in each sectoral agency. The BOT 
Centre now spends more time training national and local government officials 
and the implementation of this arrangement is prevalent throughout the 
Philippines. 
According to the World Bank as accessed from www.worldbank.org/transport 
accessed on 2008/01/14, projects in the Philippine may be proposed by the Toll 
Regulatory Board, Philippines National Construction Company or the Department 
of Public Works. In as far as regulatory intervention is concerned, it can thus be 
concluded that concession contracts may be regulated by any of the above 
mentioned bodies. 
2.11.10 The Australian state of Victoria 
State governments in Australia have the main responsibility for controlling most 
infrastructure sectors. In the state of Victoria, for instance, individual government 
departments are ultimately responsible for the design of concessions and the 
processes according to which projects are eventually awarded. In each case, 
project responsibility is assigned to a single minister. This minister is then 
responsible for facilitating consultation with the other government departments 
involved in the project. The minister is also expected to work with the Department 
of Treasury and Finance. In order to provide guidance and to promote 
consistency in issues pertaining to matters of analysis and procedures, the 
Victorian government has formulated an investment policy described in a 
publication dated June 1994 by the Department of Treasury and Finance. 
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Interestingly, the law also demands that the department acts as a reference 
centre when guidance is required by other government entities (Kerf et al., 
1998:30). 
In terms of the study that was undertaken by the Road Infrastructure Strategic 
Framework for South Africa (Department of Transport, 2002:16), Australia was 
found to have three spheres of government, namely, the federal government, the 
state government and the local government. Accordingly, the federal government 
owns the National Highway System while the state and the local governments 
take care of state and local roads respectively. Some government-owned utilities 
have been transformed into Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) that 
operate as businesses and are subject to the national competition policy. 
The norm in Australia is for each state to have a road agency with statutory 
authority to be in charge of managing, planning and maintaining the state road 
network. Each state's road agency or authority is also responsible for the 
maintenance and development of the national highway network within its 
boundaries with funding from the federal government. It is customary for the 
agency to contract out or to outsource construction and maintenance of the 
infrastructure. The BOT appears to be the main Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement currently executed in Australia. A number of road infrastructure 
projects that have been executed in Australia are shown overleaf. 
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Table 2.1: Australian Road Infrastructure Public-Private Partnership 
Projects  
Type of PPP Project Project Name Year Executed 
Road infrastructure Sydney Harbour Tunnel 1986 
Road infrastructure M4 Motorway 1988 
Road infrastructure M5 Motorway 1991 
Road infrastructure M2 Motorway 1994 
Road infrastructure Melbourne City Link 1996 
Road infrastructure M1 Eastern Distributor 2000 
Road infrastructure M7 Westlink (Western 
Sydney Orbital) 
2002 
Road infrastructure Cross City Tunnel 2002 
Road infrastructure Lane Cove Tunnel 2003 
Road infrastructure Eastlink (Mitcham-
Frankston Freeway)  
2004 
Source: Adapted from Yescombe 2007:42. 
According to Yescombe (2007:41), Australia’s Public-Private Partnership projects 
are primarily run by the states rather than the Commonwealth. Although Sydney 
Harbour Bridge opened away back in 1932, it was funded with tolls as a public 
sector project. Tolls were not widely used in Australia until private sector toll road 
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projects began with Sydney Harbour Tunnel in 1988. Later toll roads have 
transferred traffic risk more fully to the private sector. Australian toll roads are 
typically urban motorways with a high construction cost and sophisticated 
operation. 
Yescombe (2007:43) asserts that Victoria’s Department of Treasury and Finance 
had to set up the Partnership Victoria unit in 2000 as a centre of expertise within 
the Department. Partnerships Victoria has produced a comprehensive set of 
guidance documents for Public-Private Partnerships which have largely been 
adopted as a standard by the other states.  
2.11.11 New Zealand 
New Zealand has two levels of government, namely, the national and the local 
spheres of government. The national government owns the National Highway 
System and has contracted its management out to Transit New Zealand, a 
government-owned entity, which is a business concern. Ownership and 
maintenance of all other public roads in the country rest with the respective local 
governments. Local governments are at liberty to contract roads out for 
construction and maintenance. Almost 97 percent of the local road construction 
and maintenance is delivered by the private sector or by Local Authority Trading 
Enterprises (LATEs). Funding for both the national highways and local roads is 
provided by Transfund, an entity contracted to distribute and prioritise road 
expenditures from the national government’s road funds (Department of 
Transport, 2002:17). 
The arrangement with respect to the creation of a special entity dedicated to 
distribute and prioritise road expenditure appears to be sound and attractive. 
However, it is incumbent upon this study to scrutinise this arrangement closely in 
order to ascertain whether indeed it serves the intended purpose. Again it is 
imperative for this study to determine how selective borrowing has assisted 
South Africa in designing or in handling its own road authorities. 
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New Zealand has significant public enterprise sectors in terms of its share of the 
total workforce employed. The performance of the public enterprises in the early 
part of the 1980s has been poor with low rates of return relative to that in the 
private sector. In the mid-1980s, New Zealand experienced large fiscal deficits 
and has been constrained in its policies by high public debt to gross national 
product ratios (Convery and McDowel, 1990:60). 
2.11.11.1 Corporatisation in New Zealand 
Convery and McDowell (1990:60) interestingly reveal that "in the late 1985, the 
New Zealand government embarked on a major effort to rationalise and 
strengthen the operation of its public enterprise sector". The goal was to achieve 
significant improvements and efficiency in the area of production and the 
allocation of resources. Policy interventions were predicated on the belief that 
such improvements would occur only if the public enterprise sector was more 
fully exposed to the forces of competition and that enterprise managers operate 
within a commercial mandate and subject to commercial constraints and 
adequate financial accountability.  
The principles underpinning the policy of intervention were outlined in 1985 by 
the New Zealand Minister of Finance as: 
• Responsibility for non-commercial functions should be separated from 
responsibility for commercial functions. 
• Managers of a public sector should be required, as their principal objective, 
to run the public sector as a successful business enterprise. 
• Public sector managers should have responsibility for decisions on the use 
of inputs, on pricing and on the marketing of their output, within the 
performance targets. 
• Individual public sector enterprises should be reconstituted on a case-by-
case basis in a form appropriate for their commercial purposes under the 
guidance of boards, comprising generally members appointed from the 
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private sector. 
After analysing how New Zealand went about in dealing with the processes that 
lead to the involvement of the private sector, it is evident that South Africa has 
adopted the same route as indicated in Figure 1.1 of this study. When the South 
African Roads Board was reconstituted to become the South African National 
Roads Agency Limited, and had to comprise of members from the private sector, 
it was done precisely on the principles outlined in the research done by Convery 
and McDowell (1990:60) which stresses a case by case basis in the 
reconstitution of public sector enterprises. 
2.11.12 Hungary 
In the early 1990s, the Hungarian government recognised that demand for new 
road transport capacity could not be met from budgetary resources. It therefore 
established the Bureau for Motorway Concessions under the Ministry of 
Transport, Communication and Water Management. This was meant to find 
solutions for over 500 kilometres of highways and bridges. The government also 
passed a law that stipulated that a strong legal framework for the control of 
privately financed infrastructure projects be formed.  
This requirement has to date implied that toll roads had to require strong 
measures that support arrangements designed to make projects commercially 
viable and affordable (Sader, 2000:140). South Africa has also opted for 
situations where, for example, a toll concession company like the N3TC requires 
the strong support of government to ensure that projects are commercially viable 
and affordable. 
In Hungary, the financing structure was mainly based on the highest possible 
involvement of international working capital that passes on as much as possible 
of the risks of the project to the private sector. The initial toll rates were defined 
by vehicle categories and automatically increased without any prior consent of 
the government on the basis of the domestic consumer price index and the 
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exchange rate differential in proportion of the currencies of the loans. In the case 
of South Africa, it is a requirement that a public participation process be 
implemented before toll tariffs can be finalised in terms of the National Land 
Transport Transition Act, Act 22 of 2000 (Department of Transport, 2000).  
With the introduction of electronic tolling system in Hungary, where the private 
sector is involved, the concession arrangements allowed for toll variations. On 
the M5, a whole program of discounts has been introduced with 40 percent 
reduction for regular users. The regulatory challenge faced by Hungary was that 
its legal arrangements were not strong enough to prevent a legal challenge to the 
toll rate (www.worldbank.org/transport accessed 2008/01/14). This legal 
challenge illustrates the importance of an economic regulatory intervention and it 
is here cautioned that government must take external advice on the regulatory 
structure before it could be introduced. 
(i) South Africa 
By way of borrowing some wisdom from international experience regarding the 
management of toll roads, a service differentiation strategy adopted by Canada 
could be considered. A noticeable change that has taken place in South Africa 
with respect to the provision of road infrastructure is that the country is in the 
process of moving away from a self-regulated provider of services. A desire has 
been expressed to create an independent regulatory authority which needs to 
monitor a significant number of activities delivered by private operators. 
(ii) Service differentiation strategy 
Toll roads are implemented on national roads in South Africa. The way these toll 
roads are funded and operated differ mainly focusing whether they are managed 
as a Public-Private Partnership initiative or solely government owned and 
managed. A service differentiation strategy can easily be implemented in the 
Public-Private Partnership managed toll roads. A typical strategy to be 
considered could be the one similar to that implemented in Canada such as 
introducing the Roadside Motorist Assistance team patrols on the highway 24 
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hours a day. The motorists travelling on such toll roads can rest assured of some 
assistance in the event of any breakdown en-route. A range of services that 
could be provided by the Roadside Motorist Assistance team could be assisting 
in changing tires particularly where a motorist had a puncture in the middle of the 
night. The roadside team could also assist those motorists who got stuck as a 
result of not being able to reach the nearest filling station for refuelling. In this 
regard, a free 5 litre of fuel could be provided to a stuck motorist so as to reach 
the nearest filling station. Alternatively, the roadside team could then assist in 
calling a tow truck. The above range of services could be considered in Public-
Private Partnership managed toll roads in South Africa as it would add value in 
serving as service differentiators along the road corridors. 
2.12 SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS BASED ON FOREIGN EXPERIENCE 
Numerous interpretations regarding the nature and purpose of the concept 
Public-Private Partnership come to the surface when the views of the different 
countries are considered. Seen from a perspective of the experiences of foreign 
countries, then the overall picture tends to be that monolithic, vertically integrated 
state-owned entities are becoming obsolete and appear to be no longer the 
preferred option. In summing up, the concept has taken many forms, for 
example, it starts with a simple form of commercialisation to a point where the 
private sector becomes the actual dominant party.  
Therefore, of fundamental importance is that for the partnership to be 
sustainable, there should be a long-term agreement between the public and 
private sectors in the provision and operation of the transport infrastructure or 
services. In other words, there should be a sharing of responsibility and risk by 
the public and private partners because the transport system operates in a 
turbulent macro environment. An environment that is fraught with a great deal of 
challenges is brought about by dynamic circumstances, which reflect the 
complexity of the system within which highways operates. Many disciplines such 
as engineering, environmental science, the social sciences, and law, to name a 
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few, should be involved in finding solutions to the transport problems. 
It is also important to note that there are differences in emphasis between the 
public and private sectors in any kind of transaction they undertake. The public 
authority’s primary goal is to provide services whilst that of the private sector is to 
maximise profitability either in the short, medium or long term. While a distinction 
between public and private sectors is worth noting, care should be taken that 
some services do not by their nature allow themselves to fall within the spectrum 
of Public-Private Partnerships. For example, a corporatised entity such as the 
South African National Roads Agency Limited working in partnership with the 
Department of Transport is a case in point. This conclusion is arrived at because 
it is based on the knowledge of each party’s distinctive competency in its area of 
involvement.  
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that to all intents and purposes 
tokenism as an involvement in any project is inadequate to qualify a venture as a 
genuine partnership. To prevent this from taking place, there should be an 
instrument in place that would dictate the terms of efficiency and fairness to be 
adhered to. This should be based strictly on the dictum that the risk should be 
allocated to those who would benefit most from the project.  
After all is said and done, the partners should strive towards the accomplishment 
of a common primary objective if frustration, misunderstanding, mistrust and 
conflict are to be avoided. To crown it all, compliance with overall legislative 
framework should be taken seriously by all as absolutely essential otherwise any 
effort towards Public-Private Partnerships would be frustrated and may even be 
defeated. 
The rationale for Public-Private Partnerships should above all be based on the 
premise that government needs a capital injection to fulfil its mandatory 
obligations adequately and this situation is common to many countries. 
Therefore, Public-Private Partnerships, as applied in infrastructure development 
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is seen as a tool to be used in acquiring resources or technological innovations 
from a private sector for the purposes of assisting in the implementation of 
strategies for the accomplishment of South Africa’s national objectives. 
In the final analysis, there are a variety of forms of Public-Private Partnerships 
today that are applicable in the road infrastructure. There are also various types 
of contractual agreements that regulate the relationship between the public and 
the private sectors in whatever arrangement they chose to enter into. These 
contractual agreements range from the unencumbered contract, the franchising 
arrangement, the management agreement, the service contract, the liberalisation 
or the concession contract and lastly the lease contract. 
South Africa is showing an increasing interest in the concessions phenomena as 
its main viable main form of contract and this type of instrument is currently used 
in what is better known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer mechanism, which is 
designed to manage the national road network. Hopefully, this may, if correctly 
implemented, create the much sought-after job opportunities in the road and 
transport industry.  
It is important to note that there are areas in Public-Private Partnership 
arrangements that are the exclusive domain of the public sector and then there 
are those that should be managed by the private sector. Policy-making, planning 
and ownership of the infrastructure make out the exclusive role of the 
Department of Transport or the South African National Roads Agency Limited. 
The maintenance, funding and operation of the road infrastructure would be done 
better by the private sector. 
Regarding international experience on Public-Private Partnerships, it needs to be 
pointed out that in the 1980s, the restructuring of public sector enterprises took 
place in countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
France and most of Western Europe in the Pacific Rim. However, it is also 
significant to note that each restructuring process followed a specific path, and 
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this depended on the economic, social and political conditions that had been 
obtained in these different countries. In other words, care should be taken to note 
that each country is unique. South Africa is not different in this respect for it has 
its own peculiar aspects, characteristics, conditions and circumstances which 
need to be taken into consideration when designing agreements involving 
concessions.  
After analysing the approach by the United States of America towards Public-
Private Partnerships, it is evident that South Africa follows the same approach in 
terms of ensuring that the private sector carry out the construction, maintenance 
and operation of toll roads. Therefore, a study still needs to be undertaken to 
determine specifically whether this approach works well in South Africa.  
In Italy, toll roads came into being as early as 1924, and until at the time of this 
research, twenty-two concession holding companies have been founded. The 
concession scheme adopted by these companies is that of Build, Operate and 
Transfer. This scheme is made valid for a period of 30-35 years. In contrast with 
this approach, the South African approach allows the concession companies to 
be completely private sector-driven and similarities in the two approaches are 
that of the adoption of the Build Operate and Transfer type of concession. 
In France we find that the French king had concessioned roads, bridges and 
canals as early as the seventeenth century. The entrepreneurs who built these 
roads, bridges and canals had to bear the market risk and were tasked with the 
collection of tolls in return for maintaining the routes. To achieve success the 
French established a National Roads Agency that they effectively used as an 
instrument most suited for managing concession agreements. After studying the 
French model, it is evident that South Africa to a large extent followed the route 
proposed and adopted by the French in terms of the establishment of a roads 
agency to deal with the overall strategic management of national routes. 
In the United Kingdom, roads are categorised as national and local roads. The 
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national roads are funded by central government. The central department is not 
involved in operations and its responsibilities include setting policies and 
objectives and developing performance indicators. The approach followed by the 
United Kingdom is similar to that followed by South Africa. The difference is that 
while South Africa has national, provincial and local roads, the United Kingdom 
has national and local roads. 
Japan began with toll financing in the 1950s and the toll rates were fixed in such 
a way that they become equitable relative to the user’s ability to pay. Japan’s 
approach is market-oriented but the aspect of ensuring that the user’s ability to 
pay is taken into account is unfortunately not being followed by most of the 
concession companies. 
Mexico uses a centralised approach in dealing with the road infrastructure 
involving a Public-Private Partnership arrangement. Thus, in awarding 
concession contracts, Mexico gives preference to domestic construction 
companies. Seen as such, South Africa’s approach of giving preference to local 
companies is therefore in line with countries such as Mexico. 
In Austria, government institutions were encouraged to take charge of their 
affairs and to compare their performance with that of the private sector. The 
Austrian approach gave birth to various principles of the marketing concept, 
which may be compared to the Batho Pele principle. 
On the other hand, Canada’s approach to Public-Private Partnerships is that 
even though citizens may be satisfied with the service delivered in general, 
market liberalisation and further development of new technologies are allowed 
space to exert the necessary demand for change. From the lessons learned in 
Canada, South Africa has currently embarked on the process of introducing new 
technology in the road infrastructure. 
From the Philippines, the country’s government created an institutional structure 
to support its large infrastructure programme. Its Build Operate and Transfer 
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projects are being managed by the investment co-ordination committee. It is 
quite clear from relevant studies that the Philippine government takes Public-
Private Partnerships seriously, hence special agencies have been formed to deal 
with matters related to infrastructural projects.  
Australia has three spheres of government, namely federal, state and local. The 
federal government owns the National Highway System and the state and local 
governments take care of state and local roads respectively. When compared 
with the South African situation, it is clear that there are a lot of similarities with 
regard to different spheres of government and the roles of these governments 
with regard to the management of infrastructure. 
New Zealand has two levels of government, i.e. national and local. It is important 
to note that New Zealand embarked on the restructuring process, which led to 
the establishment of agencies. This is an approach followed by South Africa 
when the National Roads Agency was established in 1998. 
The Hungarian government recognised that demand for new road transport 
capacity could not be met by way of budgetary resources. It therefore established 
the Bureau for Motorway Concessions under the Ministry of Transport. The 
approach followed by Hungary is similar to that of South Africa except that it has 
an agency headed by the Chief Executive Officer. In brief, Annexure 2 serves as 
evidence that South Africa applies a mixture of approaches as applied from 
countries such as New Zealand, Australia, France and the United Kingdom.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
AS DERIVED FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a critique of the reciprocal relationship that exists between the 
environment in which toll roads operate and that constituted by the surrounding 
macro-environmental factors. In this respect, ecological economists like Common 
and Stagl (2005:21) neatly describe the important role played by the concept of 
reciprocal relationships as follows, “the economy and the natural environment are 
interdependent systems". Thus from a strategic management point of view, a 
transportation industry, just like any other industry, needs to focus on the broader 
environment, which is also referred to as a general environment (Miller, 1998:72).  
Invariably, environments are found to form a potential means of welfare 
improvement, and as such need to be handled with the care that they deserve. 
Hence, Hayashi et al. (1999:261) are of the opinion that emanating from this 
general environment is a host of amenities that come indirectly through the 
production of goods and services.  
Wheelen and Hunger (2006:73) refer to an industry in which an organisation 
operates as the task environment and it includes those elements or groups that 
directly affect an organisation and, in turn, are affected by it. Truly, it is in the task 
or operating environment that the needs of the transport industry have brought 
about a forced move towards the increased involvement of both the public and 
private sectors in the provision of financial resources for the construction of 
transport infrastructure and particularly the road network. This is confirmed by the 
Budget Review (Republic of South Africa, 2006:34), which states that the 
construction sector expanded by nearly 10 percent in the first nine months of 
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2005 compared with the same period in 2004. Generally speaking, the transport 
infrastructure is constantly affected by what Pearce and Robinson (1997:62) refer 
to as "a remote environment that consists of factors such as technology, 
physical, political, economic, social and regulatory". It is therefore important that 
these environmental factors be taken into consideration when road networks are 
undertaken. 
This chapter seeks to educate both the public and the private sectors about 
those environmental factors that exert an influence on the way government takes 
a decision regarding the direction to follow in the provision of road networks. In 
the final analysis, government is also expected to provide the organisational 
structure and internal processes it intends to apply, and this is reflected in the 
Horizon Twenty Ten Strategic Plan for 1999 (Department of Transport, 2002:7). 
Furthermore, it is also clearly stated, "the National Roads Agency operates in 
clusters that are the constituents of a combination of talent and skills so that 
expertise, vision and experience are harnessed into a holistic, multi-disciplined 
approach to our core experience". 
This chapter examines the entire remote environment as well as the way it 
impacts on the Department of Transport, especially with regard to the role of the 
emerging commercialised entities, such as the National Roads Agency. It goes 
without saying that if an organisation wants to achieve a sustainable competitive 
edge, then it has to analyse the entire remote environment. Figure 3.1 suggests 
a model of how to involve the Department of Transport and the macro-
environmental factors as well as the commercialised entities such as the National 
Roads Agency in an interrelationship that works harmoniously and effectively. 
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Figure 3.1: The interrelationship between the DoT and the macro-
environment 
Source: Adapted from Freeman and Jamet, 1998:954. 
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3.2 THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT WITHIN THE 
MACRO-ENVIRONMENT 
According to Haq (1997:13), the relationship between transport and the 
environment is reciprocal in the sense that the transport sector uses a wide 
variety of the earth’s resources. At the same time, the mobilisation, 
manufacturing and refinement of these resources impact differently on the 
various components of the environment. This submission concurs with the 
interpretation made by Common and Stagl (2005:4) with respect to the growing 
importance of both Environmental Economics and Natural Resource Economics 
as important disciplines to be applied in the Public-Private Partnership projects. It 
is worth noting that relationships by their very nature create an equation 
consisting of a dependent and an independent variable, and that these two are 
mutually interdependent for their existence. 
As a point of departure, we are reminded that Environmental Economics 
concerns itself with the insertions of the economy into the environment, and with 
problems of environmental pollution, whereas Natural Resource Economics 
concerns itself with extractions by the economy’s extractions from the 
environment, and with problems associated with the use of natural resources. In 
support, Vuchic (1999:23) asserts, "when the environment is impacted upon by 
various means such as the transport system, it in turn influences the way such a 
transport system is operated". To explicate what actually happens, Vuchic cites 
the example of "the growth and changes in cities and metropolitan areas which 
required further development of the transportation systems".  
As indicated by the macro-environmental factors and their potential impact on the 
Department of Transport and other authorities in South Africa are now outlined 
below in a step-by-step fashion that promotes easy reading and understanding. 
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3.2.1 Technological factors 
Technology is perceived as a process by which the basic resources like water is 
converted into valuable and usable items like, for example, electricity. Bannock 
(1992:419), defines technology as an integrated wealth of knowledge, of the 
means and methods of producing goods and services. However, the mistake 
should not be made of regarding it as merely an applied science, precisely 
because it is often done ahead of science. In this respect, Bannock (1992:420) 
further argues that things are often done without precise knowledge of how or 
why they are done except that they are effective. Links (2006:52) however, draws 
a distinction between science and technology and refers to the former as 
focusing on the understanding of knowledge whilst the latter focuses on the 
application of knowledge.  
For enterprises to avoid obsolescence, they need to be aware of technological 
changes in the macro-environment, because failure to do so renders an 
enterprise archaic and ultimately incompetent. Science and technology are like 
theory and practice, the one without the other is hopeless just like the dependent 
and the independent variables that are mutually interdependent aspects of an 
equation. 
It is worth to note that technology unfolds in phases and its history in the 
transportation arena dates back to the medieval era when Christopher Columbus 
went on to sail westward from the Canary Islands in 1492. Thirty-three days later, 
he made landfall in the Bahamas. Remarkably, a journey of 15 km was a major 
undertaking which, when compared to contemporary transportation technology, 
would be equivalent to an inter-continental trip (Barke, 1986:52). This historical 
account teaches us that; within the context of Public-Private Partnership 
arrangements, the Department of Transport should make sure that it takes 
serious note of the impact of technological changes. To this end, Pearce and 
Robinson (1997:66) contribute by stating, "creative technological adaptations can 
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suggest possibilities for how new or existing services can be better provided".  
According to the Budget Review (Republic of South Africa, 2006:114),  
… economic growth requires that South African businesses identify 
production techniques in which they can achieve comparative 
advantage in global markets. It also requires a favourable investment 
environment and sound regulatory arrangements and the development 
of a more systematic industrial policy.  
Fortunately, relevant and salient technological developments are today 
noticeable in the toll road industry due to advances in information and 
communications as evidenced by initiatives of the effort by Zimele Enterprise to 
introduce smart cards to operate on the toll roads (Zimele Technical Report, 
2005). Certainly, this move has resulted in creating opportunities that have 
ushered in significant improvements in the way highways are performing at 
present. It follows therefore that technologies can enhance toll road efficiency. 
This could also apply to sectors like global positioning systems, the operation of 
cellular telephones, telecommunications, and geographic information systems.  
Technology has greatly contributed to the establishment and development of the 
field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) that are nowadays driving various 
efforts intended to secure safety on our roads through, amongst others, the 
dissemination of information about the road network that allow authorities to take 
pro-active action in advance. According to the Business Report (2004.12.10), the 
Department of Transport is propagating the application of an intelligent 
transportation system because it is an effective tool that has the ability to do 
many tasks at once. Hence, in his response to questions from the national 
assembly, the Minister of Transport, Mr Radebe, stated, "a pilot intelligent 
transportation system would start trials on the N1 Ben Schoeman Highway 
between Tshwane and Johannesburg". The world over intelligent transportation 
systems are playing a significant role in the development of onboard navigation 
systems-wide operations that give more efficient traffic control and better 
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communication with users and thus adding value to the enhancement of safety  
In terms of the Strategic Highway Research (2001:20), if transportation agencies 
could be allowed to manage the road network without the involvement of the 
private sector, then these agencies would run the risk of paying for the expenses 
of acquiring and maintaining the necessary technology alone. Again, they would 
be faced with the difficulty of attracting or training or retaining technically skilled 
staff to operate the new technology they have acquired so expensively. In this 
respect, the Budget Review (Republic of South Africa, 2006:61) explicitly states 
the importance of Public-Private Partnerships as an additional mechanism to 
exploit in the quest to provide public goods, services and infrastructure in South 
Africa. 
3.2.1.1 The electronic toll collection system 
Electronic toll collection is an adaptation of military technology which aims to 
eliminate the delay on toll roads. In terms of the new toll collection system that 
has been introduced in South Africa, particularly on the N4 Platinum highway, a 
car is able to pass through a toll plaza without coming to a standstill (N3 TC 
Technical Report, 2005). The secret of the system is that for it to function 
effectively it requires that each car be installed with a tag. This tag is installed in 
such a way that it communicates with a computer located at the tollbooth to read 
the required information for the purposes of processing it. To do this, the 
roadside computer identifies the vehicle and debits the amount of the toll from 
the monetary balance on the tag. The system has the advantage of reducing or 
eliminating long lines of motorists who use the toll road on a daily basis (N3 TC 
Technical Report, 2005).  
Presently, a much more advanced technology also exists in the toll road industry, 
called the automatic vehicle identification, or simply AVI. This technology works 
by means of wireless communication between a small tag having a transponder 
mounted on a vehicle and a sensor located at the roadside or in the toll lane. The 
sensors are able to read information that is found within the tag while the vehicle 
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is stationary or while it is moving at high speed.  
What is of paramount significance here is the fact that toll collection methods 
have an influence on the degree of acceptability of the toll by the users because 
these methods have the potential to interfere detrimentally with the flow of traffic 
to the dismay of motorists. Regarding electronic toll collection, Fayard (2001:10) 
suggests that care should be taken to ensure that the user recognises the 
service provided by the electronic collection system and that the cost of the toll 
and the technology applied do not create difficulties. Tolls may vary according to 
the distance travelled, the building and maintenance costs of the motorway and 
the type of vehicle. 
3.2.1.2 Potential positive results for using electronic toll collection system 
Norway has been the world’s pioneer in the widespread implementation of the 
electronic toll collection system. In 1991, Trondheim introduced the worlds first 
use of 100% full speed unaided electronic tolling. The United State is another 
country with widespread use of electronic toll collection in several states, but 
always maintains the option of manual collection. 
According to the Department of Transport Annual Transport Statistics 
(Department of Transport, 2001a:40), many of the national roads are currently 
densified, for example, the Ben Schoeman highway carries more or less 150 000 
vehicles per day (Gautrain Technical Information). In 2002, the number of "live" 
vehicles in the Republic of South Africa stood at 7 000 316. Unfortunately, this 
state of affair appears to be getting out of control for it is now even beginning to 
threaten mobility on most of our roads. In order to normalise this situation, it 
would be ideal to execute an ETC concept along the Ben Schoeman highway as 
this would serve as a technology that would determine whether the cars passing 
are enrolled in the program and would also electronically debit the accounts of 
registered cars car owners without requiring them to stop. 
At the same time, building roads is becoming financially and environmentally 
more difficult (Department of Transport, 1999:54). To make matters worse, many 
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of the major roadways being tolled in South Africa are the existing ones and this 
situation denies motorists alternative options. This approach of doing things is 
suited to a kind of arrangement or contract commonly known as the Build 
Operate and Transfer concession and the private sector can be invited to 
operate.  
3.2.1.3 The impact of technology on transportation agencies 
Brown and Ulijn (2004:15) contend that advances in technology lead to many 
innovations and new enterprises. As proof of this, we see the emergence of 
transport agencies in South Africa that serve as confirmation of this view. Thus, 
based on the study conducted by the Transportation Research Board (2001:1), 
new technological innovations were introduced that had a profound impact on the 
transport authorities in general. The effects of the newly introduced technological 
innovations are particularly observable at the organisation level. In other words, 
the rapid introduction and diffusion of these innovative technologies has created 
far-reaching effects on organisational structure and culture in various government 
departments. 
With the proliferation of information and expertise, it is expected that technology 
would become so dominant that it would be in a position to exert great influence 
in the road industry, especially on those road managers who are expected to 
guide the transportation agencies towards a successful future. For example, with 
the introduction of an Intelligent Transportation System in South Africa, it is 
expected that the road authorities would acquire personnel equipped with the 
essential expertise to be able to manage the process adequately. 
According to Zimele Enterprise Technical Report (2005), a need was felt to 
introduce technology in the management of the N3 route, and this need actually 
prompted the subsidiary of the N3 Toll Concession Company, called Zimele 
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd, to introduce a new technology that uses the smart cards in 
the road industry as a way of collecting toll fees in an advanced and efficient 
manner. This way, job opportunities were created for the private sector to exploit. 
The only precaution that need to be exercised in this respect is that transactions 
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facilitated through smart cards need to be regulated, hence this study strives to 
assess as whether the intervention of a transport economic regulatory authority 
would be a viable option.  
3.2.2 The ecological factors  
The term ecology is defined by Common and Stagl (2005:1) to mean the study of 
the relations of animals and plants to their organic and inorganic environments. 
Pearce and Robinson (1997:67) give a contextual warning when cautioning, 
"threats to life-supporting ecology are caused principally by human activities in an 
industrial society which are commonly referred to as pollution. In support, Barke 
(1986:16) had long expressed his view by saying transport has environmental 
consequences in the form of noise, air pollution, land use, and other possible 
barriers to human life. To curb this negative trend government has prescribed 
various pieces of legislation to ensure that a harmonious relationship is 
maintained between human activities and the surrounding environment.  
In developing road infrastructure, care should be taken when making a choice of 
strategies suited to achieve the desired objective/s in the sense that whatever 
strategy is selected it has to be applied within an integrated environmental 
management paradigm, commonly referred to as "environmental impact 
management". The purpose here is to take proactive steps intended to either 
mitigate or resolve any negative impacts that are likely to occur. This step has 
potential to enhance achievement because it promotes the positive aspects of 
the development proposals as it is done by identifying the most acceptable 
aspects of a proposal without imposing undue environmental costs on other 
parties (Department of Transport, 2002:220). 
The environment, as it is broadly understood, can also include cultural, historic, 
and social components. Historically, the impact of highways on all these 
components of the environment has not been given sufficient consideration in 
either research or practice. Simply put, there is a need for research to be done in 
this respect. Going back to the issue under discussion, we find that, lately 
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however, the environmental issues have taken centre-stage by becoming a 
significant focal point that generates regulation after regulation.  
Consequently, in response to securing and also protecting environmental 
concerns, the highway controlling authority has resorted to legal and regulatory 
actions. For example, in dealing with the toll road strategy in Gauteng, the PWV 
Consortium had to have a Provincial Road Infrastructure Framework in place to 
guide the tolling process through appropriate laws. Equally so, a transport 
economic regulatory framework would be a requirement to deal with economic-
related issues in the tolling process. 
3.2.2.1 Externalities and the environmental requirements 
Mohr and Fourie (1998:454) define externalities as costs or benefits of a 
transaction or activity that are borne or enjoyed by parties not directly involved in 
the transaction or activity. Common and Stagl (2005:327) however, assert, 
"externalities are said to exist when the actions of one agent have an unintended 
effect on some other agent or agents". It means that it should become a great 
concern for the road authorities, the public, environmentalists and the health 
sector to strive at protecting the environment in order to maintain a healthy 
quality air for ensuring a high standard of living for all organisms. 
To say the least, everybody should be concerned by the hazards that are mainly 
brought about by these various externalities in the form of pollutants. For 
instance, it is reported that air pollution is particularly a concern in urban areas, 
and its effect on human health has been increasing (Transportation Research 
Board, 1996:93).  
According to the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (Republic of 
South Africa, 1998b), the concessionaire is expected to bear all the risks and 
costs with respect to environmental damage caused by the project during the 
concession period, including claims to environmental damage directly resulting 
from use of the site for the expansion, construction or operation of the highway. 
In other words, it is the concessionaire’s obligation to ensure that the physical, 
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social and socio-economic impact is given due consideration during the lifespan 
of the concession period.  
To this end, the concessionaire should procure the services of a specialist to 
undertake environmental studies in compliance with the NEMA (Republic of 
South Africa, 1998). This Act has replaced the Environment Conservation Act, 
1989 (Republic of South Africa, 1989), and it provides for the control of identified 
activities, which may have a detrimental effect on the environment (Department 
of Transport, 2002:20). Of interest here, is the fact that while the National 
Environmental Management Act deals with environmental issues, the 
quantification or costing of externalities would probably need the intervention of a 
"transport economic regulatory authority". 
3.2.2.2    An environmental policy 
From the wisdom they have gained from their studies, Common and Stagl 
(2005:402-404) advocate the view that environmental policy instruments are vital 
for avoiding or reducing environmental damage. Choosing from the array of 
possible policy instruments is a challenging task because governments typically 
have multiple goals. With this in mind, it could be safely argued that in any 
concessioning process, be it in South Africa or anywhere, the concessionaire 
should be required to draw up an environmental policy in compliance with 
relevant environmental laws. An environmental policy document prepared by the 
concessionaire should include critical aspects such as the following: 
• the concessionaire's mission, vision, core values and beliefs; 
• a commitment to comply with all relevant existing and future environmental 
legislation in the Republic of South Africa; 
• guiding principles, illustrating the spirit and philosophy of the principles of 
sustainable development contained in Section 2 of the NEMA (Republic of 
South Africa, 1998); 
• the requirement to communicate with interested and affected parties; 
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• the need to work towards continual improvement of environmental 
management; 
• the obligation to manage the prevention of pollution and ecological 
degradation, as well as the degradation of heritage and cultural resources; 
a commitment to take cognisance of and to realise, wherever possible, the 
needs and concerns of communities during the design, construction, 
operation and maintenance phases of the project; and  
• most importantly, the concessionaire should demonstrate the undertaking to 
comply with environmental standards, to mitigate negative impacts that are 
unavoidable, and to minimise impacts on affected communities wherever 
possible and reasonable.  
In effect, it is important to note that the concessionaire needs the vigilant eye of 
government to ensure that contractual obligations are adhered to. This means 
that environmental safety plus economic compliance need to be monitored.  
3.2.2.3    Noise pollution 
As a point of departure, it makes sense to quote Haq (1997:18), who defines 
noise as any acoustical phenomenon producing a sensation perceived by an 
individual or a group as disagreeable or disturbing. Noise has many other effects 
on human health that are undesirable, like interfering with someone’s sleep, 
which can influence one's mood and in so doing reduce the performance of the 
cardio-vascular system, as well as affecting intellectual and mechanical tasks. 
Long-term exposure to noise can also cause deafness and lower auditory acuity, 
with noise annoyance resulting in stress and psychological and physiological 
effects. 
Haq (1997:18) goes on to say –  
… “in Transport Economics theory, noise costs are measured by a 
number of techniques, each of which can be used to value the cost to 
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noise in different contexts. It is however, not easy to devise a formula 
of charging for noise pollution”.  
In theory, one could wish for a charge related to the marginal damage caused by 
the sound emissions from a vehicle, but a wish is only a wish and not reality. 
Research for an answer to the question of noise pollution caused by vehicles by 
day and by night still needs attention.   
Having exposed the noise problem, it might be an opportune time to establish an 
economic regulatory authority, which would be tasked with the responsibility of 
determining the direct means of limiting noise pollution by prescribing regulations 
governing the manufacturing of vehicles. 
3.2.2.4    Air pollution 
To quote Common and Stagl (2005:98), "air pollution is any chemical or physical 
change in the environment that occurs due to waste emissions that are harmful 
to any living organism". According to the study conducted by the Transportation 
Research Board (1997:16),  
… “when transport was at its infancy stage in America, many United 
States cities were facing formidable refuse and sanitation problems 
created by horse drawn traffic. The clouds of dust raised by the first 
motor vehicles were becoming a source of great public concern and 
annoyance”.  
By the 1940s, motor vehicle exhaust was found to be a source of urban smog 
and agricultural crop damage. In his analysis of the current situation with regard 
to air pollution Haq (1997:17) revealed, "mainly in urban areas, motor vehicles 
are responsible for a number of primary pollutants, which are emitted into the 
atmosphere. Exhaust emissions from petrol and diesel engines contain carbon 
monoxide, which is a health hazard to human life". What remains now is to 
decide what to do with culprits in this situation because without punishment a 
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crime/transgression is no offence. 
Be that as it may, of major importance however is, to what extent a polluter 
should be made to pay and based on which rule. In other words, which law 
should be applicable in relation to the protection of biodiversity issues? In this 
respect, the Johannesburg Municipality has undertaken to clamp down on 
vehicles emitting excessive smoke. The move is in line with the Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention Act, (Republic of South Africa, 1965) which is aimed at 
reducing excessive emissions from diesel vehicles (The Business Day 
2004.05.20:5).  
Due to the adverse effect brought about by exhaust emissions in the operation of 
motor vehicles, it is imperative that an environmental impact assessment be 
conducted before a road can be constructed by any Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement. This is a requirement demanded by the National Environmental 
Management Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998). Any envisaged environmental 
impact assessment study should be linked to various other envisaged 
developments that would take place along the road corridor. 
To ease the problem, Section 24 of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 
1996a) states,  
… everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or well-being, and to have the environment protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation (Department of Transport, 2002:219).  
For this to happen, a function of an authoritative structure whose role would be to 
determine tariffs that need to be charged to polluters is required. According to the 
Freight and Trading Weekly of June (2005:4), the South African Automotive 
Industry came out in support of a decision by government to approve the 
introduction of cleaner fuels from January 2006. The plan is to have unleaded 
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petrol, low sulphur diesel and thus aligning the South African fuel standards with 
international fuel specifications and vehicle technology requirements. The main 
goal is to improve air quality and ultimately create a healthier environment. If air 
quality is improved and a healthier environment is maintained, the result would 
be that a positive economic climate would come into being.  
3.2.2.5    Congestion costs 
The term congestion is defined by Nijkamp, Vleugel, Maggi and Masser 
(1994:165) as the result of too many vehicles using the same road network at the 
same moment. It is caused by vehicle traffic measured in passenger car 
equivalent per hour. Each vehicle's passenger car equivalent is determined by 
the amount of road space the vehicle effectively takes up, including the space 
between vehicles required for safety, compared with that of an average car. A 
truck or bus typically has two to five passenger car equivalents, depending on the 
type of road and terrain (Small, Winston and Evans, 1989:12). 
Congestion costs vary not only from road to road, but also according to the time 
of day. This crucial feature further complicates the implementation of user 
charges, and this has already led to considerable studies, new technology, and 
some experimentation. It is possible to estimate a congestion charge based on 
an average of costs of many different roads and at many different times. Small et 
al. (1989:13) point out that congestion pricing should be more targeted on 
congested roads at peak hours only. Meanwhile, Barke (1986:37) asserts that it 
is in terms of motor transport that the most severe problems of congestion occur. 
Congestion problems generally and commonly occur at peak times and this 
imposes additional costs in time, frustration and pollution. Such costs are 
imposed not only on the car users but frequently on pedestrians as well, and 
especially on those who use public transport in the form of buses. 
As a form of intervention, it would be advisable to provide additional capacity by 
expanding the existing road network in order to alleviate congestion. This could 
be done in the form of establishing a Public-Private Partnership 
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arrangement that is deliberately aimed at making motorists pay for the exclusive 
use of certain dedicated lanes. Such a concept had been proposed before in the 
form of the construction of a superhighway in Gauteng with the purpose of 
alleviating congestion on the Ben Schoeman highway. 
Apart from this arrangement, one option could be to use technology in the form of 
technologically advanced equipment such as electronic tags and smart cards that 
can be installed at the toll plazas, particularly if the private sector can be given 
more opportunities to bring in the requisite innovations.  
3.2.2.6    Accidents 
According to the Budget Review (2006:118),  
… on average, 30-35 people die on South African roads each day, 
another 20 are permanently disabled and 100 are seriously injured. In 
2005, there were 11 616 fatal accidents, a 10,9 percent increase on 
the 2004 total. The CSIR has estimated that road accidents have an 
overall annual cost equivalent to R38 billion.  
In 2004/05 the Road Accident Fund spent R5,5 billion in settling the claims of 
road accident victims, and the accumulated claims backlog rose to an estimated 
R24 billion (Budget Review, 2006:119). 
Driver behaviour and vehicle fitness contributes to most road accidents, and 
these factors can only be mitigated through consistent and rigorous road traffic 
management. These statistics paint a very ugly and horrifying picture indeed and 
no doubt something needs to be done to arrest the carnage on our roads (Budget 
Review, 2006:119).  
The introduction and implementation of road traffic management measures are 
initiatives largely left with the provinces and municipalities as mandated by the 
National Road Traffic Amendment Act (Republic of South Africa, 1999b). To this 
end, the national government’s role is to support road traffic management and 
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safety by setting policy and legislation, developing road traffic information 
systems and promoting innovative road traffic practices and innovative 
technologies.  
The Budget Review (2006:118) further states, "the Department of Transport has 
established the Road Traffic Management Corporation and the Road Traffic 
Infringement Agency, which are mandated to support and coordinate road traffic 
management". The Road Traffic Management Corporation began operating in 
2005, and its immediate priorities include coordinated and targeted campaigns to 
reduce accidents, better training for traffic officers, improving accident and traffic 
information, and better regulation of drivers’ licenses and vehicle roadworthiness.   
Most transport accidents occur on roads, and this information is contained in the 
Department of Transport’s annual transport statistics 2002, and they categorically 
reveal,  
South Africa has a high mortality rate relative to its level of 
development and the government is justifiably concerned. It needs to 
be pointed out that fatal road accidents contribute to the life 
threatening risks faced by the South African population.  
Table 3.1 shows that fatal road accidents have increased and it is therefore 
justifiable to budget more money for safety awareness campaigns to ensure that 
accidents are minimised. The intervention of the private sector with innovative 
ways of making safety a reality is absolutely essential in this regard. 
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Table 3.1 ROAD ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
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1998 1 728 1 169 1 064 704 615 798 537 409 236 7 260 
1999 2 067 1 181 1 169 549 589 608 545 382 252 7 342 
2000 1 429 1 330 709 491 463 453 439 328 206 5 848 
2001 2 182 1 960 1 211 596 775 843 551 427 209 8 754 
2002 2 334 2 149 1 238 729 754 948 811 672 283 9 918 
 
Source: Annual Transport Statistics (Department of Transport, 2002:76)  
 
On the basis of Table 3.1 it can be said that the travelling public are killed in 
great numbers and this calls for some drastic measures for intervention in order 
to arrest the problem before it spirals out of control. Surely, this terrible situation 
should be addressed if lives are to be saved on our roads. Although it is not 
enough, we have lately seen some interventions being proposed that involve the 
private sector in trying to reduce the number of accidents through a public and 
passenger liability insurance. This arrangement is not a form of punishment but a 
measure that aims at introducing insurance packages by private sector entities to 
cover those vehicles that are involved in public transport services (Department of 
Public Transport Roads and Works, 2003). 
According to Van Miert and Eekhof (2004:146), if the overall efficiency of the 
infrastructure provision is to be improved thereby levelling the playing field, toll 
fees should include external costs such as noise pollution, air pollution, 
congestion and accidents. The internalisation of these costs could be done by 
means of engaging the private sector or toll concession companies that would 
include external costs in their toll fees. Other stakeholders apart from the private 
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sector that could be involved could be the motor industry that needs to be fitted 
with the latest technology so as to lower fuel consumption. The internalisation of 
external costs would, according to Van Miert and Eekhof (2004:146) significantly 
enhance the efficiency of the individual modes of transport and result in a 
considerable reduction of environmental pollution. 
According to the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa 
(Department of Transport, 2002:217), no study has as yet been undertaken to 
quantify the externality costs in the South African transport sector. These 
externalities include accidents, hazardous load spillages, traffic congestion, noise 
and air pollution plus a lack of reliable services. Without question, the need for a 
research study in this area is long overdue.  
To this end, the Department of Transport’s vision states that a transport system 
should provide  
… “a safe, reliable, effective and fully integrated transport operation 
and infrastructure that will best meet the needs of freight and 
passenger customers at improving levels of service and costs in a 
fashion, which supports government strategies for economic and 
social development whilst being environmentally and economically 
sustainable”.(National Transport Policy 1996). 
3.2.2.7 The need for the regulatory authority as based on environmental 
considerations. 
Estache and De Rus (2000:288) are of the view that environmental issues first 
emerge in contract design and must take into account geography, construction 
techniques, and the facility’s operating practices. Initially, mitigation measures 
could include adapting designs with respect to alignments, materials used, and 
standards for construction. During construction, the concession should specify 
particular investments required to improve environmental aspects, including 
noise barriers and other remedial measures such as relocation and resettlement 
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issues if they do arise. 
The need for an economic regulatory authority is necessitated by the fact that 
when the power of eminent domain is exercised, for the relocation of the 
community during the expropriation of land for the construction of roads, a body 
with economic expertise need to quantify the costs incurred by the affected 
community. On the basis of these environmental factors, an independent body 
should intervene to determine a total compensation package to be awarded to 
the affected parties. 
3.2.2.8    Environmental externalities and the role of a regulatory authority 
Arnold (2008:372) maintains that one way to deal with externalities is for 
government to apply regulations directly to the activities that generate the 
externalities. Infrastructure projects have severe permanent effects on the 
environment and are therefore likely to require some form of environmental 
assessment. In a Public-Private Partnership project, the winning bidder normally 
undertakes much of this but environmental advisors may be needed in the initial 
stages to establish minimum environmental standards for bidders. In a road 
infrastructure Public-Private Partnership project, the concerned externalities may 
relate to air quality levels looking particularly at the emission of carbon monoxide 
from vehicles. In dealing with the above externalities, it will require economic 
regulatory authorities to create capacity in environmental economics. An 
economic regulatory body should be able to determine prices after having 
considered the negative effects of variables such as carbon monoxide emission. 
The role of the regulatory authority in this case is that after the Public-Private 
Partnership contract has been signed and thus giving the private sector the 
responsibility to deliver the services, the government needs to intervene to 
ensure that competition works as well as checking on environmental concerns. 
The government’s intervention by means of an economic regulatory institution 
becomes legitimate mainly if the concessioned body to be regulated is a natural 
monopoly. The role of the regulator in this case will be among other things, 
ensuring that the risk of abusive pricing by concessionaires are minimised. An 
economic regulatory body will also ensure that road users bear the full 
 133
cost of their travel directly, by pricing the externalities which also requires 
continued tolling. 
3.2.3 Socio-cultural factors 
3.2.3.1 Social aspects  
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (Republic of South Africa, 
1994:131) states that every effort must be made to extend organisations into 
marginalised communities. This is precisely what the N3 Toll Concession 
Company is doing in terms of ensuring that its social responsibilities are 
exercised along the road corridor in compliance with the law. When dealing with 
the concessioning process of the N3 toll road, a specialist dealing with 
biophysical and social aspects was appointed to do a comprehensive 
environmental investigative study. According to the requirements of the South 
African Environmental Authorities a detailed report with significant specialists' 
input needs to be submitted for authorisation. 
In an interview with National Roads Agency Officials (2002), it was strongly 
emphasised that the Agency strives to strike a sound balance between 
addressing the social and economic interest in road provision. The reason why 
South Africa is currently involving a range of disciplines in road projects is 
precisely because the country intends to address issues pertaining to social and 
economic interests. Traditionally, road planning and provisioning was too 
compartmentalised with little effort directed at integrated and needs-responsive 
approaches. 
It follows that roads authorities such as the National Roads Agency should be 
tasked with developing appropriate policies that would encourage the delivery of 
national roads infrastructure. The infrastructure should bring about economic and 
social benefits implemented through spatial programmes and developments on a 
national scale. While the National Roads Agency focuses on a national scale, the 
Provincial Roads Authority should take the process a step further and ensure that 
locally important spatial developments are linked to both the primary network 
 134
and the local spatial development network. 
The National Roads Agency thus promotes the concept that each and every 
roads authority should see its role in terms of the needs that have to be 
addressed rather than in terms of a class of roads that needs to be managed. By 
so doing, road authorities will be given a stronger hand to source in private sector 
involvement. 
It should also be pointed out that government or its agencies cannot manage 
transportation projects as tools to aid developments as it used to do prior to 
1994. During the previous dispensation, projects were implemented in the 
cheapest way possible without taking into consideration the interested and 
affected parties. According to Cohn and McVoy (1982:1), a philosophy of this 
nature would currently lead to problems in terms of unexpected impacts, 
unplanned growth inducement and therefore public opposition. 
The Department of Transport is experiencing significant changes in the nature 
and focus of its work. It is increasingly becoming more customer-oriented in the 
way it conceives of its mission. Moreover, it is gradually shifting from a focus on 
projects, facilities and construction to a more programmatic, system-wide 
operations perspective. According to the Horizon Twenty Ten (Department of 
Transport, 2002:41), in Public-Private Partnership projects, concessionaires 
taking socio-economic development to heart have successfully created 
meaningful employment opportunities.  
During the implementation of Public-Private Partnership programmes, most 
state-owned enterprises have suffered from the reduction in the size of the 
workforce and from retirement of large numbers of experienced personnel. A 
decline in the enrolment in highway-related fields, such as civil engineering, 
means a reduced supply of new talent. At the same time, the workload of the 
Department of Transport is supposed to increase significantly as a result of new 
responsibilities and the accountability of officials.  
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The officials need to ensure that the contractual arrangements between the 
agencies and the private sector are kept intact. Based on the experience drawn 
from the Gautrain Project, a larger and more complex workload during the 
transition towards Public-Private Partnerships tends to be handled by hand-
picked specialist human resources. This is confirmed by the report by Strategic 
Highway Research (2001:18), where it is stressed that for government 
institutions to be managed successfully, they need creative and skilled personnel 
to strive towards the accomplishment of their vision and mission. 
As part of its commitment, the N3 Toll Concession Company strives to create 
work opportunities along the corridor as a means of alleviating poverty. In his 
research studies, Botha (2005:6) postulates that public sector expenditure in the 
area of capital formation is particularly relevant for a country like South Africa. In 
most developing countries, the record of success in the adequate and cost-
efficient provision of infrastructure is closely related to government’s capacity to 
establish, finance and operate infrastructure projects such as roads. Botha’s 
findings were that: “the worsening poverty is a direct result of infrastructure 
expansion lagging behind population growth”. Although public sector capacity 
constraints in the area of infrastructure provision may be countered by Public-
Private Partnerships, the responsibility for the facilitation and fiscal provision of 
socio-economic infrastructure remains in the hands of government. 
According to the Gautrain Technical Report (2003), the social aspect is essential 
to the extent that if a new road has to be constructed, the aspects that are to be 
covered in the investigation should firstly be to determine the level and extent of 
air quality change from exhaust emissions. Secondly, the extent of noise 
pollution and the hygienic impact the project will have on the downstream water 
users will have to be established. This is the reason why an environmental 
impact assessment study prior to the commencement of a project is essential. 
3.2.3.2 Cultural aspects 
Starling (1984:142) refers to culture; as a way of organising a particular, 
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coherent view of society and enables people to orient themselves to a 
complicated and confusing world. Common and Stagl (2005:67) define culture 
from an ecological economics point of view as a social interaction between 
individuals and its consequences in terms of technologies, institutions, customs 
and is based on the ability to use symbols for communication. In another vain, 
Brown and Ulijn (2004:51) define the term culture as meaning the set of values, 
guiding beliefs, understanding and ways of thinking that is shared by members of 
an organisation and conveyed to new members as an accepted code of practice.  
In dealing with feasibility studies of Public-Private Partnerships, it is imperative to 
acknowledge culture from both the ecological economics and strategic 
management points of view. According to the National Heritage Resource Act 
(Republic of South Africa, 1999a), it is a requirement that an environmental study 
should cover any cultural heritage that may exist and through which the road will 
pass. Persons to be affected by the project are very important role players who 
should be consulted prior to the commencement of the project. 
The above constitutes one critical requirement for public participation to take 
place as required by the prescriptions laid down by the National Land Transport 
Transition Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000b). Prior to any commencement of 
construction, the preferred bidder is required to compile a Heritage Management 
Plan. In other words, any proposed management plan should be in the form of a 
plan that is developed by the preferred bidder showing clearly how he/she 
intends to manage and mitigate the impacts emanating from the construction, 
operation and maintenance of the road project on the heritage resources as 
defined in the National heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (Gautrain Technical 
Report, 2003). 
3.2.4 Economic factors 
According to the Budget Review (2006:21) the South African economy is 
expected to grow by about 5 percent a year over the next three years. The 
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Budget goes on to state that expenditure on infrastructure investment aims to 
ensure that economic growth benefits all South Africans. In their research on 
innovation entrepreneurship and culture, Brown and Ulijn (2004:20) had the view 
that economic growth can be a source of foreign direct investment and the 
development of a country’s infrastructure. According to Kambhampati (2004:18), 
economic growth is measured as the rate of change in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of a country over a specified time period. The GDP is the total quantity of 
goods and services produced in an economy in a given period of time, usually 
one year. Kambhampati also refers to development as progress in a range of 
areas. This could mean economic progress and should also involve social and 
political progress as well as the fulfilment of basic human needs. 
According to Hagget, Johnston, Taylor and Watts (1995:76), if the operation of 
the economy and society is to be accelerated, transport infrastructure is of great 
interest and vitally necessary in overcoming the friction of distance. As the 
economy grows, so does the provision of transport infrastructure or facilities and 
this is positively correlated with the level of economic development. Hagget et 
al’s school of thought is supported by the Budget Review (2006:21), which states 
that the accelerated and shared growth initiative aims to introduce further reforms 
to relieve constraints to economic expansion and improve the competitiveness of 
certain sectors. 
The importance of transport infrastructure to the economy is recognised by the 
Transportation Research Board (1996:99) as an indispensable component of any 
economy and society. Transport is said to be reaching into every phase of man’s 
existence and takes place because of uneven distributions of natural and human 
resources on the surface of the earth and in space. Transport facilitates the 
creation of utilities when goods are moved quickly and efficiently to places where 
such utilities are needed. 
The Budget Review (2006:22) further states that government spending on 
infrastructure is expected to broaden economic activities while providing an 
expanded platform for industrial growth. Public sector infrastructure 
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projects will be developed and should refurbish major transportation links, 
expand the road network and build houses. Government’s efforts to broaden and 
deepen the skills base will be strengthened by the extension of the learnership 
programme to boost youth employment. 
It should however, be pointed out that there are prospects for spending more on 
infrastructure. The world’s infrastructure index was launched recently by the 
Australian banking group Macquarie, and this index indicated that there has been 
a growing tendency in the investment community to pursue infrastructure linked 
opportunities in the form of bonds, equity and other instruments (Engineering 
News, 2005:1).  
3.2.5 Political factors 
Political factors define the legal and regulatory parameters within which 
enterprises have to operate (Pearce and Robinson, 1997:65). Government 
intervention in transport dates back to times when the current science of 
economics was at its infancy (Verhoef, 1996:3). The inevitable transition through 
which South Africa moved is that of a new political dispensation, which gave rise 
to a new constitution, new economic policy, social policy and urbanisation. 
According to Delmon (2005:51), every Public-Private Partnership arrangement 
involves a political context and would be influenced by the relevant political party 
in question. Delmon’s interpretation of political context is not confined to 
legislative or governmental entities but covers an array of influences and 
organisations such as social groupings. Satisfying political requirements is an 
essential ingredient of the project’s success and prospective investors and 
lenders have a particular interest in this regard as it gives them the risk profile 
status quo. Failure to comply with political concerns upfront can derail the 
success of a Public-Private Partnership project. This is supported by the World 
Bank’s PPI Tool Kit (2004:47) where it is stated, "cabinet should endorse the 
major policy decision and enabling legislation prior to the commencement of a 
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PPP project".  
3.2.6 Regulatory environment 
According to Neslund and Neslund (2004:249), government controls certain 
dimensions of the economy through regulations. Government’s intervention in the 
toll roads industry would therefore be justified as it is said to be pervading the 
lives of people. Black, Lodge and Thatcher (2005:3) are of the opinion that a 
regulatory environment requires innovations as this would refine the technologies 
of regulation and search for better tools of governance. In this transformation era, 
there are various pieces of legislation that impact on the development of 
infrastructure and Public-Private Partnership projects in particular. Legislation 
includes the Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996), the White Paper on National 
Transport Policy (RSA, 1996c), the National Land Transport Transition Act (Act 
22 of 2000), the National Environmental Management Act (Act No. 107 of 1998), 
the National Roads Act (Act No. 41 of 1998), the Property and Land Use Rights, 
Competition Policy and Law, legal impediments, corporate governance and the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (Act No. 53 of 2003). 
According to Rossi (2005:3), any established transport regulatory authority 
should be subjected to various regulatory restrictions, including price regulations 
and quality of service requirements. However, the regulated firm in return needs 
to receive protected franchise rights in its protected territory and its investors 
need to be allowed an opportunity to earn revenues subject to a rate of return 
constraint. Rossi further warns that without the expectation of earning a 
competitive rate of return, investors would not be willing to commit funds for 
establishing and operating the utility.  
 
3.2.6.1    The Constitution 
According to Cloete and Thornhill (2004:19-20), the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Act of 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996) is the supreme law of the 
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country and provides the necessary directives. The obligation imposed by the 
Constitution must be fulfilled, and it follows therefore that any law that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is rendered invalid. Section 24 of the 
Constitution states,  
…”Everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or well-being, and to have the environment protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation, promote conservation and secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development”.  
It is evident that this Section of the Constitution indicates how Public-Private 
Partnership projects in roads infrastructure need to be carried out, particularly in 
respect of compliance with various pieces of legislation that are designed to 
guide the concessioning process. In guiding transportation planning, more 
specifically the execution of Public-Private Partnership projects, policies and 
various pieces of legislation play a fundamental role, hence a brief discussion of 
each follows below. 
3.2.6.2    National Transport Policy 
Freeman and Jamet (1998:6) state, "the new White Paper on National Transport 
Policy was formulated and approved in 1996". What is of relevance here is that 
the new White Paper on National Transport Policy (Republic of South Africa, 
1996c) has a chapter dealing with land transport policy, which is intended to 
… “address a wide range of issues, including institutional structures, the 
proposed framework for the provision of services, funding, land use and spatial 
development in support of land passenger transport, and the need for 
comprehensive integrated planning”.  
The White Paper on National Transport Policy (Republic of South Africa, 
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1996c:12) clearly points out that  
… “as part of the overall long-term vision for the South African 
transport system, transport infrastructure will be in place for South 
Africa to be a hub of transport within the SADC region. It must serve 
as a catalyst for private investment. It should be financed through a 
combination of user charges and private public sector investments. It 
needs to incorporate technological advances which promote and 
enhance the role of transport in the economy and development”.  
On the basis of what is contained in the National Transport Policy, it is evident 
that an enabling framework has been laid down for Public-Private Partnerships to 
take place in earnest. 
3.2.6.3    The National Land Transport Transition Act (Act 22 of 2000) 
The National Land Transport Transition Act (NLTTA) (Republic of South Africa, 
2000b) came into effect in December 2000. The Act was passed in order to 
address a number of challenges that are inherent in the land transport system in 
South Africa. Given the historical fragmentations, inefficiencies and poor service 
quality of land transport, the passing of the NLTTA came as an essential 
intervention. Section 4(1)(I) of the NLTTA states that  
… “the participation of all interested and affected parties, including 
vulnerable and disadvantaged persons, in transport planning must be 
promoted, taking into account that people must have the opportunity to 
develop the understanding, skills and capacity necessary to achieve 
equitable and effective participation”. 
To achieve all the above, important progress is crucial to realise the required 
expertise with the skills and capacity to bring about the desired changes and 
developments.  
In terms of the Horizon Twenty Ten (Department of Transport, 2002:53) 
stipulations, the South African National Roads Agency is expected to 
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comply fully with the requirements as laid down in the NLTTA which demand that 
cognisance be taken of the importance of engaging various stakeholders in the 
process of executing Public-Private Partnership projects. An agency is expected 
to recognise a need to introduce education programmes that are strongly 
unbiased towards Mathematics and Science on intermediary levels of education. 
This is so, because Mathematics and Science are critical in the development of 
skills required by the road industry. 
3.2.6.4    National Environmental Management Act  
Section 2 of the National Environmental Management Act of 1998 (Republic of 
South Africa, 1998b) states,  
…”Environmental management must place people and their needs at 
the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, 
developmental, cultural and social interests equitably, development 
must be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable, and 
the costs of the remedying pollution, environmental degradation and 
consequent adverse health effects must be paid for by those 
responsible for harming the environment”.  
The relevance of the Environmental Management Act (Republic of South Africa, 
1989) in the execution of Public-Private Partnership projects is based purely on 
anticipated construction work whose end results are not supposed to have a 
detrimental impact on the environment. The Act should therefore be observed by 
all those involved in Public-Private Partnership projects so as not to be accused 
by the citizens for harming the environment. 
3.2.6.5    National Roads Act No. 41 of 1998  
According to the Department of Transport’s Annual Report (2003/04:45), the 
South African National Roads Agency was established in terms of the 
Companies Act, Act No. 61 of 1973 with the following principal tasks: 
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• strategically plan, design, construct, operate, rehabilitate and maintain the 
national roads; 
• deliver and maintain a world-class primary road network; 
• generate revenues from the development and management of assets; 
• undertake research and development to enhance the quality of roads; 
• advise the Minister of Transport on matters relating to roads; and 
• upon request from the Minister of Transport and in agreement with a foreign 
country, finance, plan, construct, acquire, provide, operate and maintain 
roads in the country. 
 
3.2.6.6    Property and land use rights 
To attract private investment at a reasonable cost, governments have to make 
credible decisions that would lead to a firm commitment to the observation of the 
rules that are established to safeguard property rights. Investors need adequate 
protection against unwarranted government expropriation and want to know that 
the land rights they hold can be exercised and also be protected (Kerf et al., 
1998:31). 
According to the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996a:11), the public 
sector reserves the right to expropriate property for public purposes or in public 
interest. However, this should be done subject to compensation, and the amount 
of such compensation has to be agreed upon by those affected. The 
compensation should be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance 
between public interest and the interests of those affected. 
3.2.6.7 Competition policy and law 
The promulgation of the Competition Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998a), 
marks a milestone in South Africa’s public policy transformation processes 
intended to change the landscape, as we know it from its present apartheid form, 
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into one of a democratic and open society. Thus the Act puts into place a system 
that is meant to contribute to economic growth and global competitiveness. The 
Act seeks to promote the social and economic welfare of citizens and open 
ownership and participation in the economy to previously disadvantaged groups. 
The Act also strives to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare as 
part of economic development. 
(i) The purpose of the Competition Act 
The purpose of the Competition Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998a) is 
summarised below as: 
• to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
• to promote employment and to advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans; 
• to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
to recognise the role of foreign competition in South Africa; 
• to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the economy; and 
• to promote a greater spread of ownership stakes of historically 
disadvantaged persons. 
(ii) Participation by foreign investors 
As a means of encouraging the promotion of direct investment in South Africa, 
measures have been put into place that consists of the Tax Holiday Scheme 
amongst others. The scheme was launched in 1996 and is open to firms making 
new investments which exceed R3 million. Foreign companies are encouraged to 
bring new industrial equipment by offering them a sizeable investment grant 
(Competition Policy and Law in South Africa, 2002:18). 
(iii)  Legal impediments hampering private participation  
According to Kerf et al. (1998:31), governments should remove 
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impediments that prohibit private participation in infrastructure. Two of the most 
detrimental obstacles regarding concessions are the lack of enabling laws and 
regulations that would facilitate equity ownership and which would also facilitate 
the way concession companies are to operate, thereby striving towards 
encouraging foreign investment in infrastructure projects. In line with the 
research by Kerf et al. (1998) concerning the participation of foreign investors in 
infrastructure, South Africa has introduced basic conditions with which potential 
foreign investors should comply prior to them being awarded a concession 
contract. Some of the conditions set in place are those dealing with compliance 
with the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, Act No. 53 of 2003 
(Gautrain Technical Report 2005). Therefore, it is important that prospective 
investors be made aware of these conditions, as failure to fulfil the conditions 
may severely limit the scope of private and particularly foreign investor 
involvement. 
(iv) Corporate governance  
In the opinion of Tirole (2006:16), corporate governance relates to ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. According to the Horizon Twenty Ten document (Department of 
Transport, 2002:50), the concept of corporate governance is instilled within the 
South African National Roads Agency Limited to demonstrate the significance 
the agency attaches to fair public procurement practices.  
As a matter of concern, the Agency and its directors should be made to commit 
themselves fully to the principles of transparency and accountability. The Agency 
should be convinced to have a strong and clear commitment to good corporate 
governance through sound management practices. The embracement of such 
values and ethics in the Agency’s vision, mission and core values should ideally 
result in the Agency becoming more efficient and effective (Department of 
Transport, 2002:50). 
In further outlining the profile of corporate governance, the National Department 
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of Transport’s Annual Report (2002/2003:53-55) gives details on how the 
National Roads Agency is governed. The report further explains, "the Agency is 
controlled by a Board of Directors consisting of eight members, of whom the 
Minister of Transport must appoint seven. The eighth member (ex officio) is the 
Chief Executive Officer". The Business, Financial and Strategic Plan are annually 
approved by the Minister of Transport, as is the Annual Report. A memorandum 
of understanding governs the relationship between the Minister and the Agency, 
and the Chief Executive Officer is accountable to the Minister in terms of a 
performance agreement stipulating the outcomes, performance and management 
standards required of the Agency. 
3.2.6.8 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act  
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (Republic of South Africa, 
2003) and the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Strategy aim to address 
inequalities resulting from the systematic exclusion of the majority of South 
Africans from meaningful participation in the economy. Government’s strategy for 
broad-based black economic empowerment looks beyond the redress of past 
inequalities and aims to position BEE as a tool to broaden the country’s 
economic base and accelerate growth, job creation and poverty eradication 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2004:4). In any Public-Private Partnership 
project, compliance with broad-based black economic empowerment remains an 
absolutely essential requirement.  
3.3 INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE ANALYSIS  
According to Wheelen and Hunger (2006:106), scanning and analysing of the 
external opportunities and threats are not enough to provide an organisation with 
a competitive advantage. Therefore, environmental analysts should also look 
within the organisation itself to identify internal strategic factors that may be 
regarded as critical strengths and weaknesses likely to determine whether a firm 
will be able to take advantage of opportunities while avoiding threats. Internal 
environmental profile analysis is often referred to as organisational analysis and 
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this is concerned with identifying and developing the organisation’s resources 
and competencies. 
3.3.1 Increased capital expenditure 
According to the Budget Review (2006:108), government’s expanded public 
works and employment programmes aim to create 1 million work opportunities 
for the unskilled, marginalised unemployed over five years. At least 40 percent of 
jobs are targeted for women, 30 percent for youth and 2 percent for disabled 
workers. In its first year, a total of 3 734 projects were registered for the 
expanded public works programme, involving expenditure of R3,24 billion and 
the creation of 176 000 net work opportunities (i.e. additional jobs over and 
above those that would have been created if the projects had been undertaken 
through machine-intensive methods). Expanded public works and employment 
programmes cover four priority sectors: 
• infrastructure project funds are allocated through the municipal 
infrastructure grant and the provincial infrastructure grants. Activities include 
maintenance of low-volume roads, trenching, storm-water drains and 
sidewalks; 
• environmental programme initiatives include the Working for Water and 
Working on Fire projects, and a wide range of local environmental 
improvement efforts; 
• social service programmes-projects include partnerships with non-
governmental organisations for home-based community care and early 
childhood development,  
• expanded employment of community health workers through local clinics 
and hospitals. 
Funds for these programmes are from national departments, provinces and 
municipalities through the normal budgeting process, with support for labour-
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intensive methods and appropriate technical and administrative oversight. 
3.3.2 Labour cost 
According to the Budget Review (2006:102), the main driving force of government is to 
strengthen education and to improve performance of the labour market. Investing in 
people and ensuring that skills development complements employment creation are 
critical platforms on which to build future prosperity. This is evidenced by the R4 272 000 
training expenditure incurred by the Department of Transport as reflected in the Annual 
Report (2003/04:26). Apart from the costs incurred in respect of skills development, the 
other cost component is that of salaries, which amounted to R40 382 000 for the 
2003/04 financial year (Department of Transport, 2003:27). 
The implication of the above cost structure is that, if the management of toll 
roads is concessioned out to the private sector, then the costs incurred in respect 
of salaries would be absorbed by such private sector entities. The absolute 
position of whether the South African National Roads Agency should be both a 
concession-granting authority and economic regulatory authority will receive 
attention in Chapter 5 of this study. 
3.3.3 Asset productivity analysis 
Delmon (2005:449) describes an asset as “a tangible and intangible property of 
an organisation”. Wheelen and Hunger (2006:106), however, hold that, “an 
organisation’s assets are the basic building blocks which include physical assets 
such as equipment and human assets or employees and their skills”. Commonly 
speaking, an organisation's assets could also mean aspects such as culture and 
reputation because these too add value to the wellbeing of an organisation in 
similar ways that tangible assets do.  
In another vein, Neslund and Neslund (2004:321) remark, “an organisation 
operates by employing its assets in productive endeavours and could also lease 
such assets”. This means that the Department of Transport has an option of 
operating through the employment of its own assets or it could even consider 
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leasing some depending on the prevailing situation. 
According to the Centre for Development Enterprise (2005:199), state revenue 
could be boosted if state assets, such as toll roads, are managed by the private 
sector. In addition, this would draw foreign direct investment into the country. On 
the basis of the above reasoning, if the Public-Private Partnership initiatives are 
taken seriously in South Africa, then they could constitute an instrument by 
means of which productivity may be enhanced, thereby improving state assets, 
which in this case are represented by the toll roads.  
3.3.4 Financial return analysis 
If the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) were to maintain 
the status quo in terms of managing the non-tolled roads, then it would mean that 
the agency has to depend on government grants for its survival. The same would 
have to apply to the toll roads as well, for the reality is that the toll roads are 
managed by the National Roads Agency. To prove this, in the years 1999, 2000 
and 2001, government grants received by the National Roads Agency amounted 
to R259,6 R599,0 and R516,7 million respectively. However, Pearce                        
and Robinson (1997:194) remark that if other sources of funds could serve as a 
financial lever for an organisation, then, the National Roads Agency can not be 
an exception in this respect. Thus, should the National Roads Agency be 
financially leveraged, then it would mean that it would have to use capital with a 
fixed interest charge that could amplify either financial returns or losses in 
relation to the equity of the shareholders and in this case, government.  
Seen as such, should a situation arise and a transport economic regulatory 
authority be established, then it would, in addition to the setting of tariffs of 
concessionaires, take decisions on how such tariffs would be regulated. Options 
for regulating prices range from rate of return regulation to price cap regulation. 
Under rate of return regulation, the regulatory authority places a limit on the 
returns earned by invested capital and may also place restrictions on the 
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dividends payable to shareholders. Under price cap regulation, the regulator 
limits price increases, often by a certain amount below inflation over a regulatory 
period (PPI Toolkit, 2004:29). 
3.4 PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT OPTIONS 
According to Wheelen and Hunger (2006:138), this phase is about "finding a 
strategic fit between external opportunities and internal strengths while working 
around external threats and internal weaknesses". The analysis of the macro 
environment reveals that technology, ecology, socio-cultural circumstances, the 
economy and politics constitute strategic factors in the toll roads industry and 
need to be responded to through the utilisation of particular capabilities and 
resources. 
In the opinion of Wheelen and Hunger (2006:139), the essence of a strategy is 
determined by opportunity divided by capacity. However, an opportunity on its 
own has no real value unless an organisation has the capacity or resources to 
take advantage of that opportunity. This is important and should therefore be 
taken into serious consideration when opportunities are to be exploited in the 
road transport industry. 
As shown in Section 3.2.1.3, technology has an impact on transportation 
agencies in more than one way. For instance, the introduction of smart cards by 
private sector companies in the toll roads industry has necessitated the 
establishment of the transport regulatory agency to regulate smart card 
transactions to the satisfaction of road users, investors and government as 
important stakeholders that deserve to be respected. 
Based on Section 3.2.2, the ecological factors are of strategic importance in the 
toll roads industry, because the movement of vehicles tend to give rise to 
externalities such as air and noise pollution. These externalities need to be taken 
into consideration when establishing an economic regulatory authority. This is 
done in order to comply fully with the environmental requirements as contained in 
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the National Management Act (NEMA) (Republic of South Africa, 1998b). To this 
end, the proposed economic regulatory authority should maintain at all costs a 
functional working relationship with the Department of Tourism and Environment, 
as failure to do so would spell certain disaster.  
Section 3.2.3 deals with social factors and shows how these factors are 
concerned with, inter alia, the creation of employment opportunities. Therefore, a 
concessionaire is compelled by the terms of agreement to compile a matrix 
showing how employment would be maximised by the formation of a Public-
Private Partnership project. The establishment of an economic regulatory 
authority is expected to strive for ensuring that there is strict adherence to the 
concession contract by the concessionaire. 
In this context, cultural aspects are regarded as an important strategic factor to 
which project leaders in any road construction project should adhere strictly in 
order to comply fully with the National Heritage Resource Act (Republic of South 
Africa, 1999a). It follows therefore that in dealing with Public-Private Partnership 
projects, the Department of Arts and Culture should form part of the major 
stakeholders of such a project. This is so, because government has to exercise 
oversight through its departments in terms of how the project unfolds and 
develops. 
Furthermore, the results of the present analysis point to the fact that those 
economic factors such as inflation and consumer price index are central to a 
successful toll road project that involves a Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement. To this end, it was also found that the establishment of a transport 
economic regulator should be a product derived from the marriage between the 
Department of Transport and the Department of Trade and Industry because 
both departments are highly influenced by transport matters and also exert 
counter-influence on transport issues. An investment decision taken with respect 
to the establishment of an economic regulatory authority needs to be adopted 
 152
and also controlled by the above-mentioned two departments. 
Political factors, as stated in Section 3.2.5, constitute a strategic factor, which 
means that when commencing with a PPP project it will be prudent to identify first 
the actual political organisations and social groupings that have the necessary 
political influence in the affected community. The best strategy to use in such 
situations is to ensure that a structure had been established to deal with political 
organisations and social groupings that are influential in decision-making 
regarding political issues of the community. In other words, there has to be the 
necessary buy-in by various groupings on the project and such groupings should 
be given the platform to express their dissatisfaction before the commencement 
of the project. This view is advocated by the PPI Toolkit (2004:47), which clearly 
states that “Public-Private Partnership requires processes to resolve conflicts 
over project objectives and there has to be a balanced adequate political control 
with rapid decision making”.  
Consequently, major Public-Private Partnership projects, such as the N3 Toll 
road project, have warranted a cabinet consideration to approve their 
establishment. In a way, this could serve as a blueprint according to which other 
PPP projects may be established. To this end, the PPI Toolkit (2004:47) is of 
great assistance because it states that “cabinet needs to consider and endorse 
the major policy decision that initiates the project and legislation to support such 
a project”. 
Palmiter (2005:41) asserts, "investment options in toll roads can be of cash or 
non-cash consideration and is expected to produce income or profit and most 
importantly, the investor is not buying a consumable commodity or service". An 
ideal key feature of government’s strategy could be in the form of seeing to it that 
development in this arrangement is led by private sector investment. The reason 
being that the private sector should be considered the main driving force behind 
growth and development. Any new development strategy should aim at creating 
an enabling environment for firms to invest individually and collectively in the 
construction of particular road infrastructures. Within the context of 
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this study, an investor refers to an entity or individual participating in the equity of 
a project company that is specifically established to implement projects (PPI 
Toolkit 2004:32). 
According to Estache and De Rus (2000:238), there are three models applied by 
road agencies in this contracting out or outsourcing process. Firstly, contracting 
out can be done by transferring the planning and management of selected roads 
to consultants and contractors. Secondly, the entire road networks can be 
contracted out to the private sector but should operate under the jurisdiction of a 
selected agency. Lastly, the agency can set up a contract-executing agency 
tasked with the execution of donor-financed infrastructure projects.  
3.4.1 Contracting out management to contractors 
Delmon (2005:191) points out that a contractor is allocated the task of designing 
and constructing a toll road by the concessionaire. According to Hodge and 
Greve (2005:99), contracting out the obligations for building and operating the 
road service to the private partners has two benefits. The first benefit is that 
private partners could absorb the risks at each stage of the project. As the 
contract would run for 25 to 30 years, private actors could experiment with new 
ways to build and operate roads. The second benefit is that this would promote a 
private sector road maintenance industry, which scarcely existed in the past. 
3.4.2 Private sector managing under toll road agency 
This model involves the contracting out of the management function for the whole 
network to the private sector. The private sector does the work under the 
jurisdiction of a selected road agency. This model is mainly applied in many 
industrialised countries and it has proved itself to be efficient. It is also applied in 
developing countries but there it is mainly done to ensure that a competent body 
that remains answerable to the local district council manages small urban and 
district roads. Some small municipalities at the county council in the United 
States and at the district level in the United Kingdom use this model. Zambia also 
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uses it for both urban and rural district councils. These arrangements offer great 
potential for road networks (Estache and De Rus, 2000:238). 
3.4.3 Setting up a contract-executing toll road agency  
This model is similar to a private sector project implementation unit. It is specially 
set up to implement donor-financed infrastructure projects. The agency normally 
comprises of a board composed of prominent persons from the community and 
does not include government representatives. It has a general manager who is 
appointed by the board, and he/she in turn appoints other line managers. The 
staff members are hired under private sector terms and conditions of service and 
are paid competitive salaries (Estache and De Rus, 2000:238). 
The agency is set up as a private, non-profit association and pays no taxes. It 
works on behalf of local authorities who delegate certain functions to the agency. 
The local government usually reserves the right to select the projects and the 
agency then recruits consultants to carry out detailed engineering. It also invites 
bids and awards contracts for supervision and works, manages the contracts and 
pays the contractors directly from a special account opened in its own name. The 
agency is subject to bimonthly management and financial audits and an annual 
technical audit (Estache and De Rus, 2000:238).  
Previous studies on Public-Private Partnerships proved that contracting out all 
over the world usually saves between 20 and 40 percent of the costs of 
government services. American scholars in California have found that for the 
maintenance of traffic lights, the government costs 56 percent more than private 
companies. For paving roads, the government costs almost twice as much as the 
private sector (Markman and Vorhies 1990:83). 
3.5 EVALUATION OF INVESTMENT OPTIONS IN TOLL ROADS  
In their research studies, Kerf and Smith (1996:5) found that in response to a 
growing appreciation of the problems of the traditional public enterprise model, 
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many governments world-wide have attempted to improve the performance of 
state organisations through performance contracts. Performing under public 
ownership becomes more preferable and tends to yield benefits particularly 
where political commitment and administrative capacity are reasonably strong. 
Botswana has proved the validity of this statement as it managed for most of its 
Water Utility Corporation's existence to carry out its operations without 
interference from political authorities. 
Although Botswana has succeeded in managing its institutions under public 
ownership, problems started to crop up when its water utility could not adjust its 
rates to respond to the user needs as required. This happens where government 
is forced to play the role of owner, regulator and operator simultaneously 
because such an arrangement is dominated by problems of conflict of interest, 
which are inherent in a situation of this nature. This is viewed as a poor 
institutional structure for attempting to operate on commercial principles (Kerf 
and Smith,1996:5). 
In the evaluation of the three investment models, it is important to consider the 
Department of Transport’s standpoint with regard to its long-term objectives. 
Public-Private Partnerships is a strategic must and one has to evaluate an 
efficient and effective model that can be implemented. Firstly, the first model is 
ideal for South Africa as it is being applied on the N3 Toll Concession Company. 
The second model is a big improvement on the first one as it makes provision for 
other spheres of government to apply a Public-Private Partnership in the delivery 
of roads. The third option creates room for the private sector to be more 
autonomous as the entire strategic direction is steered by the private sector.  
 Figure 3.2 is an adapted model derived from the Road Infrastructure Strategic 
Framework for South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2002a:30). The model is in 
support of both options and goes further to show stakeholders’ involvement at 
the strategic level. For example, the first level shows the involvement of the three 
spheres of government in determining the strategic direction of the road network 
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in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Investment options model 
Source: Adapted from Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa 
(RSA, 2002a:30) 
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PRA  Provincial Roads Agency 
Con  Concessionaire 
The second level shows a proposed body that is to be tasked with policy 
formulation at a strategic level. This body should be formed by representatives 
from the three spheres of government and other stakeholders such as the 
National Treasury and the South African Local Government Association. Of 
major importance is the fact that each sphere of government is encouraged to 
establish a service delivery unit or a roads agency to run its roads affairs. A 
practical example in this respect is agencies such as the National Roads Agency 
that attends to national roads. On the provincial level, the Limpopo Roads 
Agency Limited was established to take over the responsibility for all aspects 
related to provincial roads in the province (Department of Transport, 2002a:23).  
The validity of the proposed model can easily be seen in the context of the White 
Paper on Local Government published in March 1998, which states,:  
… “achieving the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
objectives within a reasonable time frame requires municipalities, the 
public sector, the private sector, the community and non-governmental 
organisations to be a key option to be considered by municipalities in 
their effort to rectify infrastructure deficits and disparities”.  
The proposed model creates room for innovations to take place because 
involvement by stakeholders is encouraged throughout the three spheres of 
government. It is important to note that the model encourages government 
control and this is critical precisely because government should play a role in 
ensuring that toll tariffs are controlled. This is so because of the mere fact that, if 
roads are to be managed by concessionaires, the likely result is that there will be 
more room to apply marketing strategies to ensure that the business is 
sustainable.  
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3.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, various environmental factors were discussed and also analysed 
because these factors were found to have exerted considerable influence on the 
Department of Transport. The influence exerted by these factors had brought 
about various outcomes and achievements like, the coming into being of the 
National Roads Agency. Of particular importance with respect to the introduction 
of technology was the increasing use of the electronic toll collection system in the 
operation of toll roads. 
As far as ecological factors are concerned, negative externalities such as noise, 
air pollution, congestion costs and accidents were extensively discussed and 
analysed. The impact of such externalities on the entire transport system 
received attention and it is evident that these factors also influence one another. 
Importantly too, the economic side was also found to have such a large degree of 
influence that it could be reasonably concluded that a healthy economic growth 
stands a much better chance of improving living conditions in the coming 
decades than before. However, it should be noted that economic growth, like 
population growth, is not evenly distributed and it does not necessarily follow the 
same characteristics at all times as it unfolds. This has implications for the 
transportation industry in practically every region. 
In the same vein, freight movement too is increasingly placing particular 
importance on inter-modal connections that go on to involve highways as a vital 
component in the creation and development of the road network on the one side, 
and on the other side the creation of job opportunities. In this regard, the role that 
is played by the public and the private sectors as partners is of cardinal 
importance in creating jobs and also in creating a safe road network.  
Again, electronic commerce is expected to have a significant impact on 
transportation, although it is not yet clear exactly what these impacts would be. 
Tourism too is increasingly becoming an important part of the growing economy 
and consumers need places of leisure to travel to in order to relax and to become 
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revitalised. The transport industry plays an important role in terms of travel time, 
and travel patterns and the road infrastructure required by the travellers are 
expected to vary according to the prevailing circumstances. 
In the final analysis, the Department of Transport has to evaluate a range of 
options available in order to satisfy the needs of road users. So for instance, the 
Department of Transport needs to analyse whether it is the best option to 
contract out the management of national roads to contractors or not. The second 
option would be whether the outsourcing of the management of roads to the 
private sector, while under the control of the Agency, would be the best 
alternative. Currently, South Africa is using different options that still need to be 
tested for their effectiveness. Having said the above, the study sees the last 
option as that of setting up a contract-executing agency, which should consist of 
board members from the community other than government representatives. 
 160
CHAPTER 4 
THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION 
IN THE PROVISION OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past, South Africa’s transport infrastructure was protected from competition 
through specific policies and laws designed for that purpose. This chapter 
examines this traditional practice and strives at suggesting recommendations 
appropriate for managing the present transport infrastructure, which, on account 
of the application of the latest technology, has become so sophisticated that it 
logically calls for the intervention of a transport economic regulatory authority, as 
happens in the case of other entities in the market place. Black et al. (2005:4) 
also instructively argue that regulatory innovation is theoretically seen as a 
strategic adaptive response by a system or organisation to its environment. 
To put issues into context, the 1996 Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996a) 
allows for, among other things, the right of people to choose the mode of transport they 
prefer. In emphasising the importance of this right, the present chapter wishes to draw 
our attention, inter alia, to road users’ rights as contained in the South African 
Constitution and other literary sources related to consumerism. To give expression to the 
rights of the people, this chapter explores various regulatory regimes and examines the 
extent to which the operation of toll roads in South Africa could be made to respect and 
honour the right of choice of people.  
It should however, be borne in mind that in attempting to establish a transport economic 
regulatory authority there would of necessity be a myriad of obstacles that would have to 
be overcome before everything can operate smoothly in the transportation sector. This is 
bound to happen because of various factors, such as the different fiscal regimes 
applicable in countries where the road transport corridor operates. 
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To design a relevant and appropriate regulatory authority, the first step should be that of 
analysing the concept of competition policy, particularly focusing on its application to the 
transport infrastructure. For the purposes of this study, the concept of competition is 
divided into two phases, namely competition for the market and competition in the 
market. Competition for the market, on the one hand, is defined by Delmon (2005:327) 
as competition amongst bidders and is intended to reduce the ultimate price to be paid 
for the procurement of services. Competition in the market, on the other hand, refers to a 
phase where the bidder has been awarded a tender and would now provide the service 
with a sustainable competitive advantage in mind. This will be dealt with 
comprehensively in Chapter 5. 
4.1.1 Micro-economic theory of competition 
Arnold (2008:273) is of the view that the natural monopoly may be regulated 
through price, profit, or output regulation. This study puts emphasis on the 
regulation of prices and an independent economic regulatory authority is sought 
to deal with price structures of various concession companies. In considering the 
role to be played by the regulatory authority, the capture theory of regulation 
warns that no matter what the motive is for the initial regulation and the 
establishment of the regulatory agency, the agency may find itself being 
controlled by the special interests of the industry being regulated. 
Arnold (2008:273) further warns that the regulated industry may make a point of 
getting to know members of the regulatory agency. These groups may talk 
frequently about business matters and also socialize to an extent that the 
relationship grows stronger over time and may have an impact on regulatory 
measures.  
Based on Arnold’s piece of advice, it is imperative that South Africa takes 
precautionary measures to ensure that members of the economic regulatory 
authorities are not falling into the same trap. In order to avoid this from 
happening, an industry service level agreement need to be drafted pointing out 
all regulatory principles to be adhered to during its contract with the economic 
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regulatory authority.  
4.1.2 Why the regulatory authority is needed 
The reason why the regulatory authority is needed could be justified by means of 
advancing the benefits of regulation as stated by Arnold (2008:276) where he 
gives an example of a business firm that pollutes the air with smoke from its 
factories. The government could pass an environmental regulation requiring such 
firms to purchase antipollution devices that reduce the smoke emitted into the air.  
The benefits accruing out of the execution of this kind of regulation is 
undoubtedly cleaner air. But cleaner air can lead to other benefits such as people 
having fewer medical problems in the future. In some parts of the country, 
pollution from cars and factories causes people to cough, feel tired, and 
experience eye discomfort. More importantly, some people have chronic medical 
problems from constantly breathing dirty air. Government regulation that reduces 
the amount of pollution in the air clearly helps these people. This validates the 
fact that in order to deal with environmental externalities, it would be ideal for an 
economic regulatory authority to work hand in hand with an agency that deals 
with environmental pollution. Alternatively, the responsibilities of an economic 
regulatory authority could be expanded to encompass environmental 
externalities. 
4.2 TOLL ROADS AS PRODUCTS OF A NEW TRANSPORT DISPENSATION  
Koch (1994:47) is of the view that  
… “a monopoly is a market structure where all conditions for perfect 
competition hold except that there is only one seller and also that 
there are barriers to entry to that market. If there were no barriers to 
entry, an efficient monopolist would not be a monopolist for long”.  
In addition, Koch (1994:47) also maintains that “the monopolist has market power 
and can manipulate the price of its product without buyers abandoning it 
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in favour of a substitute”. It can therefore be concluded that Koch’s definition of a 
monopoly implies that, if the users have no option in the form of a substitute or 
alternative route, then a toll road is justified to be called a monopoly and would 
therefore require regulatory interventions to control its pricing power. 
The rationale for regulating natural monopolies is intended to control the 
prevailing monopoly power from coming out with ridiculous prices that could lead 
to unnecessarily large profits as happened in public utilities in the United States 
of America (Sawyer and O’Donnell, 1999:36). The major problem with this 
regulatory model is however that it constrains public utilities from realising 
maximum rates of return on assets, and it was for this reason that the United 
Kingdom rejected such a model. In the circumstances, it is advisable that South 
Africa considers the various economic regulatory models that are presently in 
use in other countries and only then develop a model that would serve the 
country’s interests better. The section below deals with the issue of the natural 
monopolist’s tendency to abuse its power of dominance. 
4.2.1 The natural monopolists’ abuse of power of dominance 
According to Hwang and Chen (2004:174), “monopolistic enterprises have great 
market power which when abused, can have negative impact on competition”. In 
exposing this view, Hwang and Chen cite the Taiwanese episode where no 
monopolistic enterprises are allowed either directly or indirectly, which is a way of 
preventing any other enterprises from monopolising the market place. South 
Africa would do well to emulate this strategy through the Competition Act, Act No. 
89 of 1998 (Republic of South Africa, 1998a), which was designed to guard 
against enterprises abusing their dominant positions. In this regard, the 
Competition Act defines a firm in a dominant position as one that has 45 percent 
of the market share and is likely to conduct its business without taking the needs 
of customers into consideration (Competition Commission, 2003:20). 
In terms of honouring and respecting the people’s rights as enshrined in the 
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Constitution, South Africa should ensure that monopolies are regulated by 
independent, impartial regulatory bodies with in-depth technical expertise. The 
main reason for this is that, in order to honour and respect the people’s rights, 
South Africa should not allow dominant firms to use their monopolistic position to 
increase their profits at the cost of users. Presently, South Africa regulates 
through the Competition Commission to correct the past traditions that 
culminated in the abuse of monopolistic power by the dominant enterprises. To 
this end, the Minister of Trade and Industry is formulating policy that is aiming to 
encourage and support the prosecution of firms on account of anti-competitive 
practices. The Competition Commission further monitors dominant firms as such 
firms would likely lead to the eradication of efficiencies and cause significant loss 
to consumer welfare (Competition Commission, 2003:21). 
The above attempts should be viewed in the light that “roads are the backbone of 
the country’s economy and further the government’s goals to improve the quality 
of life of all citizens” (Department of Transport, 2004a:5). Seen against these 
contexts then, if intervention by the regulatory authority in these issues is non-
existent, this would simply mean that the improvement of the quality of life as 
aimed for by the South African National Roads Agency Limited would never be 
realised. By implication, this means that there should be a deliberate effort aimed 
at increasing competition in the various sectors of the economy as well as 
ensuring consistency and coherence in the application of competition principles 
in key economic policy areas. This is supported by Sawyer and O’Donnell 
(1999:39) who regard competition as the most effective means of protection 
against monopoly. Below is an exposition of the meaning of the concept of 
competition as defined by various scholars in the field of transport economics. 
4.3 THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITION POLICY IN THE TRANSPORT 
INDUSTRY 
Fishwick (1993:1) describes competition policy as a term used to describe 
intervention by public authorities to ensure competition in the markets for goods 
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and services. The definition goes even further because it also covers such 
important issues as the prevention or control of agreements between firms not to 
limit competition and to have control over monopoly power and its abuse. In 
support, Amicorum and Plompen (2005:21) point out that competition forces 
companies in a market with a given technology to offer the best quality products 
at the lowest prices.  
Fishwick (1993:15) avers, "the purpose of competition policy is to promote and 
maintain a process of effective competition so as to achieve a more efficient 
allocation of resources". The implication is that competition is a necessary 
condition for the efficient allocation of resources through the market mechanism, 
and Amicorum and Plompen (2005:25) view this as not an end in itself but the 
end goal is to increase consumer welfare. 
To actualise the above scenario, would mean that within the context of Public-
Private Partnerships, bidders need to comply with competition policy during the 
bidding process. Hence, Delmon (2005:327) points out that  
… “the impact of competition on the bidding process is in its essence 
quite simple in the sense that bidders know that there are other 
bidders in contention and are made aware of the presence of those 
bidders. Each bidder would of necessity be forced to reduce its price 
as much as possible and improve the technical and financial basis of 
its bid in an effort to win the project”. 
Against this, Fishwick (1993:16) is of the opinion that the main goal of 
competition policy is to diffuse the economic power and protect the individual’s 
freedom within society. Cvitkovic (1993:1) concurs and says, “competition is 
recognised as one of the strongest societal forces of our time". Seen in this 
context, business competition has become the undisputed global source for fast 
and dependable economic progress. It is argued that if economic progress is to 
be achieved in South Africa, competition laws need to apply to all companies, 
regardless of their classification. This should also apply to concessionaires that 
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are engaged in the commercial or economic activities like the collection of toll 
fees. 
Above all, competition enables each individual to make full potential use of skills 
and to optimise the combination of working time. In support, Delmon (2005:328) 
points out that competition should not only focus on price, but bidders should 
seek more efficient technical and commercial solutions and need to apply other 
resources available to them to improve their bid. Thus, private companies such 
as toll roads operators should not be left to serve their own interest only but 
should be monitored positively and constructively. One way to improve the 
situation is to develop corporate governance principles and to increase 
transparency.  
4.3.1 Pre-requisites for competition in the transport industry 
In order for competition to work more efficiently, it would need a positive and 
conducive commercial atmospheric culture coupled with an appropriate policy 
framework that is set up by government. The framework should include laws that 
establish rights to the possession of tangible and intellectual property. 
Furthermore, government should create an environment that promotes the 
undertaking of transactions at reasonable costs. In other words, laws so created 
should be capable of protecting consumers and employees from fraud. Such 
laws should furthermore inspire officials to exercise due care and truthful 
dealings and should not only be aimed at promoting litigation. 
Sawyer and O’Donnell (1999:39) argue for the promotion of “a regulatory 
intervention as an appropriate measure for the evolution of competition from the 
monopoly position to the privatised utility”. To placate any tendency of the toll 
road industry from operating as a monopoly, it is advisable if not outright ideal to 
put into place an appropriate interventionary policy framework that would ensure 
that the rights of all concerned and / or involved are protected. Pre-requisites 
have the ability to determine the type of procedure to be used in solving 
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particular problems, and failure to observe proper procedure renders an action 
futile or invalid. 
4.3.2 The role played by the Competition Commission in the transport 
industry  
In order to prevent malpractices taking place in the business environment, the 
South African Department of Trade and Industry was advised to set up a 
Competition Commission with clearly articulated guidelines and directions that 
are easy to follow. To understand the role of the Competition Commission better 
it is important to deal with the function of the antitrust enforcement agency first. 
This agency strives after changing industrial structure and conduct as an indirect 
means for improving performance (Petersen, 1981:81).  
Presently however, the function of the Competition Commission is among others 
that of observing the implementation of the competition policy, which includes 
exercising powers in the newly formed concession companies. This study is of 
the view that this seems to be the correct way to protect the rights of consumers 
and to shield consumers against possible exploitation and abuse. On the other 
hand, the Commission is also given the right to administer matters around the 
issuing of exemptions to would-be contractors or concessionaires. This too would 
do away with the past monopolistic tendencies that had existed in the past. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s mandate is given as that of dealing with what 
would otherwise be anti-competitive behaviour by businesses while the aim 
should not be to disadvantage the consumers but to protect them from 
exploitation.  
It is worth mentioning that the Commission has also been given significant 
powers of legislation, which it may use to create a series of exemptions that 
could ensure that consumers benefit maximally from business dealings involving 
the transport industry. The Commission is also given strong investigative powers, 
which allow it to investigate businesses to assess their compliance with 
competition law. The Commission is furthermore given the power to impose large 
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fines for infringement of the competition law. In some cases where a business 
becomes too powerful, the Commission could even order the divestment of 
assets. 
4.3.3 Reason for transport economic regulatory intervention  
A proper way in which government could reassert its power over concession 
companies is simply to establish an appropriate economic regulatory authority 
that is also given the power to issue new regulations that are designed to govern 
the behaviour of companies both in the private and public sectors. To this end, 
this study suggests that an economic regulatory authority is the body to equal out 
the position. In his research findings, Weidenbaum (1995:19) states that the use 
of regulatory power has grown in the United States mainly because this type of 
governmental intervention is seen as a means of ensuring that both the private 
and public sectors behave reasonably in the market place. This view is supported 
by Hahn (2005:1) who asserts that “in the United States, the regulatory oversight 
Agency uses cost benefit analysis to both improve regulatory proposals and 
stimulate new regulatory measures where the benefits exceed the costs”. 
Furthermore, Weidenbaum (1990:19) argues that “when private property is 
devoted to a public use, it must be subjected to public regulations”. In support, 
Kerf et al. (1998:30) state that “one of the first things investors will want to know 
before becoming involved in a concession is whether the country’s legal and 
regulatory environment is favourable to concession operations”. The main reason 
here is that a concession holder cannot unilaterally modify or override the 
provision of a law or a country’s constitution. It would therefore be incorrect to 
assume that all issues or problems involved in concession contracts could be 
handled within the boundaries of a concession agreement, and the study 
consequently explores the possibility of establishing an economic regulatory 
authority. 
Consequently, in order to create a legal environment that is conducive to 
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concession arrangements, government should amend or repeal some laws and 
regulations that have thus far promoted and perpetuated the present undesirable 
state of affairs. In other words, an opportune time has presented itself for the 
creation of new legal provisions that are geared towards allowing for the 
establishment of an economic regulatory authority that would not only grant 
specific rights in certain special circumstances but would actually be designed to 
regulate the entire transport industry.  
As a consequence of the above, the whole transport legal framework should be 
reviewed, because it would be pointless, in the context of a specific concession, 
to try and document what is before the contracting parties while also attempting 
at the same time to remedy all the shortcomings in a country’s legal framework. It 
is needless to say that in such circumstances efforts should be focused only on 
those core aspects of the legal framework that have to be in place for the 
concession programme to succeed.  
4.3.4 Competition policy as a means of regulating the transport industry  
In this context, what needs to be remembered is that monopolists more often 
than not would like to raise prices in pursuit of profit, realising that the consumers 
they lose at the margin are probably worthless to them compared to the 
consumers they keep but overcharge. The result is that the allocation of 
resources in the economy is distorted because relative prices faced by 
consumers no longer reflect relative costs. Consequently, there is an overall 
welfare loss for society because some consumers are forced out of the market or 
are otherwise forced to consume less. 
Another problem posed by inadequate competition is that monopolists often use 
inefficient and costly methods of production to meet consumer demands. 
However, what is important is that if competition is vigorous, a firm that fails to 
minimise costs would be driven out of business by more efficient firms. 
Monopolists may produce any level of output at higher cost than is necessary 
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because they face no challenge to do so cheaply (Fingleton et al., 1995:5). From 
the above exposition, it becomes very easy for one to see the importance of 
competition in the market place. To this end, Sawyer and O’Donnell (1999:31) 
are of the opinion that “where competition has been introduced, there would be a 
need for continuing regulation for charges made to access the network”. Since 
the Public-Private Partnership phenomenon has been introduced in South Africa 
to afford private sector entities the opportunity to compete for the market, the 
establishment of a transport economic regulatory authority would be ideal in 
order to regulate economic aspects. 
According to McNutt (2005:14), “regulatory authorities are established to police 
anticompetitive behaviour and ensuring that prices converge to a competitive 
price”. This too, justifies the importance of establishing an economic regulatory 
authority as it would inter alia ensure that toll fees are adjusted to competitive 
rates.  
4.4 COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET IN THE TRANSPORT INDUSTRY  
Traditionally, the approach that was used in the transport industry was one of 
protecting the existing transport industries because “existing firms were always 
under threat from entry into the market by outsiders” (Demsetz, 1989:86). The 
emphasis was on placing barriers to entry in the market place by new 
companies. Now there are new aspects that play a major role in determining the 
success or otherwise of companies in the market place, and certain factors play 
a significant role, namely economies of scale, advertising, and other factors such 
as production and distribution. Seen in this light, competition for the market is 
often referred to as the winner takes it all.  
Competition is thus regarded as a brutal struggle for survival with the 
consequence that one strong competitor defeats all other participants and forces 
them to leave the market so that the winner takes over the total market. Nobody 
cares about the defeated competitors or whether or not they lose their assets and 
their future source of income. Basanes et al. (1999:195) are of the opinion that 
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when introducing competition in the market to provide road infrastructure, there is 
a particularly pressing need to ensure effective competition for the market. This 
means that the tendering process should be organised in such a way that it 
attracts a significant number of well-qualified bidders.  
Competition is a very effective tool for allocating economic resources and for 
making optimal use of such resources. The successful bidder has to satisfy the 
technical evaluation, and the financial proposal should provide best value for 
money. This means that, in the case of a Build Operate and Transfer 
arrangement, the proposed schedule of government payments to the private 
party should result in the lowest discounted net present value (Department of 
Finance, 2000:25). To this end, the Partnership UK (2001:23) strongly argues 
that public sector bodies wishing to embark on a Public-Private Partnership 
arrangement should not regard competition as a barrier.  
It is advisable that, in the case of South Africa, the aim of the Department of 
Trade and Industry should be to increase competition in the market and not to 
prohibit it, as was the case in the past. Private sector companies managing their 
business in the form of concession agreements should be obliged to abide by the 
competition legislation. 
4.4.1 Competing through the tender process  
The National Treasury defines the tender process as  
… “a process by which the institution requests tenders from any 
parties interested in entering into a New Public-Private Partnership 
Agreement, evaluates the responses from those interested parties and 
negotiates the conclusion of a new PPP Agreement with a New 
Private Party, in accordance with the set procedures”.  
When competing through the tender process, which Pauw, Woods, Van der 
Linde, Fourie and Visser (2005:234) describe as “competitive tendering in which 
bidders offer the optimal value for money within the specifications and 
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conditions that the tender documents lay down” then; a specific procedure needs 
to be followed. In this case, the normal procedure to be followed when a road is 
to be put on tender is that the Department of Transport, through its Roads 
Agency, should advertise the tender for the purposes of securing through 
competition the best contract. This should be advertised through the tender 
bulletin.  
Before the tender can be advertised, a background information together with the 
pre-qualification requirements for the project also need to be published so that 
interested parties could get the necessary information in order to be able to make 
informed decisions (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
1998:7).  
According to the South African National Roads Agency (1999:54), the Agency is 
keen to receive even unsolicited proposals for the construction or maintenance of 
road infrastructure because it now sees this move as but another strategy to fast 
track the process of service delivery in the transport sector. To this end, the 
Agency has laid down procedures to be followed in the submission of unsolicited 
proposals. As pointed out, this is intended to stimulate a competitive environment 
that would allow interested parties to compete for employment opportunities in a 
manner as transparent as possible in order to offer the public protection from the 
possibility of monopolistic practices and exploitation. 
The South African National Roads Agency (1999:54) further states that, “in order 
to succeed, proposals should in practice reflect conformance with governmental 
aims, be in the public interest, avoid the creation of monopolistic practices, not 
seek to place onerous conditions upon government”. In support, Basanes et al. 
(1999:195) state, "the objective of the tendering process should be to attract 
bidders to the competition and the private participation should be well suited to 
local circumstances and subject to risk mitigation". The meaning is clearly that 
the terms of reference should be specific and precise. Furthermore, it implies that 
adequate time for the presentation of proposals should be allowed, and this 
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should be followed by a transparent process for qualifying and evaluating the 
bids. Delmon (2005:321) stresses that “tendering procedures are meant to 
achieve efficiency, manage costs, maintain quality, uphold expediency and 
maximise value for money”. 
Having stated the above, it is worth noting that there are key stages in the 
procurement process that leads to the construction and development of the road 
infrastructure in the country, namely: 
y the consultation phase; 
y the deadline phase for expression of interest; 
y the stage involving the tendering period; 
y the negotiation phase (which ends with a short list of prospective 
bidders); 
y the analysis phase in which the best and final offers are identified; and  
y the last phase in which the selection of preferred bidders is made and 
which ends with the final technical requirements and contract terms 
being concluded as well.  
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A diagrammatic representation of the procurement process is shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
 
1 Consultation phase 
Adverts to appear in the Government Gazette 
2 Deadline for expressions of interest 
Pre-qualification of bidders  
3 Tender period 
Tender evaluation to select short list 
4 Negotiation with short-listed bidders 
Receipt of best and final offers 
5 Analysis of best and final offers and selection of preferred bidders 
Completion with preferred bidders 
6 Finalising technical requirements and contract terms 
Contract award 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Tender process 
Source: Adapted from Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (1998:8)  
In broad terms, Pauw et al. (2005:234) categorise the tender process into three 
phases, namely, calling for tenders, assessing received tenders and awarding 
tenders. The tender process in the construction of road infrastructure is by no 
means a simple task. Experience from the United Kingdom (Department of the 
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Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998:8) also gives evidence of the fact 
that the tender process moves through a series of critical phases that are 
basically three in number but can be expanded into six steps as indicated in 
Figure 4.1. 
4.4.1.1 Call for tenders  
Pauw et al. (2005:235) state that the “tender process begins with a government 
organisation establishing a future need for a high value good or service”. The 
logical methodology to be applied here is to define the need, to cost it and to 
include it in the next budget. Once the budget is approved and introduced, the 
organisation may call for tenders. It does this through the appropriate tender 
board or under its own steam, depending on the size and nature of the contract. 
In calling for tenders, the organisation publicises the sought-after goods or 
services in the Government Gazette (see Figure 4.1). This is done in the State 
Tender Bulletin or the press whereby potential suppliers are invited to submit 
their offers by completing the necessary tender documents. This phase of the 
process is also known as a request for bids and details of the required products, 
necessary specifications accompany the tender documents. Bovis (2005:54) 
maintains that “at the phase of selecting and qualifying the tenderers, contracting 
authorities should inspect all responses received and determine the suitability of 
candidates according to objectively defined criteria that aim at eliminating 
arbitrariness and discrimination”. 
The Treasury guideline (2000) explicitly states that the bid documents or request 
for proposals (RFP) should clearly stipulate the bid requirements. The documents 
should establish the rules of bidding and should follow the conventions of public 
sector procurement. A copy of the draft contract should be included to facilitate 
the early identification of key contract issue. Pauw et al. (2005:235) further state 
that, “there is always a closing time and date for the submission of tenders and 
under no circumstances should organisations accept any late submissions”. This 
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is done as a way of stopping any possible confusion and accusation. 
When bids in the road infrastructure industry are invited, bidders should be 
compelled to demonstrate their willingness to assume sufficient risk and 
responsibility. This should be done as vital measure that would allow the projects 
to proceed as planned. Otherwise it remains a big risk to design, build, finance 
and operate, and to accept responsibility for design, construction, maintenance 
and financing of a road infrastructure without having doubts and being fearful. 
According to Lawther (2000:46), government should be prepared to cancel the 
Request for Proposal (RFP) if there are no sufficient bidders. Similarly, a contract 
should not be awarded if there is doubt concerning the potential contractor’s 
capabilities. 
4.4.1.2 The assessment of received tenders  
In an ideal situation, tenders should be opened in public, and all those who 
submitted proposals for tendering should be invited to be present. Carrying out 
this requirement should pose no problem because there is a public area at the 
offices of the State Tender Board in Pretoria from where people could have a 
clear view from behind glass as the tender proposals are being opened (Pauw et 
al., 2005:236). From there on, suitably competent officials from either the 
departmental tender committee or the Tender Board could proceed to evaluate 
the tenders. These officials should take into account the quality, suitability and 
the abilities of the outstanding bidder/s and these factors together with the price 
quoted by the best bidder/s should be considered when the winning 
bidder/supplier is chosen. 
In case none of the bids presented on the appointed day satisfies the criterion 
that is popularly known as the value-for-money criterion, then all the bids on offer 
should be rejected. However, in the case where bids are of an acceptable quality, 
they should be ranked so that the second-ranked bidder could be considered in 
case a satisfactory contract cannot be concluded with the first-ranked bidder. In 
the technical and financial evaluation process, the National Treasury (2000:25) 
recommends that the following issues be taken into consideration when handling 
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the selection of bidders. 
4.4.1.3    Technical examination of bids  
The technical proposal should be suitable for local needs. This means that the 
bidder may not, inter alia, use a high-technology solution where a low-technology 
solution would suffice. It would also be advisable for the bidder to avoid over-
designed facilities at all costs. Consideration should be given to the capacity of 
government to take over operation at the end of the Public-Private Partnership 
contract: 
• the proposed technology should be reliable, easy to maintain, with logistical 
arrangements for maintenance and support; 
• the sub-contracting plan should contain the number, nature and quality of 
sub-contractors, and assurances should be given by the prime contractor 
for ensuring sub-contractor quality and performance; 
• the empowerment process and affirmative action plus the SMME plans 
should be designed in a substantive, detailed and credible way; 
• the scope and extent of training programmes for relevant staff should be 
outlined in detail; 
• the plan for the utilisation, redeployment or redundancy of the existing 
labour force, including re-organisation of work patterns, should be made 
abundantly clear in the proposal; and  
• arrangements for the transfer or reversion of the project facilities and the 
staff should be made, which clearly indicate how all these would be 
returned to the government at the end of the contract period. 
4.4.1.4    The financial evaluation of bids  
According to the Treasury guidelines (2000), the financial evaluation should 
consider the following criteria:  
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• The financial flows used in the bid document should be consistent with the 
minimum technical design and performance standards and with 
specifications in the bid documents. 
• The financial flows of all bids should be evaluated over the concession 
period specified in the bid documents.  
• The rand should be used as the currency of bid comparison; and bids 
should be examined carefully to ensure that reasonable provisions have 
been made for staffing positions and costs, operating and maintenance 
costs, adequate working capital, replacement and renewal of equipment 
during the evaluation period, as well as income and other taxes; 
• The examination needs to ensure that the demand projections and growth 
rates underlying the analysis are reasonable and broadly consistent with the 
demand projections included in the feasibility study and/or bid documents 
• Tariff assumptions should be consistent with those in the bid documents. 
• The implementation schedule of the project should be properly indicated 
and accounted for in the financial proposal. 
• The project-cost estimates should be complete and should account for all 
construction and operation costs. Any gaps or uncertainties in the cost 
estimates are grounds for rejecting a bid. 
• The financial plan should also be examined for completeness, and financial 
arrangements, interest and amortisation of debt should be properly 
indicated and accounted for in the financial proposal. 
4.4.1.5    Negotiations with the preferred bidder 
According to Delmon (2005:326), the Agency should  
“…elect one or two of the bidders as the preferred bidder/s and then 
undertake detailed negotiations with the preferred bidder/s, agreeing and 
signing project contracts, finance agreements and any other 
documentation required for the project. Where the Agency is not able 
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to agree compliant documentation with the preferred bidder/s, the bidder 
will be replaced with the second-place bidder. However, replacement of 
the preferred bidder is not common as the process is time-consuming and 
expensive. The negotiation is based on inter alia, confirmation of the 
bidder’s commitment and determining the affordability gap”. 
Bidding parties, including debt-funders, should provide sufficient evidence of their 
commitment to the terms of the bid. Departments should not demand 
unconditional commitment. The commitment of debt financiers, for example, will 
mostly be subject to due diligence assessments after the preferred bidder has 
been selected. Departments should, as far as possible, enable bidding parties 
and their associates to commit themselves to the project. 
As the commercial details become clearer during negotiations, an upward 
pressure on price may emerge. This will force the department to reduce some 
costs to keep the project affordable, for instance by interrogating the bidders' 
pricing assumptions or by adjusting the risk allocation.  
4.4.1.6    Awarding tenders  
This confirmation is necessary in the selection and awarding of all public 
contracts. It greatly reduces the possibility of tenderers contesting the award. 
There has long been a tendency for losing bidders to believe that their offers 
have been unfairly judged, and such bidders then want to contest the final 
choice. 
Bovis (2005:67) is of the opinion that the selection of tenderers is a process, 
which is based on an exhaustive list of technical and financial requirements that 
are expressly stipulated in the relevant directives, implying that any insertion of 
contract compliance that is used as a selection and qualification requirement 
should thus be considered as ultra vires. To placate any gossip or rumour, 
managers should immediately make public the winners of tenders. After this 
action, managers may then go ahead and draw up a contract with the successful 
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tenderer, indicating clear terms and conditions to be met, although this is not 
actually necessary. Contracts should have penalty clauses covering any possible 
failure on the part of the successful bidder to meet the terms of the tender. 
One major factor to take into consideration is that during the bidding process, it is 
crucial to guard against collusive tendering because such tendering has negative 
tendencies. For instance, collusive tendering is a restrictive practice, which in its 
simplest form involves an agreement among a number of suppliers in the sense 
that these suppliers decide to form a group and to submit identical bids in 
response to an invitation to tender. Simply put, this is nothing but a risky ploy of 
trying to restrict competition, for should this succeed, then it means that the 
received bids should be sealed to the exclusion of the genuine ones. However, 
when bids are evaluated, it will be obvious to the firm inviting the tenders that 
there must have been collusion. Bovis (2005:67) concludes by saying that “this 
type of arrangement tends to encourage cheating by one or more of the 
tenderers and as such should be discouraged at all costs”. 
Experience elsewhere has taught us that in a process of evaluating the merits of 
a concession proposal, the responsible government departments are often 
confronted with many problems. One central problem that faces government is 
that of ensuring that the award of a tender to a successful bidder does not create 
destructive monopolies. The ideal situation is to request interested parties to 
submit tenders as this ensures competition. The second step is that of ensuring 
that the requirement that bidders reflect toll rates in their proposal for a particular 
period of time, which is normally ten years, is complied with to the letter.  
The European experience teaches us that the awarding of a concession to a 
prospective concessionaire should be based on the concessionaire’s financial 
strength in respect of his/her ability to access both the internal and the 
international capital market. Finally, it is worth noting that in the eyes of the 
selectors, the bidders’ expertise in managing toll roads and their technological 
experience coupled with a reliable back-up support system plus a proven know-
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how record constitute some of the major considerations that count in favour of 
prospective bidders prior to the final selection of the successful bidder (N3 
Project Information Memorandum, 1997). This information is vitally important 
when it comes to the awarding of contracts in the road transport infrastructural 
industry. 
Another important factor to be taken into consideration is that there should be a 
comprehensive business plan in place that allows for the making of an 
acceptable rate of profit for private entrepreneurs, which is commensurate with 
the various risks factors that are involved in the contract. Such a business plan 
should spell out how the public interest would be protected from a tariff viewpoint 
and should also indicate how other considerations, involving issues of 
accountability for public resources, would be dealt with.  
Finally, there should be some control measures in place that would safeguard the 
interest of stakeholders and the general public throughout the duration of the 
concession period. In other words, there should be regulation in place to ensure 
that the basic tenets of Public-Private Partnerships are not hindered or 
obstructed when executing the contract. Briefly, this simply means that the policy 
of free competition should not only be entrenched but should also be promoted 
by those contracts that the Department of Transport gives to the Public-Private 
Partnership entities (N3 Project Information Memorandum, 1997). Having stated 
the above, it is worth pointing out that the withdrawal of an alternative non-toll 
route contradicts the principle of free competition.  
In the previous paragraphs, the concept of collusion was touched upon just 
casually, and it is perhaps time to elaborate on what it could mean to the 
transport industry as it has the ability to offer alternative options to avoid the 
prescribed tendering procedures. The collusion option is a more sophisticated 
form of tendering and could be used, in particular, by those parties involved in 
the tendering process, and they could do this by simply agreeing among 
themselves on who would submit the lowest bid, and further agreeing on who 
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would only bid for the business of certain customers. Again, they might also 
agree to have a rotation system to ensure that each party/firm in turn is a 
successful bidder. Furthermore, they may agree to lower their bids by a certain 
percentage in order to keep a vigorous and efficient competitor out of the market. 
This way parties could use the collusion option to frustrate all the efforts the 
transport department has put into place in an attempt to regulate the transport 
industry.  
4.4.1.7    The rationale for awarding concessions  
Theoretically, Farrell (1994:27) argues that there is a great degree of importance 
in the assessment of benefits when awarding concessions for infrastructure 
projects. The principal justifications for government to award concessions are:  
· firstly, to introduce the benefits of private sector management and control 
techniques in the construction and operational phases of the project; 
· secondly, to promote private entrepreneurial initiative in infrastructure 
projects that could lead to effective Public-Private Partnerships; 
· thirdly and finally, to increase the range of financial resources that might 
be available to fund such projects. 
South Africa can make great strides if it could use experiences it has gathered 
from other countries to generate its own regulations to run the Public-Private 
Partnership contracts in the transport industry. To achieve progress, not only new 
equity finance support programmes for young high-technology companies need 
to be launched in South Africa but new regulations need to be introduced as well. 
To this end, regulations giving support through subsidies need to be in place so 
as to promote the realisation of a harmonious relationship between, on the one 
hand, equity finance arrangements that involve state-owned institutions as 
partners, and on the other hand, with the private sector. All these factors should 
be based on a supplementary and non-competitive relationship between 
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government finance and private sources of funds as determined by the key 
principles governing such arrangements.  
There should be a contractual and administrative setup as adapted to the needs 
of private market requirements as well as a flexible pricing mechanism as 
institutionalised through the influence of government agents and adapted to suit 
certain basic parameters that are in accordance with market needs. Finally, exit 
decisions of public agents and their eventual replacement by private agents in 
the late phases of the transaction are needed to act as an underlying principle of 
ensuring harmony and progress. 
There is however an alternative model that is managed by the state-owned Bank 
for Reconstruction and this arrangement involves re-finance arrangements for 
private lead investors. These private institutions then go on to provide equity 
finance for start-up firms, which then become responsible for ownership and 
management of contracts. 
4.5 COMPETITION AS KEY TO UNLOCKING THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE  
The perception here is that government should implement policies designed to 
improve competition because competition is seen as a key to unlocking the 
people’s right to freedom of choice in the transport industry. In other words, 
transport policies should be created to increase competition in the transport 
industry or to produce competitive results. According to Petersen (1981:9), the 
primary mechanism for improving competition in the United States was the 
application of antitrust laws. These laws gave government the power to alter 
existing or proposed market structures and to impose civil or criminal penalties 
for certain types of business conduct deemed not to be in the public interest. 
In the current study, competition is seen as a key to empowering the users to 
exercise their right of the freedom of choice. Competition in the transport market 
will be discussed exhaustively in Chapter 5 section 5.3 titled “The emergence of 
post award regulation”. 
 184
4.5.1 Consumerism as precursor for introducing a transport economic 
regulatory authority 
To begin with, Springer (1970:1) states that as society grows increasingly 
complex, and the technique of business becomes increasingly sophisticated, it 
becomes obvious that the consumer as an individual lacks the resources to 
participate effectively in the buyer-seller relationship on anything approaching a 
basis of equality. Hence it is not surprising that consumers in the United States of 
America have organised themselves into groups and are plainly saying it is time 
to redress the balance or resort to consumerism.  
In addition, Bloom and Smith (1986:3) are of the opinion that consumerism has 
become an element of our social fabric and is engrained in our national 
consciousness. Seen in this light, it could undoubtedly be said that the balance of 
efforts to improve the wellbeing of consumers would change as the future 
unfolds, as would other conditions in our society that influence the way we think 
and live. Such change would in turn help to shape future social conditions in 
which consumerism would gain ascendancy until achieving a position of 
preponderance. In South Africa, consumerism has found expression in such 
bodies as the Road Freight Association, which constitutes a major force in 
opposition of the construction of the toll roads in the country. 
It is interesting to discover that the Institute for Global Dialogue (2002:38) brings 
to our attention bodies such as the National Consumer Forum, which had been 
formed to represent consumers and to comment on issues that impact negatively 
on such consumers. The forum not only emphasises the need for consumer 
awareness in South Africa but it also highlights the positive impact an organised 
consumer movement can have on an organisation as shown by the experience 
gained in the pharmaceutical industry.  
To forestall the advent of a strong consumerism movement in the South African 
transport industry, a pro-active stance is needed to deal with the delicate issues 
that pivot around the irrational way in which toll roads are being provided 
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around the country without giving the public alternative options. The issue of 
providing toll roads has rapidly become an all-important point and it is currently 
very topical in that it has become a hot potato politically, economically, 
commercially and strategically. Should the present trend hold, consumerism in 
South Africa would in future undoubtedly become the driving force for the 
establishment of a transport economic regulatory authority with its main function 
being to protect the needs and interests of road users, operators and the public 
sector at large. 
For South Africa to begin to make a positive move in the direction of finding a 
lasting solution, it would be advisable to encourage the existing concessionaires 
to establish a forum consisting of all affected stakeholders in an attempt to 
provide a platform for regular communication, consultation, negotiation and the 
resolution of problems. 
4.6 ROAD USERS’ RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND POWER OF 
REDRESS 
Wheelen and Hunger (2006:67) assert that “human beings have certain 
fundamental rights that should be respected in all decisions. A particular decision 
or behaviour should be avoided if it interferes with the rights of others”. The rights 
of the road users have been deliberately violated by road authorities, as they 
took the view that most road users are not aware of their rights. Unfortunately, 
this view seems to be true in that most road users appear not to be aware of their 
rights. Eckert (1974:34) however is of the opinion that “road users are supposed 
to know both their rights and what to do when these rights are being violated”. 
History tells us that President J F Kennedy was the first to proclaim consumer 
rights formally. These rights, laid down in 1962, included: 
• the right to make meaningful choices; 
• the right to be heard; 
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• the right to safety; and 
• the right to be informed. 
Here too it is important to state that most of the support came in the form of 
consumer rights legislation as a consequence of the changed conditions and 
circumstances and the new ways of thinking that characterised the technological 
generation. South Africa still needs to witness more of this trend because the 
characteristics of the South African road infrastructure network have become so 
complex that they now possess a high degree of potential influence on the road 
users’ behaviour to the extent that any form of rebellion to challenge the 
traditional protective practices is a possibility these days. In view of this, the basic 
rights, responsibilities, and methods of redress need to be revisited by all 
stakeholders in the road industry. 
Fortunately, the Gauteng provincial government has proactively seen it fit to 
allocate R11,8 million for the education of consumers with respect to their rights. 
While it is appreciated that Gauteng Province has taken the lead by initiating an 
effective and appropriate educative consumer programme, it should be evaluated 
as whether a transport economic regulatory authority should take consumer 
matters provincially or on a national scale. 
4.6.1 The road users’ freedom of choice as enshrined in the Constitution 
The concept of freedom of choice presupposes that when a road user makes a 
decision to make use of a road, he or she is buying a service. Accordingly, Wish, 
Steely and Tritten (1978:8) argue that “buying a product or service involves 
getting something you need and also making some sacrifices to get these 
features”. However, the current position is that the Toll Road Concession 
companies now provide road transport infrastructure to road users on a 
monopolistic basis, leading to a lack of competitiveness. This move is counter-
productive in that it brings back the old monopolistic tendencies that the 
introduction of the policy of competition intended to eradicate.  
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Viewed from a different angle, it could be argued without fear of contradiction that 
an optimised use of the existing road infrastructure would make the building of 
new infrastructure acceptable for the public and interesting for private funding. 
This would have the effect of promoting the right of freedom of choice for road 
users. No doubt the construction of new roads by the private sector would 
unburden governments by providing resources required for the development of a 
transport infrastructure. Government in this respect should play a key role in 
ensuring that there are fair terms of access to and use of the infrastructure, and it 
should also set up safety measures and acceptable environmental standards 
(Van Miert and Eekhof, 2004:129).  
Fingleton et al. (1995:12) furthermore point out that  
…”competition is required as it is expected to facilitate consumer choice. 
Consumers should be able to exercise choice, not merely because this will 
enable them to obtain the services they prefer but also because they no longer 
wish to be told how to live”.  
Allowing inadequate competition would therefore threaten the ability of citizens to 
exercise their autonomy as represented by their right of choice. No doubt that 
this step would also threaten consumers’ standard of living directly and in many 
ways. Consequently, the need to absolve certain groups of toll road users from 
paying toll fees because of their poverty no doubt would be contrary to the 
principles on which toll roads are based. 
To avoid any potential contradictions, it was generally required in the past that 
road authorities should provide and maintain an alternative route, albeit to a 
lower standard. Subsequent amendment to the legislation has however removed 
this requirement and we now encounter cases in which road users between 
certain origins and destinations have no choice but to use a toll road and to pay 
the additional fee for a superior level of service they do not require (Road 
Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa, 2002a:99).  
Another contentious issue is that of an existing road being declared a toll 
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road. This adversely affects long-standing users who now have to pay an 
additional fee for the use of the same facility. These road users are now left 
without their right of freedom of choice as regards road use. From whatever 
angle we look at this, it would be logical to arrive at the conclusion that such a 
move would constitute the main cause of public resentment as users are denied 
their freedom to use the road the way they were used to, as it was initially 
available without toll fees. A case can thus be made for exemption from toll fees 
for users who, not by choice of desiring a superior level of service, are forced to 
use a toll road where no alternative exists, and especially where such people 
have been using an existing non-toll road previously.  
Lastly, it is typical for road users to locate their places of residence in relation to 
their work and other destinations on the basis of there being no toll. The case 
becomes so much stronger when road users are poor, or where road users’ 
places of residence were dictated by previous apartheid policies that forced them 
to commute for long distances to their places of work (Road Infrastructure 
Strategic Framework for South Africa, 2002:99). Be it as it may, we have in South 
Africa a special case from which a lesson can be drawn, namely that of low-
income road users who have made representations regarding their transport 
problems and were fortunate to receive a sympathetic hearing. This resulted in 
changes during the design stage of the Grasmere plaza in Gauteng to provide an 
alternative route for Orange Farm commuters. 
4.6.1.1 User choice and sovereignty 
If the user has the freedom to decide what to buy, then there is a certain level of 
user choice. Fingleton et al. (1995:12) aver by saying, “as long as the user is 
presented with a variety of options then, there is a degree of choice”. On the 
other hand, user sovereignty implies that users are the ones to determine what 
those options are and this is defined by Common and Stagl (2005:324) as “an 
idea that individuals should get in terms of what they want and that the proper 
measure of economic performance is the preference of individuals as expressed 
in their willingness to pay”.  
 189
Ideally, this should mean that in the toll roads industry, road users ought to be 
presented with a range of route options. No one should force road users to make 
use of toll roads. Using a toll road should be of an individual’s own choice and on 
account of his / her willingness to pay. If road users are required to make use of 
a toll road due to lack of alternative road, then there is no option and they are 
therefore denied a certain level of choice and sovereignty. It is therefore 
imperative that there should be an alternative road that would allow road users to 
make a rational decision and choice. 
Artis and Miller (1981:82) are of the opinion that “even if user choice exists, there 
are a number of things that individuals are forced by law to buy”. For example, in 
Gauteng, if an individual owns a taxi, such an individual would be obliged by law 
to purchase a public and passenger liability insurance. The individual has 
therefore no choice when it comes to purchasing the liability insurance. It may 
also be said that individuals in such circumstances could exercise their right to 
choose not to own a taxi if they construe a passenger liability insurance as a 
burden. 
The establishment of an economic regulatory authority could serve as a possible 
solution to deal with aspects related to user choices and sovereignty. The 
regulatory authority would therefore exercise its powers as an independent body 
ensuring that the needs of users, operator and public sectors are addressed. 
4.6.2 The right to be heard as enshrined in the Constitution 
The right to be heard simply means that citizens should be afforded the 
opportunity to complain if they are not satisfied with the quality of the toll road 
service they get. In support, Lawther (2000:173) argues that “customers, who 
wish to complain, compliment, or comment should be given a form to fill at each 
toll booth”. There should be a register where road users could register their 
complaints on site. To make this possible, the Environmental Management Plan 
(2003:13) states that “the register shall contain all contact details of the person 
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who made the complaint and information regarding the complaint itself”. 
The complaints register must be kept in accordance with the record-keeping and 
documentation control requirements as set out in the Environmental 
Management Plan. The concessionaire has to ensure that all complaints 
received are reported to the Environmental Monitoring Committee and should 
respond to all complaints received from any third party in a prompt, courteous 
and efficient manner. In addition, there should also be a toll-free telephone 
number for those who wish to respond vocally. The concessionaire’s Director of 
Quality Management should respond to each written complaint or call (Gautrain 
Technical Report, 2005).  
To strive for even better results, it is advisable to establish an ombudsman’s 
office as a way of maintaining communication between government, the public 
and the concessionaire. Referring to the office of the ombudsman, Steele 
(1997:136) points out that “the office’s staffing and resource levels are small, but 
its role in relation to the provision of information is huge”. The ombudsman’s role 
is important because his/her office disseminates information related to the 
performance of state agencies and distributes information pertaining to the 
functions of departments and the way departments account for their actions. 
Lastly, the ombudsman’s office is expected to play the role of enabling citizens to 
seek redress for their complaints.  
In Ireland, the office of the ombudsman has been successfully implemented. 
Unfortunately, the South African situation is different and can be best served by a 
transport economic regulatory authority. Hence, the current study assesses the 
feasibility of having a transport economic regulatory authority as an intervention 
to bring about solutions to problems affecting good communication between 
government, the public and the concessionaire. 
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4.6.3 The right to be informed as enshrined in the Constitution 
In their research studies, Jelly and Herrmann (1973:7) came to the conclusion 
that “consumers have a need for information and knowledge”. Furthermore, 
these authors stress the view that learning to be a wise consumer was not only 
important but also essential in enabling an individual to discharge his or her 
duties as a citizen. Consumers are, according to Steele (1997:7), “users of public 
services and regulations, they therefore need information to exercise choice and 
control over their personal situations”.  
Jelly and Herrmann (1973:15) advocate the view that “there should be additional 
information concerning the use and care of products at the disposal of the public 
or road users so that they can be in a position to make informed decisions and/or 
choices”. On this basis, it is reasonable to expect toll concession companies to 
provide a strategy that would ensure that every piece of information about the 
route is disseminated at each toll plaza. This could be achieved by amongst 
others the provision of brochures that inform road users about the entire route. 
Such a step could also assist in the realisation of the currently proposed 
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), which is aimed at keeping the road user 
informed about the road network. 
In a nutshell, road users need route information in order to meet their social and 
convenience needs. Concession companies should be made to provide 
information to market their range of services en route if they intend to stay in 
business. This marketing strategy is supported by Wish et al. (1978:38-39) who 
stress that “the seller must produce a usable product, distribute the product to 
potential consumers, price the product so that consumers will be able to buy it, 
and promote the product so that consumers will want to buy it”. With this in mind, 
the Gautrain project has established a policy that compels the concessionaire to 
be responsible for providing a website which shall keep the public informed of the 
development of the project. The website needs to include details of the 
organisational structure, roles and responsibilities (Environmental Management 
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Plan 2003:12). 
In other words, the concessionaire is required to ensure that throughout the 
design and construction phase, a person is nominated whose duties include the 
responsibility for providing information about the project to the public. Such a 
person or persons should also liaise directly with each affected community on an 
ongoing basis. The concessionaire shall comply with all statutory requirements 
for public consultation, including those contained in the South African 
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) and the National Environmental Management Act 
(Act 107 of 1998) (Gautrain Technical Report, 2005). 
Finally, it is argued that; during the construction phase of the road infrastructure, 
the concessionaire should take the responsibility of erecting information boards, 
in the position, quantity, design and dimensions specified by the Independent 
Environmental Control Person (IECP). The information board shall contain 
background information for the construction activity and the relevant contact 
details to assist anyone who wish to submit complaints. If an economic regulatory 
authority is established in South Africa, it could probably deal with the regulation 
of information between the concessionaire, the public and government.  
4.6.4 The right to safety as enshrined in the Constitution 
The concept of safety is fundamental to the survival of living organisms as we 
know them. Thus, if the right to safety is to be given undivided attention, then an 
office of the Independent Environmental Control authority needs to be 
established to deal with issues of safety. In addition, an independent person 
needs to be appointed with the authority to impose spot fines on the 
concessionaire for failure to comply with environmental specifications contained 
in the Environmental Management Plan. Among the transgressions to be 
monitored by the Independent Environmental Control Authority is littering on site, 
vehicles driven in excess of designated speed limits and excess dust or excess 
noise or vibration emanating from the site, etc (Environmental Management Plan, 
2003:13). 
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Seeing that South African roads are notorious for the dangers posed to drivers 
and pedestrians alike, particularly as a result of inadequate technical 
specifications (such as being too narrow) and deterioration (such as potholes), 
the Independent Environmental Control Authority would have to play a major role 
in ensuring that road safety is given thorough attention during the construction 
phase of a concessioned road infrastructure. South African roads are ranked 
number 23 internationally with regard to the prevalence of vehicle accidents 
accompanied by injury, and number 21 with regard to the number of deaths on 
roads. It stands to reason that any significant improvement in the quality of roads 
would be accompanied by a lower prevalence of accidents, injuries and fatalities 
(Botha, 2005:5). 
By the look of things, it is evident that environmental regulation is an area that 
has not been given enough attention in the developing countries. In their 
research, Basanes et al. (1999:80) found that most countries are just beginning 
to allocate responsibilities for environmental aspects to specific institutions. It is 
time for South Africa to establish appropriate regulatory authorities in order to 
deal with aspects of safety, environmental aspects and economics in nature with 
diligence. It is worth noting that the responsibilities of the current Rail Safety 
Regulator are extended to regulate other modes of transport or be brought under 
one roof with other safety regulatory authorities.  
4.6.5 The need to have rights included in concession contracts 
Basanes et al. (1999:21) point out that it is of major importance in Public-Private-
Partnership contracts that there should be a balance between the two parties in 
the contractual agreement, including a balanced resolution of disputes or 
disagreements over the performance of the contract and its interpretation. The 
two contracting parties should have the same rights and status before the law 
and the courts. By contrast, in a concession agreement, the government as 
signatory party should reserve for itself certain powers to which the private party 
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is not entitled.  
It has to be emphasised that government plays an active role in planning, 
coordinating and monitoring the construction of infrastructure. This active role is 
also extended to the cost-recovery stages, since investment recovery is usually 
highly dependent on the level of traffic and congestion. A combination of diverse 
fiscal resources is necessary to finance the costly infrastructure. Basanes et al. 
(1999:2) further caution that government’s use of unilateral powers in contractual 
agreements could become a major source of instability and risk thereby 
compromising sustainable Public-Private Partnership and increasing the cost of 
private involvement. 
4.7 THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH TOLL ROADS ARE TO BE OPERATED  
The Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa (2002a:99) states 
that the principle on which toll roads are based is that of  
… “providing a road with a superior level of service for users who are 
willing to pay more for that service. From a user point of view, the 
normal road user charges are argued as being for the use of non-toll 
primary and secondary roads, and the additional toll fees as being for 
the additional level of service provided by the toll road”. 
The toll road authority is justified, both by legislation and by business principles, 
in charging full fees to all users of the toll road, since the superior level of service 
the authority provides is identical for all users. Any decision to alleviate the cost 
burden for certain user groups is one based on social equity, and is the 
responsibility of government, not that of the toll road authority. In the case of the 
state toll roads operated by SANRAL, such a decision can be made by the 
Minister of Transport as the shareholder of SANRAL acting through the SANRAL 
Board. In the case of toll roads operated by concessionaires in terms of a PPP 
agreement, such alleviation would have to be negotiated between the Minister, 
SANRAL and the concessionaire. In both instances, the toll road authority might 
be justified in seeking compensation from government for the loss of 
 195
income resulting from the reduced fees. Alternatively, it might decide to absorb 
some of the loss of income under its social responsibility programme (Road 
Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa, 2002a:100). 
4.7.1 The need to review policy on construction and operation of toll roads  
According to the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa 
(2002a:100), a detailed examination should be made of which types of low-
income users should be eligible for reductions or exemptions when using the 
existing toll system. For that matter, principles should be established for 
negotiating similar arrangements in future when toll facilities are to be provided.  
The following are mere suggestions of how the above problems could be 
resolved in future. These suggestions include various possible means of how to 
make provision for users whom the government decides should not pay the full 
toll fee. 
• Provision of a viable alternative non-toll route; 
• use of the toll route at a reduced fee or no fee at all by providing dedicated 
on and off ramps to a particular community, for the use of that community 
only; 
• use of the toll route at a reduced fee or no fee at all by identifying users 
qualifying for such use by means of an identification card, or by means of 
advanced technology such as a smart card or transponder fitted to the 
vehicle; and 
• use of the toll route at a reduced fee or no fee at all by public transport 
vehicles conveying passengers whom government decides should not be 
subject to toll fees by means of advanced technology such as a smart card 
or transponder fitted to the vehicle. 
If such special provisions are made, precautions should be required to ensure 
that abuse by other non-intended users is prevented at all costs. It is suggested 
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that an independent review panel be established whose mandate should be to 
examine the existing relationship between the toll fees, the risk factors and 
ultimately the structure of the concession agreements so as to formulate 
appropriate principles and guidelines for the control of future proposals as well as 
formalising the present precarious position of the country’s toll roads. 
4.8 REGULATION AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING COMPETITION  
Van Miert and Eekhof (2004:144) are of the opinion that “road transport policies 
should focus on the safety of the users and on specific environmental effects as 
emanating from such factors, such as the performance of vehicles, excise duties 
and taxation matters”. In other words, there should be effective pricing 
instruments in place that are able to prevent excessive congestion, accident 
rates and pollution if the use of toll roads is to attain any acceptable degree of 
success. Pricing policies therefore should be used as tools to control the 
negative side effects of transport by-products or off-shots. The research by Van 
Miert and Eekhof (2004) on the state of current pricing strategies conducted in 
the European Union, suggests that these strategies are unable to make it 
possible for victims to recoup the external costs of transport. This means that 
these external costs are not fully included in the price of transport.   
Van Miert and Eekhof (2004:145) further highlighted fundamental flaws that 
result from the non-allocation of costs. The first flaw is that government 
sometimes accepts inefficiency to gain other benefits such as the stimulation of 
employment. The second flaw relates to the application of different policies of 
member states for charging the use of infrastructure in the form of different taxes. 
These flaws give rise to distortion of price signals in the market and so distort the 
industry’s transport choices. In their concluding remarks, Van Miert and Eekhof 
(2004) further accept the difficulties involved in measuring and allocating the 
external costs caused by transport to the user. They advise that failure to 
acknowledge such costs might result in excessive use of certain goods or 
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services.  
4.8.1 The role of a regulatory authority in the transport industry 
According to the Budget Review (2006), the Department of Transport aims to 
increase investment in transport infrastructure, both through public investment in 
road and rail infrastructure and through Public-Private Partnerships. There is 
therefore a critical need to have regulation in place that will encourage sustained 
private investment in infrastructure. This would help to serve more than the 
interests of investors. It would also promote competition and would increase 
access to basic services. Regulations are expected to be clear and credible, 
ensuring investors that regulators are committed to fair, consistent, and 
sustainable policies and procedures (Kessides, 2004:101). 
Kessides (2004:101) further says that infrastructural industries are essential for 
the development of both the public sector and the economy in general. Thus, 
care should be exercised in that, when the price of the infrastructural services is 
based on costs, the price may end up eating a large portion of household 
budgets. This implies that some measure of protection should be put into place to 
avoid this from happening. In another important vein, Bailey (1987:5) contends 
that an economic regulator could serve as an appropriate intervention for dealing 
with externalities such as the control of pollution.  
In this context, therefore, the Department of Transport’s decision to establish a 
transport economic regulatory authority to ensure that prices imposed on users 
are regulated, should be commended. Otherwise, there is no doubt that the price 
changes could have a considerable impact on the level and distribution of real 
income if not checked in time.  
4.8.2 Creating regulation through administrative procedures  
In some countries, utility regulation is based on well-defined administrative 
procedures. These procedures determine how regulatory agencies make 
substantive decisions and define mechanisms for executing such decisions by 
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way of specifying the institutional environment for decision-making. O’Malley 
(1998:29) argues that “where full competition was not possible from the outset, 
regulators have a duty to encourage the development of competition in their 
industry”.  
The reason that regulators need to be established stems from the need to 
eradicate the abuse of power by the existing monopolies who fail to meet 
deadlines and also rigidly enforce rules even when the results are irrational, or 
even fail to respond to requests to relax rules in such circumstances. The need to 
establish regulators is further underscored by the fact that controversies are 
inevitable even under the most enlightened circumstances. Moreover, it is difficult 
to determine the merits of any complaint especially when conflicting problems are 
strongly asserted by opposing parties (Kessides, 2004:104). 
To deal amicably with the above situation, then, the services of an independent 
consultant to conduct management audits of current regulatory agencies and to 
examine the claims of excessive rigidity is a sine qua non. Another suggestion is 
to create an ombudsperson for each regulatory agency or for all regulatory 
agencies. Ombudspersons could combine the objectivity needed for prompt 
accountability and impartiality (Kessides, 2004:104). 
4.8.3 Generating regulation through concession contracts  
Generally speaking, not all regulation is legislated, but it often happens that 
common sense and precedent also give rise to regulation as well. Indirectly, 
Delmon (2005:109) points out that in certain circumstances “the regulatory 
structures intended to monitor and manage certain sectors or utilities may 
provide a particularly salient example of an administrative function that would be 
key to the viability of a project”. It is precisely on the basis of this contention that 
a transport economic regulatory authority be established with significant power 
and authority over the concessionaire’s operation. 
The Department of Transport’s standpoint should be that of developing a 
regulatory system and should give it the capacity to ensure that operators in the 
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transport sector meet the required safety and security standards (Budget Review 
2005/2006). We should be mindful of the fact that a concession contract grants a 
private company, typically through competitive bidding, the exclusive right to 
provide a service for a specified period by using existing facilities and developing 
new ones. In other words, a concession agreement only transfers assets to the 
private sector on a temporary basis. Thus, at the end of the concession period, 
the assets are transferred back to the public authority. In a way, continuing 
government ownership of infrastructure assets could be perceived as providing 
some assurance that social obligations would be met and that, if the service is 
inadequate, government would intervene (Kessides, 2004:105). 
Regulation of concession agreement is complex because governments often 
retain for themselves contradictory functions that can create conflicts of interest 
or even exacerbate the regulatory risk involved in the implementation of the 
concession agreement (Basanes et al., 1999:26-27). A concession contract 
typically defines the concessionaire’s obligations in terms of service coverage 
and performance standards, rights, incentives and risks, including pricing 
arrangements. 
By establishing an explicit contractual relationship, concessions limit 
government’s discretionary powers and can reduce the risk of political 
expropriation. Contracts that contain certain guidelines say for revising tariffs and 
settling disputes can help minimise regulatory discretion and opportunism. 
Moreover, concessions granted through competitive bidding contribute to 
allocative and productive efficiency by resulting in average cost pricing and the 
selection of the most efficient firm. In addition, periodic re-bidding of concessions 
creates competition for the market, potentially solving the problem of natural 
monopoly (Kessides, 2004:105). 
4.8.4 Adopting regulation through substantive economic restraints  
Government discretion can be limited by having regulatory authorities publicly 
articulate the basic economic principles that guide their policy decisions. Before 
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private investments are made, regulatory authorities should commit to the 
transparent application of these principles to reach decisions and resolve 
disputes (Kessides, 2004:108). 
To enhance government credibility, these principles should be embedded in 
concession contracts. Alternatively, they could be contained in an overarching 
statute and so have the force of law. They would not, however, rigidly 
micromanage the terms of Public-Private Partnership. Instead these principles 
would allow space for regulation to adapt to changing market conditions and 
require regulators to: 
• refrain from unilaterally imposing policy or rule changes that undercut 
promised investment value; 
• refrain from intervening in activities of regulated firms that relate to 
competitive markets, or at least markets not identified as protected natural 
monopolies; 
• avoid expanding regulatory interventions without demonstrating that the 
benefits outweigh the costs; 
• ensure competitive service quality and prices by avoiding Public-Private 
Partnership deals that result in higher prices than necessary, allowing 
consumers to challenge deals that result in higher prices in return for higher 
government revenue, using price cap mechanisms to control regulated 
monopoly prices, and allowing consumers to seek rate adjustments if 
service quality falls far short of that promised in a Public-Private Partnership 
agreement; 
• provide consumers, suppliers of complementary and substitute services, 
suppliers of inputs, and investors with signals and incentives for efficient 
actions by ensuring that prices reflect the value and marginal costs of 
services and by giving providers pricing flexibility; and require infrastructure 
monopolists to give rivals open access to their bottleneck facilities at prices 
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with the same mark-ups as the competing services sold by these 
monopolists (Kessides, 2004:108-109). 
4.8.5 Getting the economics right through transport economic regulation  
In order to protect the interests of customers, all forms of private sector 
participation require some measure of economic regulation and O’Malley 
(1998:15) avers by pointing out that “regulation protects the consumer for as long 
as the utility company retains a near monopoly in the provision of services”. In 
addition, Basanes et al. (1999:180) are also of the opinion that “economic 
regulation may be carried out either by establishing a regulatory body with 
specific responsibility for the activity or through the specific terms of the contract 
itself”. In other words, an economic regulatory authority of some kind is needed 
to see to the smooth running of affairs, and this is presently not the case. 
In support, Kessides (2004:110) is of the opinion that “effective regulation 
requires more than just building institutions and ensuring regulatory 
independence”. Therefore, to create an attractive investment environment, 
policymakers are challenged in addition to create institutions whose key function 
would be to regulate both procedural and substantive issues involved in the 
transport industry. On the other hand, care should be taken because even the 
pricing policy might make it impossible to attract private investment if not well 
managed. Similarly, regulation that forbids flexible prices or which imposes social 
service obligations on only some competitors could hinder the promotion of 
efficient investment even if institutional mechanisms provide a credible 
commitment to stable policies. 
Furthermore it is worth noting that to achieve success revenues have to be 
adequate if they are to enable a firm to maintain, replace, modernise, and 
expand facilities and services. On the contrary, “if revenues are lower, services 
would deteriorate and utilities would have a harder time obtaining new capital 
because the market for funds simply offers no room to those who cannot face 
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competition from others seeking capital” (Kessides, 2004:111). For prices to 
make sense economically, they have to be compatible with the prevailing level of 
earnings. 
However, it is again important to note that no prices can guarantee that regulated 
utilities would earn adequate returns overall. In other words, if demand for utility 
services is insufficient, their operations are conducted wastefully, or their 
services are poor, even appropriate prices cannot be expected to lead to 
profitable operations. 
On the contrary, once utilities are permitted to charge appropriate prices in a 
competitive environment this would lead to regulatory impediments to the 
elimination of financial viability. It is then up to the utilities to take advantage of 
this opportunity through efficient operations, high-quality services and effective 
marketing (Kessides, 2004:112). According to Santos (2004:17), “road pricing 
has become important as it contributes towards travel time saving. Time has 
become a significant cost component of any trip and its value is therefore of 
fundamental importance”. 
4.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the introduction of competition in the provision of 
infrastructure. It gave a historical background of transport infrastructure in South 
Africa and strived to examine this traditional practice and made suggestions for 
managing the contemporary infrastructure with efficiency and effectiveness in 
mind. In this turbulent business environment, transport infrastructure requires the 
intervention of a transport economic regulatory authority, as happens in countries 
such as Australia and the United Kingdom, to name but a few.  
The main emphasis in this chapter was road users’ rights as contained in the 
South African Constitution and other literary sources related to consumerism. 
The chapter further explored various regulatory regimes and examined the extent 
to which the operation of toll roads in South Africa could be made to respect the 
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fundamental consumer rights of road users in terms of the toll roads industry. 
The chapter went further to caution that in an attempt to establish a transport 
economic regulatory authority there would of necessity be a myriad of obstacles 
that would have to be overcome before everything can operate smoothly in the 
transportation sector.  
Central to the discussion of this chapter was the concept of competition policy, 
which focused particularly on its application in the transport infrastructure. 
Competition for the market is defined in this context as competition amongst 
bidders and is intended to reduce the ultimate price to be paid for the 
procurement of services. Competition in the market however refers to the case 
where a bidder has been awarded a tender and would now provide the service 
with a sustainable competitive advantage in mind.  
Attention was also focused on toll roads as products of a new transport 
dispensation and that such roads are not supposed to be operated as 
monopolies. The chapter further highlighted the fact that if the users have no 
option in the form of a substitute or alternative route, then a monopolistic 
situation exists. A toll road is justified to be called a monopoly when there is no 
alternative route available for road users, which would therefore require 
regulatory interventions to control the pricing power of toll roads. Hence, a need 
for the introduction of a transport economic regulatory authority was emphasised 
throughout this chapter. 
The pre-requisites for competition in the transport industry received attention and 
the chapter pointed out that, in order for competition to work more efficiently, it 
would need a positive and conducive commercial atmospheric culture coupled 
with an appropriate policy framework instituted by government. It is worth 
mentioning that the competition commission has been given significant powers of 
legislation, which it may use to create a series of exemptions that would ensure 
that the consumers benefit maximally from business dealings involving the 
transport industry. The commission is also given strong investigative powers, 
which allow it to investigate businesses to assess their compliance 
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with competition law. The commission is further given the power to impose large 
fines for infringement of the competition law. In some cases where a business 
becomes too powerful, the commission could even order the divestment of 
assets. 
The principles on which toll roads are to be operated received attention, and in 
principle, the toll road industry is supposed to provide a road with a superior level 
of service for users who are willing to pay more for that service. There is 
therefore a need to review policy on the construction and operation of toll roads. 
The rationale is to determine the whole question of road users’ ability and 
willingness to pay.  
In terms of the role of a transport economic regulatory authority in the transport 
industry, the Department of Transport’s decision to establish a transport 
economic regulatory authority to ensure that prices imposed on users are 
regulated, should be commended. The reason for regulators to be established 
stems from the need to eradicate the abuse of power by the existing monopolies 
who fail to meet deadlines and who rigidly enforce rules even when the results 
are irrational or fail to respond to requests to relax rules in such circumstances.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TRANSPORT ECONOMIC REGULATORY REGIMES 
IN THE TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter investigates the different types of transport economic 
regulatory regimes that are in use in other countries. The aim is to determine 
which regulatory framework or approach, after the necessary modification, would 
best suit the management and regulation of the transport industry in South Africa. 
In examining the different regimes, the purpose is to afford the researcher an 
opportunity to compare and contrast the structure, function, aim and purpose of 
the various transport economic regulatory regimes that are available and to 
enable him to assess the one that would be suitable for the South African 
situation. To begin with, the words of Delmon (2005:128) who states that “in the 
transport industry the process is often regulated by local law and may be 
influenced by the rules set out by multilateral organisations are of direct 
significance”.  
It is important to state from the onset that, according to Delmon (2005:128), the 
after-award phase is “a phase that involves the preparation of the project before 
financial closure1 and includes negotiation of various project documents as well 
as obtaining debt and equity funding”. However, when taking into consideration 
the complex nature and the lengthy period of negotiations that take place when 
the awarding of the Build Operate Transfer project is determined in the transport 
                                            
1 The point at which the documentation has been executed and conditions precedent have been 
satisfied or waived (Delmon, 2005:470). 
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infrastructure industry, it becomes quite clear that the risk borne during this 
phase could be considerable. 
Thus, in order to render the after-award phase of competition workable and 
realisable, there should be an appropriate framework with a sound fundamental 
structure in place. Otherwise, the harm that would attract the public interest if the 
road networks were turned into monopolies without the essential regulatory 
interventions would be too ghastly even to contemplate. For example, if not 
monitored, toll fees of concessionaires would be charged beyond the affordability 
level of road users. This is not acceptable and should not be encouraged. 
Common knowledge has furthermore taught that bidders for candidate 
concessionaires often request some form of legal protection from competition 
and such a step easily leads to the undesirable situation where monopolies re-
emerge. However, to forestall the development of such circumstances protection 
should only be allowed where such protection supports investments that are 
advantageous to the consumers.  
5.1.1 Micro-economic theory of regulation 
Baumol and Blinder (2006:10) define a theory as “a deliberate simplification of 
relationships used to explain how those relationships work”. When the concept of 
regulation of industry is explained theoretically, it is then seen as a process 
established by law that restricts or controls some specified decisions made by 
the affected firms and it is designed to protect the public from exploitation by 
firms with monopoly power. It can therefore be said that the establishment of a 
transport economic regulatory authority is theoretically valid as it would be 
designed to protect the transport infrastructure users from exploitation by 
concession companies. 
5.1.2 The role to be played by the regulatory authority 
For all practical purposes, the main instrument of a regulatory authority is the 
concession contract signed between public and private sector or concessionaire. 
The tough question now is to decide how much discretion to give to the economic 
regulatory authorities. The larger the degree of discretion desired, the less 
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detailed the contract will have to be, as the regulatory decisions will be based on 
laws or decrees that have to be interpreted by the regulators. The smaller the 
degree of discretion desired, the more detailed the contract will have to be, thus 
increasing the relative importance of contracts in the design of the regulatory 
environment.  
For concession performance, an economic regulator must be concerned with 
among other things, the technical quality of the road which will be discussed 
below: 
The technical quality of roads 
Estache and De Rus (2000:285) advise that  
…”one needs to consider road quality issues at the outset of concession 
design and technical specification. Technical matters such as pavement 
materials, thickness, and construction techniques must be specified from 
the beginning, because these aspects will help determine the facility’s 
performance and future maintenance and investment needs. An inventory 
of the initial state of assets is a minimum requirement for effective 
economic regulation”. 
Based on Estache and De Rus’s advice, it can be seen that the role of a 
transport economic regulator commences from the time when technical 
specifications are designed and progresses during the award of a tender and 
becomes more crucial during the operation phase of the concessionaire. Figure 
5.1 on page 210 gives a broad illustration of what a transport economic regulator 
is expected to do particularly with regard to a road transport infrastructure Public-
Private Partnership project. 
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5.1.3 Institutional arrangements 
In practice, when regulatory authorities are being introduced, they may face two 
risks. The first risk is having the regulators controlled by the concession 
companies and become lenient in the case of conflict. The second risk is that of 
having the regulator controlled by the users of the transport infrastructure and 
imposing demands not covered by the contract. What needs to be emphasized 
here is to have a regulatory authority with competent personnel who should act 
independently and impartial when dealing with both concessionaires and users of 
the transport infrastructure. 
The dilemma faced by the United Kingdom when it established its rail economic 
regulator as it was an additional agency to work hand in hand with the safety 
regulator. At this stage the United Kingdom is in the process of merging these 
two agencies as a way of easing the coordination of regulatory decisions. In the 
United States of America, regulatory agencies are much more independent from 
policy-makers and cover all sectors and have their own sources of funding. They 
also rely on this funding to sub-contract activities for which skills are required that 
they do not have in-house. In trying to endure good coordination between the 
competing agency and the transport regulator, one of the members of the 
Transport Regulation Board is also a member of the Competition Commission. 
5.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Hodge and Greve (2005:213) assert that the bidding process in a Public-Private 
Partnership project is a lengthy process that could take up to two years. After the 
bidders had been pre-qualified, the agency should prepare the bid evaluation 
criteria and the pre-qualified bidders should be asked to resubmit their bid after 
adjusting the bid and complying with the set criteria. The winning bidder should 
be announced at this stage and a project company or what is referred to as an 
interim concession company should be established. The purpose of establishing 
this company is to start entering into negotiations for developing a concession 
contract with the agency. This phase of the project is depicted in Figure 5.1 titled 
conceptual framework model of Public-Private Partnership. 
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According to Figure 5.1, other stakeholders need to be given attention in a BOT 
project. These stakeholders are the granting authority or agency, the interim 
concession company and the Department of Transport. The next step should be 
that of establishing a concession contractual arrangement, which is to be entered 
into between the Department of Transport and the concession company through 
the facilitation of the granting authority or agency. 
The above arrangement is in line with the English law of contract as outlined by 
Stone (2005:157) who states that “there should be three parties involved in the 
contract and these are the Principal, Agency and Third party”. When this 
arrangement is adopted into the South African situation, then the role of the 
principal becomes assumed by the Department of Transport while that of the 
agency becomes assumed by the South African National Roads Agency Limited 
and the position of the third party becomes assumed by the interim concession 
company. This is what was obtained in England, and as indicated, this chapter 
examines the various transport economic regulatory regimes in different 
countries in order to ascertain which one could be adopted with some necessary 
modifications into the South African situation. 
Consequently, after a project has been awarded, an interim concession company 
needs to be established in order to go into contractual agreements with critical 
stakeholders such as input suppliers, lenders, construction contractor, operator 
and the shareholders. Activities of this nature form part of the negotiations that 
end when financial closure is reached. Figure 5.1 outlines all the essential steps 
that are necessary for the proper negotiation of a contractual arrangement to 
take place in the transport industry in a country like England. This figure is 
presented here as an option to be considered for adoption with modifications or 
for comparison purposes. 
 
 
 210
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure5.1: Conceptual framework model of Public-Private Partnerships 
 
5.2.1 Concession company 
Yescombe (2007:108) views the position of a concession company as that of the 
centre of all the contractual and financial relationships in a Public-Private 
Partnership project. During its formation process, Delmon (2005:72), advises that 
“the sponsors will identify a project and put together a bid in an effort to be 
awarded the project. Once awarded or selected as a preferred bidder, an interim 
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concession company, which is referred to as Special Purpose Vehicle2 (SPV) is 
normally created”. Yescombe (2007:109) stresses that an SPV cannot carryout 
any other business that is not part of the project. The formed SPV must then 
satisfy the agency regarding its ability to comply with the requirements as 
specified by the principal. This step is necessary because it ensures that there 
will be a constant supply of (input) resources to execute the project. To complete 
the deal, an “input supplier contract” should be drafted. To this end, Hodge and 
Greve (2005:72) are of the opinion that "the private sector special purpose 
vehicle may be required to give security to various parties, including to the 
lenders". In support, Delmon (2005:179) states that “lenders often want the right 
to step-in3 to be included in a concession agreement so as to be able to continue 
with operation in the event of a concession company breaching the concession 
agreement”. 
Furthermore, Delmon (2005:72) is of the opinion that “the use of a Special 
Purpose Vehicle is meant to enable the sponsors to finance the project”. An 
interim concession company would generally be required to include shareholder 
companies that specialise in several of the tasks, which need to be performed 
under the concession agreement. The agency may require that an interim 
concession company invite the local investors in order to improve transfer of 
technology, and provide jobs and training to local personnel. 
 
 
 
                                            
2 An entity created to undertake a project in order to protect the shareholders with limited liability 
or non-recourse financing (Delmon, 2005:503). 
3 The right of a third party to step into the place of one contractual party where that party fails in 
its obligations under the contract and the other party to the contract has the right to terminate the 
contract. 
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5.2.2 Input supplier 
Delmon (2005:74) asserts that “the input supplier assumes the supply risk for an 
input necessary for operation of the project”. The input supply protects the 
concession company from possible failure in complying with the requirement that 
it provides resources. The input supplier may also be required to provide 
infrastructure that is needed to permit the delivery of inputs like cement. The 
ideal thing to do would be to draft an input supplier contract in order to facilitate 
the construction of a road project especially where the project that is undertaken 
requires the supply of such inputs of resources such as cement. With this in 
mind, the input supplier contract would be ideal for the Gautrain project, as this 
project will need a constant supply of cement throughout its construction phase, 
which commenced on 28 September 2006. 
5.2.3 Lenders 
Delmon (2005:66) points out that the lender group varies from project to project 
and may include a combination of private sector commercial lenders together 
with multilateral finance organisations. The lenders usually take on those risks 
that are measurable and may not engage themselves in the operation-related 
activities. Normally, the lenders solicit the assistance of an independent engineer 
to review projects and to give an informed opinion. Again, it is common for the 
lenders to enter into contractual agreements with project participants that could 
otherwise be done more efficiently and effectively by a transport economic 
regulatory authority. Hence, this study strives to assess the validity of introducing 
a transport economic regulatory authority that would facilitate the construction of 
contractual agreements in the transport industry. 
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5.2.4 Construction contractor 
According to Delmon (2005:73), the construction contractor forms a link with the 
project company. The construction contractor would then enter into a 
construction contract with an interim concession company in order to undertake 
its obligation to the agency in the form of designing, building, testing and 
commissioning the project. Presently, this task is generally undertaken on a 
turnkey4 basis, which places completion and performance risk on the 
construction contractor. The construction contract would be, as far as possible, 
back to back5 with concession agreement, and therefore any construction risk 
placed on the project company by the concession agreement would, through the 
construction contract, flow through to the construction contractor. Generally, it 
also happens that the construction contractor subcontracts certain or all of its 
construction obligations to other entities in order to share risk and revenues, 
subject to any restriction imposed by the concession agreement or the 
construction contract. 
5.2.5 Operator and maintenance 
Delmon (2005:73) argues that the operator normally “operates and maintains the 
project from completion of construction until the end of the concession period”. 
This approach needs management of inputs as supplied and monitoring and 
testing of the project to ensure that proper operation and maintenance are 
carried out. In another vein, Delmon (2005:165) is of the opinion that the project 
shall have depreciated both in value and in operating capacity by the time it is 
transferred back to the agency. To minimise any damage on the project during 
the concession period the agency must ensure that the maintenance regime 
                                            
4 The design and construction of a project to completion so that the project is ready to produce 
cash flow. 
5 The effort to transfer all project risk to the project participants. 
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implemented by the project company during the concession period is given 
sufficient powers to regulate the nature of the work involved.  
Another problem to be considered is that incentives, given to the interim 
concession company to invest funds in maintenance during the final phase of the 
concession period, may have diminished. This will imply that proper maintenance 
of programmes no longer result in greater revenue being realised by the project 
company owing to the imminent transfer of the project to the agency.  
5.2.6 Shareholders and shareholders’ agreement 
Pallister (2003:465) sees a shareholder as an owner of shares in a company. On 
the other hand, Delmon (2005:501) outlines some of the practical challenges 
encountered in Public-Private-Partnership projects with respect to shareholding 
when saying,  
… “in the shareholders agreement, an interim Concession company 
needs to indicate when to distribute revenues to its members. The 
shareholders will want to distribute revenues as early as possible, 
while the lenders on the other hand want to delay revenue sharing to 
ensure that the shareholders remain committed to the operation of the 
project and to retain control over amounts otherwise available for 
distribution”.  
Such a situation is untenable because it often creates financial challenges to 
small and medium enterprises as the withholding of revenue may affect their 
long-term performance. 
Having said the above, Hodge and Greve (2005:71) come to the rescue by 
arguing that the obligation to finance the infrastructure is usually satisfied through 
various shareholders subscription arrangements, subordinated debts 
arrangements, and senior project financing arrangements. Delmon (2005:64) 
however states that the shareholders agreement governs the relationship 
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between the shareholders within an interim concession company. This may lead 
to the production of several documents such as a sponsor’s agreement for the 
pre-financial closing phase of the project. A joint venture agreement and articles 
of association should be created for the concession company to run its affairs 
legally. The shareholder’s agreement should cover topics such as the business 
of the concession company.  
5.2.7 Concession agreement 
Delmon (2005:165) regards the concession agreement as the backbone of a 
Build Operate Transfer project because under this agreement, the agency grants 
a concession to the concession company over which traditionally would be a 
public sector project for a given period. During that period, the concession 
company should build and operate the facility according to the terms of the 
concession as set out in the concession agreement. The concession agreement 
allows the agency as the "contracting authority", to allocate project risk to the 
concession company (Bovis 2005:42). According to this arrangement, the agency 
should then identify those risks, which it is prepared to bear and should 
subsequently allocate the remaining risks to the concession company. Another 
option could be that of the agency wishing to define to some extent the sharing of 
risk among the project participants through the concession agreement. It is 
therefore not uncommon to find the primary constituent documents defined and 
described in some detail in the concession agreement. 
However, in certain cases, the agency may append drafts of the constituent 
documents to the concession agreement, to ensure that the terms the agency 
wants to include are properly set out and form part of the concession itself. When 
this happens, the sponsors usually resist strongly because such action interferes 
with the sponsors’ commercial relationships with other project participants and 
increases development cost, particularly where the sponsors are required to 
negotiate these issues during the tender phase and before they have been 
selected as preferred bidder (Delmon, 2005:166). 
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It is important to note that an agency can issue a concession contract by means 
of a contract or authorisation. A concession issued by means of a contract 
involves the agency entering into a contract with the private sector project 
company. Such contract should contain the mutual project obligations. In the 
case of a concession issued by means of authorisation, the applicable legislation 
would normally prescribe the form of contract. In countries such as Greece, a 
concession contract is negotiated, which is then submitted to parliament and 
ratified as a law (Delmon, 2005:165-168).  
5.2.8 Accommodating changes and flexibility 
According to Hodge and Greve (2005:73), the social significance of PPP projects 
affects all contracting parties and their subsequent participation. Flexibility should 
therefore be made mandatory for projects that involve public assets and a risk-
sharing relationship over a period of 25-30 years should be put into place in order 
to resolve problems, should they arise. In addition, a degree of flexibility needs to 
be clearly articulated within the terms of project contracts and should not be left 
to the discretion of each party. Should a need arise then, there should be a 
regime in place which would allow either party to propose a change. 
However, there should be an understanding that any change should, before 
being introduced, be assessed with respect to its effects on the performance and 
costs of the project and the respective parties need to meet to discuss and agree 
on possible solutions. 
5.3 THE EMERGENCE OF POST-AWARD REGULATION 
According to Kessides (2004:80), the 1980s and 1990s saw a dramatic global 
reassessment of the state’s role in dealing with infrastructure, particularly with 
respect to those industries that were mainly natural monopolies, such as national 
roads. When South Africa began restructuring its infrastructure mainly in the 
1990s, it looked to the countries that had done so in the recent past, and in this 
regard, countries like Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom appeared 
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to be the best examples to follow. The abovementioned countries were selected 
after an extensive and intensive study of many countries’ transport infrastructure.  
To design an appropriate transport economic regulatory authority is not an easy 
task, for the challenge becomes clear when it is found that developing economies 
have few precedents to guide them when designing regulatory mechanisms that 
suit their countries’ needs. Be it as it may, Kessides (2004:81) maintains that 
transport economic regulatory authorities should be independent of government 
or insulated from political control. In his opinion, this is a crucial condition if 
Public-Private Partnerships are to achieve their goals.  
For a transport economic regulatory authority to do well in South Africa, it would 
therefore need the technical assistance of international agencies from countries 
like Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, as already pointed out. The 
implication is that transport economic regulatory models from industrial countries 
should be carefully evaluated and be considered for application in South Africa 
after a thorough refinement and adaptation. These countries’ technical 
assistance should therefore be sought. 
With the above in mind, Button and Swann (1989:3) drew a distinction between 
internal transport economic regulation and external regulation by pointing out that 
self regulation involves the parties regulating themselves. External regulation on 
the other hand, arises when control is exercised by a body which is outside the 
regulated group. Interestingly, we find that a wide variety of bodies is actually 
involved in executing the function of external regulation. Sometimes government 
departments perform this function, but more often it is in the hands of agencies 
that enjoy some degree of independence from government. These bodies often 
operate under titles such as commission, for example, in the case of South Africa 
we have the Competition Commission.  
In practice, the choice depends to a significant extent on the degree of 
uncertainty attached to the private sector operation over its lifetime and to the 
nature of the customer base, which the regulation is designed to protect. The 
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greater the degree of uncertainty over the future evolution of the private sector 
service targets, investment needs and operating environment, the greater the 
need to create a regulatory regime to adapt to changes that cannot adequately 
be anticipated at the outset (Basanes et al., 1999: 180). 
According to Basanes et al. (1999:180), new investment would usually be an 
ongoing requirement in a concession agreement. Concessions often involve the 
transfer of existing assets, such as toll roads, to concessionaires and this has a 
tendency of giving rise to uncertainty over additional investment needs such as 
the establishment of truck stops and other related amenities within the road 
corridor. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to write a contract that 
would anticipate all possible contingencies. It would be more appropriate to 
create a transport economic regulatory authority that could respond to new 
circumstances that surface from time to time.  
5.4 NEED FOR TRANSPORT REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Having considered the various strategies that compete in the market place, there 
is a need to make a case for the introduction of a transport regulatory authority to 
regulate the behaviour of competing entities in the transport industry. Button and 
Swan (1989:3) regard regulation as the imposition of controls and restraints and 
the application of rules. One of the challenges for policy-makers in developing 
economies is that of managing the shift from state ownership and control of 
infrastructure operations to more independent regulatory oversight (Kessides, 
2004:79). In their research, White and Bhatia (1998:48) discovered that many 
countries have continued with Public-Private-Partnership programmes with the 
least effort to develop a regulatory framework. Regulation is a requirement to 
ensure that the process is conducted within the right legal parameters. Well-
managed implementation requires detailed operating policies and procedures 
covering the routine parts of the programme.  
Kessides (2004:88) highlights the fact that  
“most regulatory effort have focused on institution building such as 
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writing enabling legislation, determining administrative procedures and 
identifying sources of funding. Not enough attention has been paid to 
identifying issues such as eliminating anti-competitive cross-subsidies, 
setting prices and re-balancing tariffs”.  
In addition, White and Bhatia (1998:43) reason, "the ideal situation in the design 
of a Public-Private Partnership programme should be to conduct an audit of the 
public enterprise sector". This is done in order to make sure that the environment 
in which the Public-Private-Partnership is to take place and the constraints that 
may be encountered, are noted. 
In practice, what happened in many African countries is that the concept of 
Public-Private Partnerships was implemented without adequate knowledge and 
understanding, with regard to the initial conditions. As a result, projects that were 
implemented in many African states failed. Thus, this study has also noted that 
the extent to which the Public-Private Partnerships were under-performing was 
not known, and is so because of a lack of appropriate information in respect of 
the nature of subsidies advanced by government. This aspect too needs closer 
attention if things are to run smoothly in the transport industry where Public-
Private Partnerships are involved.  
In terms of the Gautrain project, what South Africa has achieved in Public-Private 
Partnership terms is that after the announcement of a preferred bidder, both the 
public and private sectors agreed to the appointment of an Independent Certifier 
(National Treasury, 2000). This could be in the form of an individual or body that 
would constantly monitor the progress and impact made by the concessionaire. 
According to White and Bhatia (1998:43), none of the African countries has come 
out with a mechanism that measures the impact of the Public-Private-Partnership 
processes on the performance of the private sector enterprises. 
5.4.1 Institutional requirements 
Usually, the structure and the processes that underscore any infrastructural 
 220
regulation determine how effectively such regulation would support reforms 
intended to promote efficiency and other social objectives (Kessides, 2004:83). In 
most of the developing countries, such regulation is at an early stage of 
implementation. To be up to speed with developments, such developing 
countries could draw lessons from developed countries’ recent findings on how to 
go about implementing effective regulations on running utilities that have 
undergone a Public-Private Partnership process. This could include drawing 
knowledge and appropriate experience on the importance of principles like 
coherence, independence, accountability, transparency, predictability, and 
capacity. 
5.4.1.1 Coherence 
Kessides (2004:83) is of the view that “regulations for each infrastructure sector 
should be complementary and mutually supportive. The laws guiding regulation 
must be in agreement and consistent over time”. This signifies that new rules 
should take into account previous ones plus whatever amendments were made 
to eliminate inconsistencies. Furthermore, Kessides (2004:83) says, “regulatory 
coherence requires that there should be clearly defined regulatory responsibilities 
on the national, provincial and municipal governmental level”. This implies that a 
specific agency at a specific level of government should make decisions involving 
specific aspects of regulation in a consistent manner. Such arrangements should 
maintain continuity in the people and methods used to arrive at sound decisions 
and to make adherence to the rule of law more likely. 
Based on South Africa’s trade relation with neighbouring countries, it is therefore 
suggested that a transport economic regulatory body be assigned with handling 
regulatory activities that are cross-border by nature. Such a transport economic 
regulatory body would then be required to harmonise transport standards in 
various countries. Kessides cites the example of Argentina, where a privatised 
telecommunication sector has its regulatory agency that deals with cost reporting 
and which makes telecommunication tariffs accessible to the users in various 
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countries. 
South Africa could borrow the reasoning by Kessides (2004:85) and introduce 
"transport economic regulators that publish statements explaining their goals and 
reasons for decisions on entry, pricing, and other industry behaviour". Doing so 
would force government to think through its long-term policy objectives and 
regulatory principles more thoroughly and objectively. 
5.4.1.2 Independence 
Infrastructure regulators should be free to make decisions within their scope of 
authority without having to obtain prior approval from other officials or agencies 
of government. Independence requires effective regulation on the part of an 
economic regulatory authority in that it must be perceived to be largely free from 
influence by any specific state department, which means that it should be seen 
as an authority that is objective, apolitical and an enforcer of policies that are set 
forth in the statutes. Experience has however taught that complete independence 
for a transport economic regulatory authority is not practically possible, because 
regulatory authorities are not insulated from political intervention and as such, the 
regulatory process may become politicised and decisions discredited. 
Consequently, the art of compromise is necessary to ensure that a transport 
economic regulatory authority is both independent and responsive to issues of 
the transport industry. Fogli (2006:4) refers to responsiveness as “the 
organisation’s willingness to help customers and provide prompt service”. This is 
what is expected of a transport economic regulatory authority. Safeguards that 
could help achieve such compromise are inter, alia, giving the transport 
economic regulatory authority a statutory authority, free from ministerial control. 
This would help the transport economic regulatory authority to exert its authority 
fully. Members of the transport economic regulatory authority board should be 
appointed for fixed periods and their removal without clearly defined cause 
should be prohibited. It would be advisable to stagger the terms of office of a 
transport economic regulatory authority’s board members so that they can be 
replaced only gradually by successive administrations. Funding operations of 
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the transport economic regulatory authority with user fees may assist in 
enhancing the regulatory authority’s independence and thus insulating it from 
political interference through the budget process (Kessides, 2004:86). 
5.4.1.3 Accountability 
Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000:129) describe the term accountability as “one of the 
principal cornerstones of democracy precisely because each public official 
should give account in public for her or his activities”. In another vein, Pauw et al. 
(2005:136) see accountability as implying that “managers are held responsible 
for carrying out a defined set of duties or tasks, and for conforming with rules and 
standards applicable to their posts”. In addition, Davids et al. (2005:55) argue, 
“the public sector should respond by reporting to the public on how money is 
spent and on the successes and failures of public programmes”. Again, Davids et 
al (2005:55) point out, “democratic governments create and sustain independent 
public institutions of accountability that are empowered to oversee the 
government’s actions and demand explanations”. One of the reasons to have a 
regulatory authority in place is to ensure that the tenet of accountability is 
adhered to in the transport industry. 
In support of the setting up of a transport economic regulatory authority, 
Kessides (2004:86) is of the opinion that a regulatory authority should be 
independent and be reconciled with its accountability. A transport economic 
regulatory authority should be given power to set prices and quality standards. 
Checks and balances should be established to ensure that a transport economic 
regulatory authority does not become corrupt or inefficient. The public should 
know who makes regulatory decisions and what guides them, and which 
channels are open to them to voice their concerns. There should be room for 
affected parties to obtain redress easily and quickly in case a regulatory authority 
acts incompetently. 
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5.4.1.4 Transparency 
In the opinion of Rouban (1999:16), “an output or performance orientation has 
been considered a major prerequisite for increasing transparency in public 
organisations”. Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000:130) assert, “the public has the right 
to be informed on any matters concerning their relations with the government, 
meaning that there is a need for transparency”. However, according to Delmon 
(2005:328), “transparency is required as it is intended to improve competition and 
reduce the unseen costs associated with unequal treatment amongst bidders”. 
When setting up a transport economic regulatory authority, it would be advisable 
to keep transparency in mind as such regulatory authority would protect citizens 
against corrupt practices. 
Importantly, Kessides (2004:87) is of the opinion that “transparency helps induce 
investment by incumbents and new entrants and avoid costly, time-consuming 
regulatory disputes”. This view is supported by Delmon (2005:329), who 
emphasises the fact that in a Public-Private-Partnership, transparency should be 
increased as it would “attract new forms of investment and thus potentially 
reducing the cost of the project”. The envisaged transport economic regulatory 
authority could gain much credibility, mileage and respect if it undertakes its 
duties and responsibilities in a transparent manner because transparency leads 
to openness and fairness. 
5.4.1.5 Predictability 
A predictable service is often referred to as a reliable service, which Fogli 
(2006:7) refers to as “the ability of the organisation to perform the promised 
service dependably and accurately”. A transport economic regulatory authority 
should therefore render a predictable service and observe the rule of law. The 
rule of law means that all citizens should be equal in the eyes of the law and 
should be treated equally in terms of the law. The rights and freedom of the 
individual should therefore be respected (Cloete, 1996:77). If transport economic 
regulatory decisions are to be predictable, they should therefore be based on 
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rules and procedures that are certain and durable in the sense that such rules 
would be good and applicable to future cases unless new information and laws 
are introduced. Even then, a transport economic regulatory authority should 
prove that past decisions could be changed. Otherwise, market participants will 
lack confidence in regulation, undermining the size, scope, and quality of 
infrastructure and related investments (Kessides, 2004:87). 
5.4.1.6 Capacity 
In setting up a transport economic regulatory authority, the responsibilities of 
human resources required to manage the entity should be determined. A 
comprehensive business plan should reflect the financial resources required to 
address the human capital requirements. To this end, Kessides (2004:88) 
maintains that “a transport regulatory authority would require expertise in 
disciplines such as economics, accounting, transport engineering, and law”. 
In trying to overcome the issue of capacity or skills deficiencies, it is advisable 
that a transport economic regulatory authority at its commencement be given 
complete freedom to hire specialised staff. While it cannot be denied that the 
shortage of skills in setting up a transport economic regulatory authority is a 
concern, it would be of great advantage to ensure that the curricula of academic 
institutions cover transport economic regulatory aspects so as to bridge the skills 
gap in various transport disciplines.  
5.5 CULTURE OF TRANSPORT ECONOMIC REGULATION 
The concept culture was defined in Section 3.2.3.2 of this study, by quoting 
Brown and Ulijn (2004:51), who points out that culture refers to "the set of values, 
guiding beliefs, understanding and ways of thinking that is shared by members of 
an organisation and conveyed to new members as an accepted code of 
practice". While the principal task of transport economic regulation is to restrain 
monopoly power by keeping prices down and ensuring that quality is up, it is 
equally important to respect investor value in order to maintain incentives for 
 225
efficiency and new investment for growth. More importantly, the goal of meeting 
consumer needs flexibly through the balanced structure and strategy is 
necessary. Transport economic regulation must accept responsibility for fostering 
competition in the market place (Basanes et al., 1999). 
Basanes et al. (1999) maintain that there should be a distinct function of public 
utility style regulation that needs to perform with organisational and financial 
independence from the politicised arms of government. The decision-making 
processes of transport economic regulation should be insulated from political 
pressures by means of the culture of administrative bodies. Public utility-style 
regulation should substitute its influence for the missing disciplinary forces of 
competition. The forces of competition generally are ruthlessly effective in driving 
markets to efficiency in ways that soon enough show their benefits to consumers 
and to the economy as a whole. 
5.5.1 Regulation by a specific regulatory body 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages attached to implementing 
regulation through a specific regulatory body, such as those indicated by 
Basanes et al. (1999:181), namely: 
• Flexibility of the approach, which, using pre-specified principles, allows tariff 
controls and standards of service regulation to be modified in the light of 
changing circumstances unforeseen when the private sector contract was 
put in place; 
• Transport economic regulation can be undertaken by an expert body with 
full understanding of the transport sector economics and operations; and 
• Transport economic regulation is clearly separated from responsibilities for 
service provision, avoiding conflict of interest and making the regulator 
clearly accountable for its actions.  
The disadvantages include: 
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• In order for the arrangement to be effective, the contract must leave scope 
for the exercise of discretion by the transport economic regulatory authority. 
Where there is not a strong tradition of effective independent regulation, 
potential bidders may perceive this as a source of transport economic 
regulatory risk, which may lead to a reduction of interest in the scheme; and 
• It may be more costly to establish and administer as compared to regulation 
by contract. 
5.5.2 Moving towards practical regulation 
Designing an effective transport economic regulation in developing and transition 
economies is a daunting task for several reasons. Some reasons are endemic to 
infrastructure regulation everywhere, while others are driven by the complexities 
of underdevelopment. In the face of scarce technical expertise, severe 
information problems further weaken accounting and auditing, limited separation 
of powers, lack of checks and balances, ineffective legal systems, widespread 
corruption and poor commitment, adopting many aspects of the United Kingdom. 
In addition, regulatory models of the United States will prove challenging for 
developing and transition economies. Most developing countries are poorly 
suited to the complex procedures required by quasi-judicial, command-and-
control regulatory techniques (Kessides, 2004:124). 
Moreover, transport economic regulatory methods have very different 
implementation costs. Given the limited expertise in most developing and 
transition economies, it is crucial for these resources to be allocated efficiently 
by: 
• exploiting all opportunities for competitive restructuring that might reduce 
the need for regulatory intervention; 
• isolating activities that require regulatory oversight from those that should 
be left to market forces; and 
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• identifying second or even third-best regulatory instruments that demand 
less information but are better suited for countries with limited capacity 
(Kessides, 2004:124). 
5.5.3 Multinational regulatory authority 
Since South Africa is currently dealing with SADC members, it would be ideal to 
obtain consensus from all governments in a region for a regional transport 
economic regulator. In this regard, Kessides (2004:128) points out that it would 
be problematic due to different attitudes and commitments toward reform, as well 
as concerns about national sovereignty. It requires considerable cooperation and 
trust between countries, more than currently exists in most parts of the world. 
Thus regional transport economic regulatory cooperation might be a more 
realistic option for alleviating scarce regulatory expertise and resources, 
especially in low-income countries such as Mozambique. 
According to Mushkat (2004:100), tensions among SADC members over 
economic regulatory standards might be diffused by a structured programme of 
standard harmonisation. As a first step, regional transport economic regulatory 
advisers could be established to facilitate information exchange and to offer non-
binding advice on procedural issues and matters such as standardisation, 
interconnection, and pricing and costing methodologies. The establishment of a 
multinational regulatory authority would, based on the research of Mushkat 
(2004:100), be ideal to serve as a regional economic integrator as it has worked 
in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  
5.5.4 Separate regulatory authority 
Basanes et al.(1999:182) advance a theoretical argument and state that “the 
creation of separate regulatory institutions yields a degree of independence from 
political interference. This would also encourage transparency and lend some 
stability and predictability to the regulatory regime". In practice, it is hard to 
achieve complete independence. The study conducted by Basanes et al. 
(1999:182) in Argentina and Colombia revealed that regulatory institutions have 
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some degree of political dependency. It was found that members of the 
regulatory board were either representatives of the central or local government or 
nominated by politicians. 
Of major importance regarding a transport economic regulatory authority is that it 
should acknowledge the fact that the private sector is the primary mover of 
economic investment, the public sector attracts, stimulates and encourages 
private sector economic development efforts (Frank, 2006:82). It therefore 
implies that a transport economic regulator should be impartial and that it should 
play a catalytic role in ensuring that the objectives of both the public and private 
sectors are accomplished in a Public-Private Partnership arrangement. 
5.5.5 Concession agreements and regulatory independence  
Government, as the owner of assets, has a signatory function. Incentives 
involved in contract performance could be aligned with those of a private party. 
The higher the profitability and the expansion in investment the higher the net 
present value of the assets involved (Basanes et al.1999:27).  
Because the public authority surrenders its duties as the main service provider 
only temporarily, the concession contract usually includes very detailed clauses 
to account for all the complexities of the services and to anticipate every possible 
circumstance in the development of the contract. The concession contract 
becomes the most important instrument available to the authority to guarantee 
compliance with its duties regarding service provision. Therefore, government is 
also retaining another important function, namely guaranteeing that the 
concessionaire or the private contractor complies with operational or managerial 
requirements.  
In the light of the above explanation, it should be noted that contract 
interpretation and the need to adapt it to changing circumstances are major tasks 
in the concession performance and could become important sources of creating 
risks for the two parties involved. However, if the private partner is not in 
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compliance, government has the right to intervene and declare the contract void. 
As a contracting party, government is not on equal footing with the private 
counterpart (Basanes et al., 1999:27). An independent transport economic 
regulatory authority is essential to manage the concession agreement and to 
ensure that economic risks are apportioned to the respective parties accordingly. 
5.5.6 Regulation in a concession contract 
The Latin American governments have shown a preference for concession 
agreements or some intermediate form of public-private contractual arrangement 
for certain infrastructure services. From a political perspective, state ownership of 
infrastructure assets and the provision of services are assumed to guarantee that 
social obligations will be met. It is also believed that ownership will allow 
government to intervene whenever it perceives that the service provider is not 
fulfilling its obligations (Basanes et al., 1999:26). 
It must however be stated that the long duration of concession contracts makes 
them poor candidates for self-regulation. It is ideal that an independent transport 
economic regulator responsible for the monitoring of the performance of the 
contract be considered. If the concessionaire does it alone, it will not penalise 
itself for not achieving the targets of contract requirements as it will be the player 
and the referee. In fact, as supported by Basanes et al. (1999:26), the 
concessionaire will not be intrinsically motivated to satisfy the public policy 
objectives. 
5.5.7 Autonomy of an infrastructure regulatory authority 
In trying to put the interpretation by Basanes et al. (1999:17) into practice, the 
transport economic regulatory authority should enjoy independent legal status 
and should not serve simply as a mouthpiece of government. While it is proper 
for the relevant ministry, member of the Executive Council or the mayor of a 
municipality to formulate overall policies for the sector, it is inappropriate for 
government to enforce these policies on a day-to-day basis under the veil of a 
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nominally independent regulatory authority. A transport regulatory authority 
should therefore be truly independent from government and thus free of political 
interference.  
South Africa’s standpoint regarding the autonomy of the envisaged transport 
economic regulator is supported by the National Freight Logistics Strategy 
(2004), which states: 
“It is important that economic and safety regulation be controlled by a 
regulator who is independent of government’s sector responsibility 
regarding policy and infrastructure provision. The methodology for the 
application of regulatory powers must also be transparent, with clear 
powers established by appropriate supporting regulation”. 
Even though the question of autonomy is emphasised in the National Freight 
Logistics Strategy, a complete autonomy may not be possible in the sense that 
the Department of Transport, as the initiator of the concept of the transport 
economic regulatory authority, needs to be consulted constantly. This is 
supported by a survey conducted in Washington where it was found that 
economic regulatory bodies were frequently required to consult government (in 
56 percent of regulated industries) or members of the regulated industries 
themselves (33 percent). They are required to consult the public in respect of 9 
percent of regulated industries (See Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Parties to be consulted by regulators 
Source: Replies to the INTOSAI survey (1993) 
Figure 5.2 indicates that regulators consulted government in 56 percent of cases. 
This implies that when considering the establishment of a transport economic 
regulatory authority in South Africa, complete autonomy may not be possible. 
5.5.8 Transparent and flexible regulatory process 
According to Basanes et al. (1999:165), the transport economic regulatory 
function should be committed to reaching decisions and resolving disputes 
through the transparent application of economic principles. This should be 
publicly articulated before the initial commercial investment is made by the 
private sector. These principles may be articulated within a concession 
agreement so that they become part of the contract between the concessionaire 
and government. According to this hypothesis, these economic principles should 
be the continuing guidepost for ongoing after award governance. This solution 
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would provide appropriate limits on the discretionary exercise of regulatory 
power. 
Basanes et al. (1999:165) go further to state that the guiding transport economic 
regulatory principles would generate efficient solutions to a wide range of 
potential disputes in the transport industry. This also includes issues that might 
arise in a regulated road transport infrastructure such as to: 
• allow competition to function where it can without distortion; 
• weigh the costs of rules against the benefits; 
• assure service quality and price levels that offer consumers no less than the 
competitive standard of comparison; and 
• allow open access to bottlenecks on terms that reflect competitive parity. 
5.5.9 Granting authority versus regulatory authority  
A granting authority is described by Delmon (2005:475) as a “party that grants a 
concession, a license or some other right”. A granting authority would refer to the 
National Roads Agency, which is in essence involved in the granting of roads 
concessions. A regulatory authority, however, would ensure that there is 
compliance with minimum and maximum toll fees charged to the road users. The 
current state of affairs in South Africa is that the public authority that signs the 
contract is the party responsible for its performance. Presently, the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited keeps for itself the final say on tariffs and is the 
party legally entitled to intervene unilaterally in the contract or to terminate the 
contract on “public interest” grounds. 
Basanes et al. (1999:166) are of the view that government, as a signatory, can 
approve modifications to the agreed provisions, unless the law explicitly 
authorises that another regulatory institution may do so. In this setting, the role of 
the regulator is not clear and many overlaps may occur. Even if by law the 
contract monitoring and tariff negotiation could be delegated to the transport 
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economic regulator, the public authority retains crucial duties with respect to the 
after-award performance of the contract. 
In this setting, the transport economic regulatory authority becomes only a 
delegated party and there is no independent regulator as such. The menace of 
political interference is always present, adding further risks to this type of 
institutional arrangement. To complicate matters, in some Central American 
countries, the National Assembly is responsible for approving any substantial 
change in the concession agreement during the life of the contract (Basanes, et 
al. 1999:167).  
Thus, in the process of establishing a transport economic regulatory authority, it 
needs to be made clear that the ultimate entity becomes a regulator and not a 
granting authority. A granting authority, on the one hand, theoretically deals with 
aspects such as issuing operating licenses to operators after making sure that 
there is full compliance with economic requirements such as tariff structures. A 
regulatory authority, on the other hand, monitors compliance with economic user 
requirements such as ensuring that the operator does not exceed maximum 
tariffs charged to the user. 
To have a transport economic regulatory authority with granting and regulatory 
authority may not be appropriate based on the White Paper on National 
Transport Policy (Republic of South Africa, 1996c:16) which states that it may be 
undesirable for the role of provider and regulator to be embodied in a single 
institution. In these instances, ownership and regulation of transport 
infrastructure should be separated, whether state owned or privatised. 
It is worth noting that government’s involvement in giving directions should be 
essential. This was supported by the findings of a study conducted by INTOSAI, 
(1993) in Washington as reflected in Figure 5.3. 
The Working Group examined how regulation operates in practice. Accordingly, 
the survey asked whether governments could give directions to regulatory bodies 
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and whether governments have exercised this right in practice. The replies 
showed that governments have the power to give directions to a regulatory body 
in 45 percent of regulated industries. In the remaining 55 percent a government 
minister or ministry may often be the regulatory authority. 
The survey also found that government had exercised the right to give directions 
at least once in 30 percent of all regulated industries. In about two-thirds of those 
industries where governments have the power to give such directions, they have 
actually used those powers at least once. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Government’s right to issue directions to regulators  
Source: Replies to INTOSAI survey, (1993). 
 
Figure 5.3 shows that Governments can give directions to regulators in 45 
percent of regulated industries and that this right has been exercised at least 
once in 30 percent of cases. The implication of Figure 5.3 is that if a transport 
economic regulatory authority is established in South Africa, it should not be 
divorced or insulated from political intervention and direction because of 
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initial funding requirements and implications. Thus, it is essential and necessary 
for government to provide the initial funding and to give its approval for the 
project to start operating, as this definitely needs political will and direction to 
succeed. 
5.6 REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS (INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE) 
In the words of Denhardt and Denhardt (2006:41), a variety of independent 
agencies were created internationally outside the normal cabinet organisation. 
Some of these agencies are engaged in staff functions in support of other 
agencies. Agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency fall outside 
cabinet level departments and are regarded as independent agencies. The 
personnel managing these agencies are appointed by the President with the 
confirmation of Senate. Seen in the above light, it would be ideal that the 
introduction of the transport economic regulatory authority be established within 
the Department of Transport for a specific period before becoming completely 
autonomous so as to be well guided and funded. 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2006:41) continue by saying, “regulatory commissions 
are formed to regulate a particular area of the economy and are structured quite 
differently. Typically, they are headed by a group of individuals called directors or 
commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the senate”. These 
commissions are protected in various ways from removal by the President. In 
some cases, their terms of appointment overlap with presidential terms. 
Presumably, the regulatory commissions are to perform their tasks independently 
and objectively, free from undue influence either by the political incumbent or by 
the affected clientele. The nature of regulatory work makes this task exceedingly 
difficult. 
Public corporations are employed where the objective of the agency is essentially 
commercial, where the work of the agency requires greater latitude than would 
be typical, and where the agency acquires at least a portion of its funding in the 
market place (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2006:41). In this regard, South Africa then 
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needs a transport economic regulatory authority to regulate such public 
corporations.  
In his research of public enterprise economics conducted in Amsterdam, Bos 
(1986:34) contends, "if government allows the private sector to operate some of 
state-owned enterprises; it basically wants to rely on the market for the 
achievement of welfare optimum and therefore relax some regulation at the end". 
Bos goes on to say that, if the private sector is given the right to operate a natural 
monopoly, market forces will not prevent the monopoly from using all means to 
keep its monopolistic position and to exploit consumers in order to maximise 
profit. It is for this reason that the current study is suggesting a range of 
regulatory regimes from which South Africa can choose in order to establish and 
also implement an overarching transport economic regulatory authority. 
5.6.1 Structure of regulatory institutions 
Schultz and Alexandroff (1985:2) define regulation as follows: 
“any constraint imposed upon the normal freedom of individuals by the 
legitimate activity of government and economic regulation would 
therefore mean the imposition of rules by government, backed by the 
use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the economic 
behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector”.  
Black et al. ((2005:11) understand regulation as “the sustained and focused 
attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to standards or goals with the 
intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may 
involve mechanisms of standard setting, information gathering and behaviour 
modification”. Demsetz (1989:75) says, “the basic intellectual arguments for 
believing that truly effective regulation is desirable have not been challenged”.  
Consequently, even those who are inclined to reject government regulation or 
ownership of public utilities because they believe these alternatives are more 
undesirable than private monopoly, implicitly accept the intellectual 
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arguments that underlie regulations”. Kessides (2004:95) is of the opinion that 
"decisions must be made about the organisation of regulatory governance". The 
definitions above are quoted in order to assist us in our quest to seek a transport 
economic regulatory regime that would suit the South African situation. The 
question that still needs to be answered is whether regulatory institutions such as 
the Competition Commission should regulate toll roads or whether another 
institution should be introduced as the study suggests. Alternatively, both 
institutions should exist side by side with each being assigned specific 
responsibilities and duties.  
Weidenbaum (1995:36) says in terms of the Swedish Competition Authority, 
competition should take place on equal conditions. There must be rules to 
prevent undertakings from anti-competitive co-operation and abuse of market 
power. Rules or regulations are statements that implement, interpret or prescribe 
a law or policy. Government agencies use two methods to carry out laws, namely 
rule making and adjudication. Through rule making, agencies issue general 
policy statements as well as detailed requirements. In terms of adjudication, the 
agencies would formulate enforceable orders backed by civil or criminal penalties 
and settle specific factual disputes. Rule making is described as the agencies’ 
legislative function, and adjudication as judicial. On the basis of the above 
information, it needs to be decided whether the proposed transport economic 
regulatory authority would have both legislative and adjudication or only judicial 
function. 
5.6.2 Centralised or decentralised regulatory institution  
Frank (2006:124) asserts that “planning as a comprehensive, long range, global 
activity is best done top down in a centralised fashion because the top executive 
has the best idea while agencies may have better ideas on efficiency”. In another 
vein, Rouban (1999:18) argues that “decentralised systems are more likely to 
increase efficiency than centralised systems because individual agencies have 
more information according to which the operations of the agency can be 
changed”. Without taking sides, Delmon (2005:109) states that “an efficient and 
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effective regulator can make every difference in the success of the Project 
Company and in the realisation of the project’s aims”. Seen from Delmon’s point 
of view, it is evident that the establishment of a transport economic regulatory 
authority could make a difference in bringing about successes in the operations 
that are undertaken by concessionaires in South Africa.  
The words of Frank (2006:125) who warns that “centralisation and 
decentralisation do not necessarily mean a contradiction but can be expressed 
as two ends of a scale or continuum”. To this end, Kessides (2004:96) advises 
that “designing regulation involves tradeoffs”. For example, decentralisation on 
the one hand makes lower levels of government responsible for regulating 
utilities and offers advantages such as: 
• allowing local conditions and preferences to shape regulation; 
• moving regulators closer to services, allowing them to gather better 
information on users; 
• promoting competition among sub-national regulators to attract private 
investment; and 
• improving enforcement of regulatory decisions. 
On the other hand, centralisation, however, offers advantages in the sense that: 
• a national regulatory structure makes the best use of scarce expertise and 
minimises the fixed costs of regulation; 
• centralisation can also reduce the risks of a regulatory race to the bottom; 
and 
• centralisation may be necessary if jurisdiction is too small to support an 
efficient scale or scope of operations for certain industries. 
The current state of affairs in South Africa appears to be a grey area because the 
provincial and municipal roads agency are at present given only minimal powers 
to execute both safety and economic regulations within their areas of 
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jurisdiction while the national sphere of government still retains all authority 
regarding the budget, which determines all that needs to be done by both the 
provincial and local spheres of governments. This is precisely the reason for the 
need for a transport economic regulatory authority that would operate 
independently but with the cooperation of all the involved stakeholders, be they 
governmental or private. 
5.6.3 Multiple agencies or just one 
Stone (2005:159) argues that an agency can be created in a variety of ways and 
the three principal ones are express agreement, implied agreement and 
operation of law. Thus, an agency can be established to enter contracts on 
behalf of the principal in a range of situations, or to act in connection with one 
particular project. The need to establish a regulator with the regulatory 
responsibilities and be assigned to a single tier of government needs to be 
explored. This would be in order to determine whether government should create 
an industry-specific regulator, or a single agency with a broader mandate. To this 
end, Kessides (2004:98) advises,  
… “establishing separate agencies may precipitate advantages. A 
separate Agency would recognize the unique economic and 
technological characteristics of each infrastructure industry. It also 
creates an opportunity for the development of deep, industry-specific 
expertise and thus encouraging innovative responses to regulatory 
challenges”. 
Kessides (2004:99) also supports the use of a single regulator for several 
industries, which would make it possible to share fixed costs, scarce talent, and 
other resources. A single regulator leads to the consolidation of expertise in a 
cross-cutting manner in the sense that it regulates issues like the administration 
of tariff adjustment rules, the introduction of competition in monopolies, and the 
management of relationships with stakeholders. In addition, the broader 
responsibilities of a multi-industry agency reduce its dependence on any one 
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industry. A multi-industry agency may be better able to resist political interference 
because its broader constituency gives it greater independence from sector 
ministers. The establishment of one transport economic regulator that would 
oversee all modes of transport needs to be evaluated for its validity in South 
Africa. 
It needs to be mentioned that deciding on the breadth or depth of regulatory 
coverage involves numerous considerations. It is therefore reasonable to accept 
that no single approach would suit all circumstances. Firstly, it must be 
acknowledged that in economies with a small base of consumers and limited 
human and financial resources, there would be a strong argument for merging 
regulatory responsibilities. For example, multi-industry regulators have been 
successful in Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama and Brazil (Kessides, 2004:99). The 
effectiveness of any system of regulation is, according to Sawyer and O’Donnell 
(1999:32), dependent upon the regulators, not only in terms of their competence 
and the information available to them, but also in terms of the objectives and 
interests that they pursue. In considering the establishment of a transport 
economic regulatory authority in South Africa, the circumstances and conditions 
under which it should function must be known and also well understood to ensure 
that the regulatory authority’s objectives are unbiased and focused. 
5.7 TRANSPORT ECONOMIC REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
During 2005, the Department of Transport developed a National Freight Logistics 
Strategy, which indicates as part of its challenges that the regulatory frameworks 
are incapable of resolving problems in the industry and that the vision for the 
freight logistics system is to respond to problems in institutional and regulatory 
frameworks; infrastructure; ownership; management; operations; skills; financing 
structures; and methodologies for the freight system. The strategy states that an 
economic regulatory authority should manage the relationship between the 
owner of the infrastructure and the operators of a particular network. 
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Government’s immediate focus seems to be that of increasing economic 
regulation of the ports, rail and road sectors, with the regulation of access to 
infrastructure by multiple operators being the responsibility of non-existing 
transport economic regulatory authority that is at this stage only in the proposal 
phase. Table 5.1 overleaf depicts the suggested transport economic regulatory 
authority with its proposed tasks of planning, promotion and integration.  
Table 5.1: Proposed transport economic regulatory function 
Regulation of each mode of transport 
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Source: Adapted from Schultz and Alexandroff (1985:13) 
▲▲ Regulatory impact 
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It needs to be re-emphasised that the concept of a transport economic regulator 
was proposed by government. This regulator will be introduced over a period of 
time to encompass all current regulatory entities within the transport sector. 
According to Schultz and Alexandroff (1985:11), one of the objectives of a 
transport economic regulator is to ensure that the rates of different modes of 
transport are just and reasonable. Equally so, the proposed transport economic 
regulator in South Africa would be ideally positioned to monitor the rates of 
different modes of transport as indicated in Table 5.1. It is necessary to 
remember that government at this stage has only gone as far as making tentative 
suggestions and proposals on the introduction of a transport economic regulatory 
authority and this study is the evaluation of these proposals. 
5.7.1 The planning function of a transport economic regulatory authority 
According to the Department of Transport, a transport economic regulatory 
authority needs to regulate the entire transport industry, which would include inter 
alia, sea, air, rail and road transport. The National Land Transport Transition Act 
(NLTTA) states that land transport planning should focus on the most effective 
and economic way of moving freight and people from one point to another in the 
system. The envisaged role of the transport economic regulator as contained in 
Section 1.3.4 of the draft National Rail Transport Policy states:  
“the economic regulatory function would include, where applicable: 
promoting effective planning, managing competition and contractual 
regimes in railways, subsidy management, performance compliance, 
and public and consumer protection. It will require sufficient 
information and reporting from operators, asset owners and transport 
authorities”.  
Currently, the Department of Transport is establishing a rail economic regulator 
whose role is seen as a transition towards a fully-fledged transport economic 
regulatory authority and its specific objectives are: 
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• to introduce and promote competition; 
• to promote affordability and financial sustainability of operations; 
• to create a balance between service quality and cost; 
• to ensure public and consumer protection; 
• to facilitate an environment, which would attract private sector investment; 
and 
• to promote strategic transformation. 
5.7.1.1 Ports infrastructure 
The present situation is that the seaports are regulated by the National Ports 
Authority. On the other hand, the White Paper on National Transport Policy 
(1996c:38) confirms the seaports’ strategic role in the facilitation of seaborne 
trade and the seaports are also seen as strategic assets serving the nation as a 
whole. Inter-modal transfers and load consolidation occur at a range of locations 
that are concentrated in urban areas, which are found usually at ports and 
airports. In order to enable a seamless flow of traffic to overcome operational 
challenges such as inter-modal planning, a transport economic regulatory 
authority would be an appropriate remedy to regulate inter-modal operations.  
Experience has taught that what usually affects operations is the unwillingness of 
stakeholders to share information and to coordinate modal processes at inter-
modal facilities. Hopefully, a transport economic regulatory authority would 
contribute positively in bridging this gap if it could be introduced. Hence, based 
on the contribution derived from Basanes, Kessides and others, it is ideal to 
establish a transport economic regulatory authority that would run the various 
affairs of the transport industry in the Republic of South Africa as is already the 
case in developed countries.  
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5.7.1.2    Rail infrastructure 
In a developing country such as South Africa, the role of a rail infrastructure need 
not be over-emphasised because it is self-evident in any case, as people and 
goods need a reliable mode of transport to take them from one point to another 
and a rail transport is ideal for this activity. A transition towards the establishment 
of a transport economic regulatory authority in the form of a rail economic 
regulator would require sufficient information from operators and owners of 
assets to monitor and benchmark railway performance against strategic national 
objectives. Finally, the envisaged transport economic regulatory authority needs 
to manage the relationship between infrastructure owners and operators of a 
particular network. 
5.7.1.3    Road infrastructure 
Toll roads have undoubtedly become a reality in South Africa and more and more 
toll roads are being constructed. These roads are usually constructed on a Build, 
Operate and Transfer (BOT) concession with the private sector as a partner. The 
private sector has become a partner that is responsible for the maintenance of 
the condition of the road over the concession period. The income generated by 
the tolling of the different classes of vehicles must adequately compensate the 
private sector so that it can afford to maintain the roads and create shareholder 
value in terms of return on investment. The success of all operations be it public 
or private, rests with the income they can generate, in the sense that the more 
they generate the more they can achieve, and the less they generate the less 
they can achieve. 
5.7.2 The promotional function of a transport economic regulatory 
authority 
The National Freight Logistics Strategy identified key bottlenecks in the logistics 
system that are inhibiting the introduction of a seamless movement of cargo, as 
well as decreasing the cost of doing business in South Africa. The National 
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Freight Logistics Strategy went further and defined a vision for seamless logistics 
and also identified the necessary key interventions to improve the situation in 
which these bottlenecks were occurring. The main challenge now is to accelerate 
the introduction of the strategy to ensure implementation of elements such as 
economic regulation in the rail and port environments, the improvement of rail 
infrastructure, rolling stock and operations, the introduction of competition to 
bring down costs and improve service and the achievement of an appropriate 
modal split of cargo movement. 
5.7.3 Integration function of a transport economic regulatory authority 
The 1996 White Paper on National Transport Policy (Republic of South Africa, 
1996c) outlines a vision for the transport sector focusing on the objectives of 
"safety, reliability, efficiency, integration and economic and environmental 
sustainability". The most relevant policy principles to the economic regulation of 
transport are to regulate services such as: 
• maximum price; 
• minimum quality (technical and environmental standards, as well as rules 
for infrastructure investment and financing); and 
• control of monopolistic behaviour. 
All these are done to determine the overall characteristics of the functioning of 
the sector within the broader policy frameworks and objectives of the 
government.  
5.8 POSITIONING OF A TRANSPORT ECONOMIC REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY 
In principle, a transport economic regulatory authority would provide a transport 
regulatory service while the Department of Transport would formulate transport 
policies. This separation of policy and regulatory service provision would enable 
the transport economic regulator to adopt methods analogous to the 
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private sector particularly that of improving service quality and reducing costs. To 
this end, a draft proposal of a transport economic regulatory unit and its funding 
is presented below. 
5.8.1 Proposed organisational structure of a transport economic 
regulatory authority 
While it may be accepted that it is difficult to prescribe a rule of thumb for 
selecting an ideal structure for a transport economic regulatory authority, 
Macmillan and Tampoe (2000:55) suggest that the ideal structure should 
resemble that of commercial enterprises with a chief executive and a 
management board. In essence, the commencement of the unit should reflect a 
functional structure, which requires people with well-defined skills and areas of 
specialisation to run it. Wheelen and Hunger (2006:239) advise that each 
manager should be matched with his/her area of specialization hence the 
structure below reflects modal specialisation, each headed by a general 
manager. The structure merely reflects the commencement and has room for 
additional functions that might arise during the implementation phase.  
Pearce and Robinson (1997:342) warn that the strategic challenge presented by 
the functional structure is often an effective coordination of the functional units. It 
means therefore that the chief executive officer who is required for this position is 
expected to deal with the coordination of four modal regulatory areas indicated in 
Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Proposed organisational structure of a transport economic 
regulatory authority 
As far as the roads infrastructure is concerned, the existence of a transport 
economic regulatory authority is without doubt indispensable, as it would serve 
as an intermediary between road users, toll concession companies and the 
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as customers, and Fogli (2006:3) refers to a customer as "anyone who receives 
products or services and can be internal or external to the organisation and are 
the foundation of any business". In the toll roads industry, motorists should be 
regarded as customers as they are the toll concession companies’ main source 
of revenue. 
Within the context of the road infrastructure, a transport economic regulatory 
authority should take account of the road user’s needs, considering among other 
things how existing needs are changing. Macmillan and Tampoe (2000:66) refer 
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customer needs, as it serves as an essential approach to anticipate future needs.  
This implies that the transport economic regulatory authority should repeatedly 
be required to conduct customer satisfaction surveys so as to ensure that 
regulatory instruments are updated accordingly. This is supported by Lawther 
(2000:196) who points out that customer satisfaction could be done by transport 
economic regulatory authorities through inter alia mail or telephone surveys. 
5.8.2 Funding  
Funding in any company needs no emphasis, thus it is desirable for self-
sustainability to be a goal of all economic regulatory entities. The key aim of the 
transport economic regulatory authority should therefore be to see to it that 
concession companies are well regulated to forestall corruption. In support, 
McNutt (2005:186) asserts that it is imperative that its effectiveness be measured 
by some "in-house" effectiveness index, such as fines, which would constitute a 
constant source of revenue. McNutt (2005:186) further suggests that a newly 
established transport economic regulatory authority needs to have a complaint-
receipt function with powers to investigate the complaints.  
Most importantly, there should be enabling legislation that would enable 
concession companies and individual citizens to seek legal redress if aggrieved. 
For example, an aggrieved new entrant or operator wishing to enter the rail 
operating environment may lodge a complaint to the transport economic 
regulatory authority. McNutt (2005:186) went further to suggest that fines should 
not leave a convicted offender with large monopoly gains. The economic 
objective is to set fines and penalties and probabilities of conviction just high 
enough to induce optimal choices of behaviour and structure by operating 
concessionaires in the economy.  
5.9 SUMMARY  
This chapter dealt with transport economic regulatory regimes in the transport 
industry. The main focus pivoted on the period after the award of a bid, which is 
in this context called "competition in the market". The after-award phase 
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involves the preparation of the project before financial closure and includes 
negotiation of various project documents as well as obtaining debt and equity 
funding. It must be re-emphasised that the bidding process in a Public-Private 
Partnership project is a lengthy process that could take up to two years. After the 
bidders have been pre-qualified, the agency should prepare the bid evaluation 
criteria and the pre-qualified bidders should be asked to resubmit their bid after 
adjusting and complying with the set criteria. The winning bidder should be 
announced at this stage and an interim concession company should be 
established which would serve as a special purpose vehicle. The purpose of 
establishing a special purpose vehicle is to enable the sponsors to finance the 
project.  
Practically speaking, an interim concession company would in essence be 
required to include shareholder companies that specialise in several of the tasks 
to be performed under the concession agreement. It has become a norm for an 
agency to require that an interim concession company invite the local investors in 
order to improve transfer of technology, and to provide jobs and training to local 
personnel. 
In typical Build Operate and Transfer projects, there is a concept of "input 
supplier". The input supplier assumes the supply risk for an input necessary for 
operation of the project and it protects the concession company from possible 
failure in complying with the requirement that it provides resources. The input 
supplier may also be required to provide infrastructure that is needed to permit 
the delivery of inputs like cement. The lender group varies from project to project 
and may include a combination of private sector commercial lenders together 
with multilateral finance organisations. The lenders may not engage themselves 
in the operation of related activities.  
Within the Build Operate and Transfer framework, there is also the "construction 
contractor" which forms a link with the project company and which should enter 
into a construction contract with an interim concession company in order to 
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undertake its obligation to the agency in the form of designing, building, testing 
and commissioning the project. Linked with the concession company, there is 
also "the operator" who normally operates and maintains the project from 
completion of construction until the end of the concession period. An important 
stakeholder in the structure is a shareholder who is an owner of shares in a 
concession company. The shareholders are governed by the shareholders’ 
agreement, which is normally drafted by an interim concession company 
indicating when to distribute revenues to its members.  
The chapter attempted to motivate the necessity for having the intervention of a 
transport economic regulatory regime that would navigate the process of Public-
Private Partnerships in the road transport infrastructure. Section 5.3 of this study 
suggested that for a transport economic regulatory authority to do well in South 
Africa, it would need the technical assistance of international agencies from 
countries like Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The implication is 
that transport economic regulatory models from industrial countries should be 
carefully evaluated and considered for application in South Africa after thorough 
refinement and adaptation.  
Having evaluated various transport economic regulatory regimes in various 
countries, the main task is to agree on the specific model to be adopted. The 
logical step would be to come out with a structure. This is very difficult, as one 
cannot prescribe a rule of thumb for selecting an ideal structure for a transport 
economic regulatory authority. It is, however suggested that the ideal structure 
should resemble that of commercial enterprises with a chief executive and a 
management board. In essence, the commencement of the unit should reflect a 
functional structure, which requires persons with well-defined skills and areas of 
specialisation to run it. In conclusion, the funding of a transport economic 
regulatory authority needs no emphasis, thus it is desirable that self-sustainability 
be a goal of the proposed transport economic regulatory authority. It should see 
to it that transport-operating companies are well regulated to forestall corruption. 
Most importantly, there should be enabling legislation that would enable 
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concession companies and individual citizens to seek legal redress if aggrieved.  
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CHAPTER 6 
TRANSPORT ECONOMIC REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS 
IN THE TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters dealt with various kinds of approaches that examined the 
concept of Public-Private Partnerships, and this discussion ended in a number of 
proposals about the need for the establishment of a transport economic 
regulatory authority. In the transport industry, the process of monitoring and 
evaluating of Public-Private Partnerships is a very essential aspect to be 
executed by a transport economic regulatory authority and Royer (2005:68) 
describes this as a combination of semantically different concepts with different 
historical antecedents.  
This chapter will mainly focus on assessing whether the study has accomplished 
the main and secondary objectives as outlined in Chapter 1. Having outlined the 
main objective of the study, it is also necessary to discuss the sub-objectives of 
this investigation, namely to examine the effects of the ongoing rollout processes 
of Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa and in other countries and also to 
find out to what degree experience from other industrialised countries has 
influenced the South African transport industry.  
 
The study explored this in order to be in a position to analyse and also to assess 
what kind of model would in the final analysis best suit the South African situation 
after weighing all available options. 
Furthermore, the study examined the efficacy of the concept of competition for 
and in the market with the ultimate aim of recommending the establishment of a 
transport economic regulatory authority to regulate among other 
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things, the toll road industry and also to assess how the regulatory intervention 
mechanism would operate in the road transport infrastructure. 
From the above information, the design of an ideal transport economic regulatory 
authority is undertaken with the aim of providing a structure that would serve as a 
strategy to lure investors to invest in the development of the road industry.  
The strategy implementation phase focuses on what the transport economic 
regulatory authority is expected to deliver. The final phase then deals with the 
evaluation of the transport economic regulatory authority in terms of assessing 
whether this authority promotes Public-Private Partnerships as a viable strategy 
to attract investment in the road infrastructure.  
6.2 ASSESSMENT OF INTRODUCING AN OVERARCHING TRANSPORT 
ECONOMIC REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
 Based on the above main objective of the study, a host of countries’ Public-
Private Partnership arrangements were analysed. Annexure 2 was created as a 
list of countries that underwent a Public-Private Partnership process and some 
ended up establishing regulatory authorities to ensure that controls are imposed 
on newly formed concession companies. 
 
From the literature findings, the United States of America had to establish a 
Transport Regulation Board which has the regulatory oversight over all sectors. 
These regulatory agencies are independent from policy makers. Based on the 
findings above, it would be valid for South Africa to consider establishing an 
independent transport economic regulatory authority with a regulatory oversight 
over all transport sectors.  
Derived from the United States of America’s experience as stated in section 5.1.3 
of this thesis, good coordination between agencies was endured through 
assigning an agency’s board member to other competing agencies. South Africa 
could consider adopting the same approach by encouraging coordination 
between the South African National Roads Agency Limited, the Competition 
Commission and the proposed transport economic regulatory 
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authority. It is recommended that some of the members of the proposed transport 
economic regulatory authority also be on the board of the Competition 
Commission. This would help in alleviating any potential dysfunctional conflict 
that may arise as a result of possible duplication of roles and responsibilities of 
each institution. 
A wealth of experience gained from the United Kingdom is that a Highways 
agency was established and was assigned to manage, maintain and improve the 
national road network. In order to deal with rail transport infrastructure, the Rail 
Safety and Economic Regulators were subsequently established. Although this 
tallies with the worldwide trend towards the creation of separate and specialised 
regulatory entities, the United Kingdom experienced problems with regard to 
regulatory co-ordination. This led to the government considering the 
amalgamation of both the rail safety and economic regulator to become one 
overarching entity. Based on this trend, it appears that South Africa would be 
taking the right decision in considering establishing an overarching transport 
economic regulatory authority. 
On the basis of the experience gained from Canada, the Canadian Treasury 
Board was established to facilitate Public-Private Partnership projects. The 
regulatory function is executed by the Highway Operations Control Centre which 
works hand in hand with Environment Canada to anticipate road conditions and 
surface temperatures. What can be deduced from the Canadian regulatory 
regime is that the economic regulatory authority encompasses environmental 
issues which position the institution on the overarching level. As a lesson for 
consideration in South Africa is that the transport economic regulatory authority 
could consider incorporating environmental issues within its tasks and 
responsibilities. 
The Philippines has established a Sectoral Agency called specialist BOT unit that 
co-ordinates, design and implement Public-Private Partnership projects. The 
study indicated that projects may also be proposed by the Toll Regulatory Board, 
Philippines National Construction Company or the Department of Public Works. 
The regulation of concession contracts is done by any of the above mentioned 
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regulatory bodies.  
The Hungarian government passed a law for the formation of a strong legal 
framework for the control of privately financed projects. It thereafter established 
the Bureau for Motorway Concessions that facilitated Public-Private Partnership 
projects. The country was faced with regulatory challenges with respect to toll 
rates regulation. What could be adopted by South Africa from the Hungarian 
approach is the drafting of a legal framework for the control of privately financed 
projects. However, it needs to be pointed out that South Africa has made great 
strides with respect to this aspect as the Public Finance Management Act has 
been enacted to deal with public financial matters.  
6.2.1 Justifying regulatory authority as a valid intervention in the 
management and operation of transport infrastructure 
Section 1.2.1 of this study proposed to make rational suggestions as to what 
South Africa should do in order to maintain mutual relationship between transport 
infrastructure providers and the users. It needs to be pointed out that chapter 4 
outlined the users’ rights as enshrined in the constitution. Regulations are 
therefore needed to ensure that both the existing and potential road users are 
protected. A body responsible for the execution of these regulations is needed 
and it is therefore justified that a transport economic regulatory authority be 
established. The regulatory authority should be urged to outline the quality of 
service standards road users are entitled to expect. The lines of communication 
or access to the regulatory authority to seek redress of grievances should be 
made explicit and easily accessible to all road users.  
The outcome of the literature reveals that where the establishment of a 
regulatory authority can be justified on public interest grounds, an independent 
regulatory authority appears to be preferable as compared to regulation by a 
government department. It should however, be acknowledged that a fully 
independent economic regulatory authority may not be achievable in the short 
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term as this would need political will to set it on the ground. 
Section 2.11.3 outlines the experience gained from France where the Toll Act 
was drafted to authorize toll roads operators to levy tolls to finance construction, 
maintenance and operation of highways. The agency called Highway 
Administration was formed and it was mainly responsible for the award of 
concessions as well as the management of the road network. A need for the 
establishment of regulatory authorities evolved and this was seen as the right 
intervention in the management of transport infrastructure. It would therefore be a 
valid intervention for South Africa to consider introducing a regulatory authority 
as other processes such as establishing a roads agency has been fulfilled. 
The Australian experience suggests that each state has its roads agency that is 
responsible for the maintenance and development of the national highway 
network within its boundaries. Government owned utilities are being transformed 
into Government Business Enterprises that operate as businesses. Such 
businesses are subjected to the national competition policy of the Economic 
Regulator. 
If the Australian approach is followed by South Africa without any modifications, it 
would mean that the newly formed private sector entities or concessionaires 
would be subjected to the Competition Commission of the Department of Trade 
and Industry. This would therefore defeat the objective of establishing a 
specialized overarching transport economic regulatory authority. 
6.2.2 The promotion of the interest of government, toll road industry and 
road users. 
Section 1.2.1 of this study intends to make rational suggestions as to what South 
Africa should do in order to maintain mutual relationship between transport 
infrastructure providers and the users. The introduction of a transport economic 
regulatory authority could serve as a valid intervention as reflected in Section 
5.7.1 where it is stated that the function of the transport economic regulatory 
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authority would include, where applicable, promoting effective planning, 
managing competition, subsidy management, performance compliance, and 
public and consumer protection.  
It will thus require sufficient information and reporting from operators, asset 
owners and transport authorities. The transport economic regulatory authority is 
also expected to promote the issue of affordability and financial sustainability of 
operations. By so doing, it will be promoting the interest of among other things, 
the toll road industry. 
It is also expected of a transport economic regulatory authority to create a 
balance between service quality and the cost incurred by road users. In terms of 
satisfying government’s interests, the promotion of strategic transformation and 
attraction of investment would be seen as some of the critical areas to be 
addressed by the transport economic regulatory authority. By so doing, the 
transport economic regulatory authority ensures that the interests of government, 
industry and road users are protected and thus satisfying the objective of the 
study as listed above. 
With respect to the promotion of the interest of users, Chapter 4 intensively 
investigated the rights of road users as contained in the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution. The researcher has strongly argued that the following rights as 
propagated by President Kennedy be honoured and these are: 
• the right to make meaningful choices; 
• the right to be heard; 
• the right to safety; and 
• the right to be informed. 
It is therefore hoped that the proposed transport economic regulatory authority 
would ensure that the interests of government, the toll road industry and 
transport users are protected. The immediate establishment of such an authority 
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is therefore justifiable as the balancing of these interests is critical. 
6.2.3 Examination of the effects of the Public-Private Partnership rollout 
process in other countries 
Some of the countries that were researched in the quest to determine the effects 
of the rollout process of Public-Private Partnerships are, the United States of 
America, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Mexico, Austria, Canada, the 
Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The reason behind the selection of the 
listed countries above is that they had an effect on the thinking that took place in 
South Africa in the sense that the Public-Private Partnership initiatives 
undertaken in South Africa have to a large extent elements of resemblance with 
what is happening in the above countries.  
The influence of the experiences gained from the abovementioned countries on 
the ongoing rollout processes of the Public-Private Partnership in South Africa 
finds expression in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 Section 2.11.1, the Public-Private 
Partnerships that were studied in countries such as the United States of America 
(USA) are discussed in detail. For instance, the USA has a strong tradition of 
how road users should pay for the use of roads through road-user charges and 
all the revenues so generated are dedicated to the improvement of roads. This 
has ensured that the money so generated contributes positively by way of 
improvement of the road infrastructure in the United States of America. South 
Africa could do well in copying this model of generating funds and also utilising 
them for improving the quality of the road infrastructure. 
Section 2.11.2 dealt with the experience gained from Italy where twenty-two 
concession holding companies are owned by public bodies or local authorities. 
Reference was made to a concession company such as Austostrada which 
manages 52 percent of toll freeways successfully, and which may become a 
model for South Africa. The concession scheme adopted by the Italians is that of 
Build Operate and Transfer (BOT), which is valid for a period of 30-35 years. The 
loan is guaranteed by the state and the road is handed back to the state at the 
end of the concession period. Build Operate and Transfer creates room for 
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the investors to channel their resources in the development of road infrastructure 
in the country. In this context, the BOT model was effectively used as a strategy 
by Italy to attract investment in the road infrastructure. 
Section 2.11.3 refers to the French experience regarding the effect of Public-
Private-Partnerships where it is stated that in 1955, a French law was passed to 
allow the toll financing of highways. Public control was maintained by granting 
concessions only to local public organisations, chambers of commerce or a 
mixed company in which a public interest held the majority of shares. As a lesson 
from the French, it is evident that business communities, such as the South 
African Chamber of Commerce, are strongly encouraged to participate in road 
infrastructure projects. This has a positive effect as a Public-Private Partnership 
would take place within a strategy that is appropriate for implementation in South 
Africa. 
Section 2.11.4 states, “When roads are being financed in the United Kingdom, 
the Highway Agency takes the lead. The Highway Agency examines the way the 
procurement process is being done as well as the value for money likely to be 
obtained from the contracts”. In a similar fashion, the South African National 
Roads Agency is facilitating the process as a granting authority but the study is of 
the view that it would be ideal to have an independent transport regulatory 
authority that ensures that the concessioning processes are done in the right 
way. 
Section 2.11.5 deals with the Japanese experience regarding the rollout process 
of Public-Private Partnerships. The Japanese government established a network 
of freeways which were financed from private loan capital and government 
borrowings. The criteria were stipulated for toll rates, implying that the road had 
to cover all costs and still remain equitable relative to the users’ ability to pay and 
most importantly, rates should not exceed the benefit of using the toll road. The 
rollout process in South Africa has some similarities with the Japanese process 
in that there are some toll roads which are operated by the National Roads 
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Agency and which are financed by the Department of Transport’s allocation while 
the concessioned routes are financed by the private sector. The gradual 
concessioning of national routes would create a favourable platform for private 
investors as happened in Japan.  
Section 2.11.6 discusses the experience gained in Mexico where the secretariat 
to the inter-ministerial commission, located within the Ministry of Finance, is used 
as a channel for managing concession loans or donor support to the Public-
Private Partnership programme. The approach followed by South Africa is similar 
to that adopted by Mexico in the sense that the National Treasury has 
established a Public-Private Partnership management unit that is in charge of co-
coordinating Public-Private Partnership projects in the country. This unit is used 
as a channel for managing PPP projects of various institutions. The facilitation of 
these PPP projects would ultimately create opportunities for private investors to 
participate in the transport infrastructure development as happened in the studied 
countries. 
Section 2.11.7 relates to the experience earned in Austria where government 
organisations were encouraged to take charge of their affairs and to compare 
their performance with those of the private sector. The organisations adopted 
strategic management principles and charters to define the services delivered to 
citizens whom they now perceive as "clients". By way of borrowing, the concept 
of charters is now featuring very strongly in South Africa as the country goes 
about its rollout programmes that involve Public-Private Partnerships as was the 
case in Austria. 
Section 2.11.8 deals with the experience gained from Canada in that the 
Canadians’ experience is based on collaboration with public service delivery, 
which is often referred to as Alternative Service Delivery or ASD, The experience 
gained from Canada can be seen in the recent collaboration methods used in 
South Africa and other countries. Within this model, the Canadian government 
recognises the need to develop collaboration as a means of allowing its foothold 
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on the global market scene to endure. Having made this observation, the study is 
of the opinion that this could have important lessons for South Africa in the sense 
that collaboration is now encouraged as an alternative service delivery 
mechanism in municipalities of the studied countries. 
Section 2.11.9 discusses the experience gained from the Philippines where the 
government created a novel institutional structure to support the country’s large 
infrastructure programme. National, provincial and municipal authorities were 
selected and awarded projects based on a list of priorities which had to be 
approved by the Investment Coordination Committee. As a lesson for South 
Africa to attract investors, an Investment Coordination Committee should be 
established. This committee could provide advice to investors who wish to invest 
in road infrastructure. Furthermore, the committee could provide technical 
assistance and training to national, provincial and local government officials on 
how to design and implement road infrastructure projects.  
Section 2.11.10 points out that Australia has three spheres of government, 
namely, federal, state and local. The federal government owns the National 
Highway System and the State and local governments take care of state and 
local roads respectively. Individual government departments are responsible for 
the design of concessions. Each state has a road agency with statutory authority 
to manage, plan and maintain the state road network. 
Section 2.11.11 handles the experience earned from New Zealand where the 
New Zealand government has created a two-level tier of governmental 
structures. In this structure, the national government owns the National Highway 
System and has contracted its management out to Transit New Zealand, a 
government owned entity, which is a business concern. Ownership and 
maintenance of all other public roads in the country however rests with the 
respective local governments. Local governments are at liberty to contract roads 
out for construction and maintenance. The same strategy would be ideal for 
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South Africa to adopt and refine to suit the situation. 
Section 2.11.12 relates to the experience gained from Hungary. In the early 
1990s, the Hungarian government recognised that demand for new road 
transport capacity could not be met from budgetary resources. It therefore 
established the Bureau for Motorway Concessions under the Ministry of 
Transport, Communication and Water Management. This was meant to find 
private financing solutions for over 500 kilometres of highways and bridges. The 
government also passed a law that stipulated that a strong legal framework for 
the control of privately financed infrastructure projects be formed. It is therefore 
not surprising that South Africa had to draft an infrastructure legal framework to 
be able to facilitate the Public-Private Partnership project in Gauteng (South 
Africa). 
6.2.4 Effects of the rollout process of Public-Private Partnerships in South 
Africa 
The effects of the ongoing rollout processes of Public-Private Partnerships in 
South Africa is summarised in Section 2.2.1 of this study, which states,  
…”Public-Private Partnerships should be seen as a means to acquire 
resources or technological skills from a private sector in order to assist in 
the implementation of strategies for the accomplishment of the national 
objectives in general and those of the transport sector in particular”.  
Specific reference is made to the South African toll road industry where flexibility 
in the acquisition of technological innovations, such as the introduction of an 
electronic toll collection system, is granted by the National Roads Agency to the 
Bakwena Toll Concession Company.  
Borrowing from the French experience as stated in Section 2.11.3 of this study 
regarding the drafting of enabling legislation as a requirement for the rolling out 
of Public-Private Partnership, the Gauteng Department of Public Transport 
Roads and Works in South Africa has drafted a legal framework on infrastructure 
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that serves as a frame of reference on issues related to expropriation. The use of 
this provincial legal framework has enabled the Gauteng Department of Public 
Transport to expropriate land with ease for the rollout of the Gautrain Public-
Private Partnership project. The researcher therefore recommends that other 
provinces also develop provincial legal infrastructural frameworks so as to roll out 
Public-Private Partnerships on a provincial level.  
As reflected in the French experience discussed in Section 2.11.3, the toll 
income collected by concession companies from road users is used to maintain 
toll roads so that there should be value accruing to the road user in terms of a 
better quality road infrastructure. In this respect, based on the N3 Toll 
Concession Company Board of Directors’ plan, the company is embarking on the 
implementation of a strategic marketing strategy. According to this strategy, 
motorists are supplied with information that gives them a comprehensive history 
of the areas along the corridor. This serves to differentiate toll routes operated by 
Public-Private Partnerships from other roads. This would attract more tourists as 
such a history is vital for the tourists. Annexure 1 gives detailed information about 
the N3 corridor stretching from Heidelberg in Gauteng to Cedara in KwaZulu-
Natal. 
According to Section 3.2.2 of this study, the environment can also include 
cultural, historic and social components. This section further argues that these 
components have not been given sufficient attention in the past particularly when 
roads were constructed. The study therefore recommends that in Public-Private 
Partnership projects that deal with the construction of roads, the impact on all 
these components should be given sufficient consideration particularly because 
of the reciprocal nature of transport and its immediate environment.  
Section 4.3 of this study argues strongly that, if economic progress is to be 
achieved in South Africa, competition laws need to apply to all companies, 
regardless of their classification. The researcher is of the opinion that concession 
companies should be subjected to competition laws and the ideal situation would 
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be to establish a transport economic regulatory authority to deal with all technical 
aspects concerned with the transport systems of all modes. 
Section 4.3 also makes a suggestion that there is a need for the development of 
corporate governance principles to run the road industry in an increasingly 
transparent manner. This aspect is important because a transport economic 
regulatory authority should be seen as an ideal body adhering to the principles of 
corporate governance and ensuring that the rights of road users, the toll road 
industry and government are honoured.  
Section 4.3.4 deals with the Public-Private Partnership phenomenon. The 
introduction of Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa was aimed at affording 
private sector entities the opportunity to compete for the market, so that the 
establishment of a regulatory authority is therefore justifiable in order to regulate 
the market. 
Section 4.6.1.1 points out that the user should be given a choice and 
sovereignty. The withdrawal of an alternative non-toll route would therefore 
contradict the principle of free competition. It is therefore recommended that a 
comprehensive study be conducted testing the concept of road users’ freedom of 
choice and other related rights as contained in the Bill of Rights.  
Section 4.8.2 makes a suggestion along the lines of creating an ombudsperson 
for each regulatory agency or for all regulatory agencies. This suggestion is seen 
as one way of ensuring that the toll road industry and road users’ rights are 
addressed while waiting for the establishment of a fully-fledged transport 
economic regulatory authority to be established.  
Section 5.2.7 states that an established agency could issue concession contracts 
by means of a contract or authorisation. A concession issued by means of a 
contract involves the agency entering into a contract with the private sector 
project company which contains the mutual project obligations. In the case of a 
concession, issued by means of authorisation, the applicable legislation would 
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normally prescribe the form of contract. Given the two approaches of issuing a 
contract, the researcher argues that the rolling-out of Public-Private Partnership 
projects would require issuing concession contracts by means of the former 
approach because there should be a mutual relationship between the two parties 
and a thirty-year contract as it is already happening in South Africa requires such 
a relationship.   
Section 5.2.8 relates to flexibility in negotiating a concession contract. The study 
quotes Hodge and Greve (2005:73) who strongly stress that flexibility should be 
made mandatory for projects that involve public assets and a risk-sharing 
relationship over a period of 25-30 years. This should be put into place in order to 
resolve problems if and when they arise. The researcher concurs with these two 
authors and wishes to add that this aspect be captured within the South African 
supply chain guidelines so as to guide prospective bidders. All conditions should 
also be clearly articulated within the terms of the project contracts and should not 
be left to the discretion of the contracting parties.  
6.2.5 Assessment of the model that would suit South Africa 
Strategy formulation was defined in Section 1.7.2 of this study as "a process of 
developing long-range plans for the effective management of environmental 
opportunities and threats in the light of corporate strengths and weaknesses" 
(Hunger, 1989:14). The long-range plans for government to exploit investment 
opportunities in the road infrastructure management effectively received attention 
through the Public-Private Partnership initiatives that are being implemented 
every year. Prior to the selection of an appropriate regulatory intervention 
strategy for the road infrastructure, a model for South Africa is suggested below. 
6.2.6 Suggested model for South Africa 
After having identified and highlighted the fact that Public-Private Partnership 
projects are in the growth phase in South Africa, it is opportune to have a better 
understanding of how the process unfolds as well as the relevance of the 
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intervention of transport economic regulatory authority. To this end, Figure 3.1 in 
Chapter 3 of this study gives an overview of the history leading to the 
establishment of the South African National Roads Agency which then assumed 
the responsibility of a granting authority. Hence it awarded concession contracts 
to concessionaires such as the N3 Toll Concession Company. The second model 
detailing a Public-Private Partnership process is depicted in Chapter 5 (Figure 
5.1), which shows the relationship between the South African National Roads 
Agency Limited as a granting authority, the principal or Department of Transport 
and the concession company (or the Special Purpose Vehicle, SPV). Flowing 
from Figures 3.1 and 5.1, a Public-Private Partnership model was designed as 
depicted in Figure 6.1, which shows various phases such as broad strategies at 
national government level, the granting authority facilitating competition for the 
market and the process entering the construction phase where a number of 
construction management strategies are suggested. The final phase in this 
regard is operation, which calls for the implementation of competitive operational 
strategies by concession companies. Such competitive strategies include the 
pricing and service quality executed in the toll road industry. The challenge here 
is the implementation of both the construction management and competitive 
operational strategies that should contribute to realising the broad strategies as 
set at national government level. The study therefore sees this phase as the right 
time to ensure the full transport economic regulatory intervention as indicated in 
the model (see Figure 6.1) 
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Figure 6.1: Transport economic regulatory oversight and PPP processes 
In Section 3.4.1, reference is made to setting up a contract-executing toll road 
agency which is similar to a private sector project implementation unit and which 
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is specially set up to implement donor-financed infrastructure projects. In as far 
as the model’s applicability to the South African situation is concerned; it could 
be applied as a transitional model to ascertain how it can contribute to South 
Africa’s economic developmental objectives such as job creation.  
Section 3.4.2 of the study refers to private sector managing under the toll road 
agency. This model involves the contracting out of the management function for 
the whole road network to the private sector. The private sector does the work 
under the jurisdiction of a selected road agency. The critical evaluation of this 
model indicates that the model does not create room for the private sector to 
come with investments, and therefore it may not constitute an effective strategy 
for attracting investments unless it adopts a concession contract which would 
make provision for investments by the private sector.  
6.2.7 Examining the efficacy of the concept of competition for and in the 
market 
Competition for the market was dealt with in Section 4.4.1 during the discussion 
of those activities that constitute the tendering process. This section went further 
to discuss various key stages in the procurement process, namely the 
consultation stage, the deadline phase, the tendering aspect, the negotiation 
stage, the analysis and selection phase in which the preferred bidder is identified. 
This process then ends with the technical requirements and contract terms being 
concluded.  
This process is seen as one way of allowing competition in the market to take 
place; and it is also a significant way of attracting investors from all walks of life 
as this presents an opportunity for companies to compete for work or projects.  
Section 5.6.3 clearly states the importance of introducing competition with a view 
to nullifying monopolies. In this respect, it is argued that the management of 
relationships with stakeholders would be achieved if the establishment of a 
transport economic regulator is meant to oversee all modes of transport. 
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Competition in the market refers to that type of competition that takes place after 
the bid has been awarded. This type of competition requires the intervention of a 
transport economic regulatory authority which would regulate, inter alia, the 
relationship among modes of transport. The study has indicated that a transport 
economic regulatory authority is essential to regulate competition for the market 
as well as in the market. 
6.2.8    Assessment of a regulatory intervention mechanism in the transport 
infrastructure 
It is important to emphasise the fact that the main aim of a study of this 
magnitude and level is to contribute positively in suggesting or recommending an 
appropriate regulatory intervention mechanism in the transport infrastructure in 
the country because the existing structures are currently deemed inadequate. 
In Chapter 5, a number of regulatory regimes have been suggested. Section 
5.5.1 made a suggestion for a type of regulation by a specific regulatory body, 
which would lead to transport regulation being undertaken by an expert body with 
full understanding of public sector economics and operations. The researcher is 
of the opinion that an appropriate strategy should be to create a body of 
expertise within the Department of Transport to deal with transport infrastructural 
issues. To do this, proposals or solicitations from people with expertise in public 
sector economics should be called for. Such a step would create room for other 
related disciplines required for establishing and sustaining a transport economic 
regulatory authority to come on board. 
Section 5.5.2 outlined the practical challenges of implementing transport 
economic regulations for such regulations require the services of technical 
expertise such as accounting, auditing, transport engineering, law and 
economics. While it is accepted that the above disciplines coupled with 
appropriate experience are very scarce and indispensable in South Africa, the 
study nevertheless suggested in Section 5.5.3 the establishment of regional 
transport regulatory advisors to facilitate information exchange which is 
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necessary even though it is of a non-binding procedural nature. The calling for 
proposals for the creation of a database of regional transport regulatory advisors 
could be a practical strategy for the building of skills capacity in the transport 
economic regulatory environment. 
Section 5.5.3 also looked at the option of establishing a multinational regulatory 
authority which is motivated by the fact that South Africa requires considerable 
cooperation from SADC countries. Thus establishing a regional transport 
economic regulatory authority might be a realistic strategy option but it requires 
the cooperation of neighbouring countries for its ultimate success. The 
researcher therefore recommends that the current mandate of the Cross-Border 
Road Transport Agency be explored particularly with respect to upgrading it in 
order to be able to deal with transport economic regulatory issues across the 
South African borders.  
Section 5.4 investigates the Gautrain project, which is a Public-Private 
Partnership initiative in the Province of Gauteng in South Africa. After the 
announcement of the preferred bidder, both the public and private sectors agreed 
to the appointment of an independent certifier whose role it is to monitor the 
progress and the impact made by the concessionaire on the transport industry 
constantly in terms of the contract.  
None of the African countries has ever before come out with a mechanism that 
measures the impact of the Public-Private Partnership processes on the 
performance of the private sector enterprises. While the researcher commends 
the initiative of Gauteng Province in introducing an independent certifier, it would 
be ideal if the function of an independent certifier could be seen as a transition 
measure towards the establishment of a fully fledged transport economic 
regulatory authority.  
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6.3 OTHER AREAS INVESTIGATED IN THE STUDY 
6.3.1 Operation of regulatory intervention mechanism in the road 
infrastructure 
During the operation phase of a Public-Private Partnership project, a transport 
economic regulatory authority may be required to intervene to ensure that the 
concessionaire has reserved sufficient funds for maintenance and repair of the 
assets for the transport economic regulatory authority’s area of jurisdiction (see 
Figure 6.1). This evaluation process needs to be done to ensure that service 
quality is not compromised, thus ensuring that users derive value for money paid 
in the form of toll fees. 
A transport economic regulatory authority could also intervene to assess whether 
the parties to the contract have the financial capability throughout the operation 
phase. This approach is strongly supported by Estache and De Rus, (2000:286) 
who suggest that the concessionaire should be monitored through reviews and 
audits. If the concessionaire’s performance is below standard, the contract 
should specify the nature and type of sanctions to be imposed. 
6.3.2 Regulating the amount to be recovered by operators through toll 
systems 
If a transport economic regulatory authority has to take social aspects into 
consideration when determining toll fees, it implies that government must impose 
a special treatment of some user groups and have their use of the roads financed 
through subsidies. This requires a special investigation which needs to inform the 
Department of Transport’s National Land Transport Policy direction. An added 
regulatory challenge deals with how high a toll really could be? It is 
recommended that a special study be conducted to assess the user’s willingness 
to pay tolls with a view to savings on the travel time. 
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6.3.3 Assessment of how the regulatory intervention mechanism would 
operate  
Section 5.6.3 argues that the use of a single regulator for several industries, such 
as the road and rail infrastructure, would be preferable because it would make it 
possible to share fixed costs, scarce talent, and other resources and thus lead to 
the consolidation of expertise in a cross-cutting manner. The fact that one 
transport economic regulatory authority would take responsibility of multiple 
modes of transport means that fruitful results would in the long term come about 
because of cross-pollination of skills among different specialists under one roof. 
6.3.4   Justification for the establishment of a transport economic 
regulatory authority  
A need for the establishment of a transport economic regulatory authority to 
protect the needs of users, the transport industry and government was 
emphasised throughout this study. This has in essence been supported by the 
White Paper on National Transport Policy (Republic of South Africa, 1996c:16), 
where it is explicitly stated that "regulatory structures will be established where 
they are appropriate but do not exist". The White Paper goes on to say that 
infrastructure will be regulated where monopoly situations could occur. Setting up 
a transport economic regulatory authority is therefore justified and valid as it 
would serve as a good intervention. The Department of Transport is urged to 
prepare a business plan which needs to give a comprehensive total cost 
structure required to set it in operation.  
6.4    SUMMARY 
This chapter dealt with various kinds of approaches that examined the concept of 
Public-Private Partnerships, and a need for the establishment of a transport 
economic regulatory authority was expressed throughout the study. The process 
of monitoring and evaluating Public-Private Partnerships is seen as an essential 
aspect of strategic management, and a transport economic regulatory authority 
should fulfil the function of monitoring Public-Private Partnership processes.  
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From the study, it is clear that a transport economic regulatory authority should 
be able to promote the interest of various stakeholders, such as government, the 
toll road industry and road users, to name a few. The experiences from a number 
of industrialised countries were investigated to assess the extent to which they 
have influenced the South African transport industry. This has culminated in the 
suggestion of a Public-Private Partnership model, which is believed to be suitable 
for the South African situation after weighing all available options. 
The establishment of a transport economic regulatory authority serves as an 
ultimate strategy to monitor, evaluate and control Public-Private Partnership 
processes and issues with transport economic implications. In the assessment of 
regulatory intervention mechanisms in the road transport infrastructure, this study 
has suggested regulatory intervention mechanisms such as a regulatory body 
with full understanding of public sector economics and operations. It is further 
suggested that a body of expertise within the Department of Transport be created 
to deal with transport infrastructural issues.  
Among the practical challenges identified in implementing transport economic 
regulations are the scarcity of technical expertise such as accounting, auditing, 
transport engineering, law and economics. To overcome these challenges, it is 
suggested that there should be regional transport regulatory advisors to facilitate 
information exchange. It is further suggested that there should be a call for 
proposals by the Department of Transport for the creation of a database of 
regional transport regulatory advisors. The intention is to build skills capacity in 
the transport economic regulatory environment. 
Establishing a multinational regulatory authority might be a possibility as South 
Africa requires the cooperation of neighbouring countries for its ultimate success. 
The current mandate of the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency should be 
explored particularly in order to find out whether it is currently able to deal with 
transport economic regulatory issues across the South African borders.  
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The appointment of an independent certifier by the Gauteng Department of 
Public Transport Roads and Works for the monitoring of the progress and impact 
made by the concessionaire is commended, but should be seen as a transition 
measure towards the establishment of a fully fledged transport economic 
regulatory authority.  
It is interesting that during the operation phase of a Public-Private Partnership 
project, a transport economic regulatory authority is required to intervene 
because it has to ensure that the concessionaire reserves sufficient funds for 
maintenance and repair of the assets. Among the tasks to be performed are 
evaluation and monitoring, which should ensure that service quality is not 
compromised, thus ensuring that users get value for money. It is also important 
to assess the concessionaire’s financial capability through reviews and audits 
throughout the operation phase.  
With respect to the transport economic regulatory authority’s role of promoting 
the interest of government, the toll road industry and road users, it is suggested 
that lines of communication be opened to link with consumers, operators, asset 
owners and transport authorities. It is strongly emphasised that the fundamental 
rights of users be honoured, namely the right to make meaningful choices, the 
right to be heard, the right to safety and the right to be informed. 
The efficacy of the concept of competition for and in the market was examined. 
With regard to competition for the market, the study reveals that those activities 
that constitute the tendering process are crucial as they level the playing field for 
prospective bidders. The key stages in the procurement process were listed and 
include the consultation stage, deadline, tendering, negotiation, analysis and the 
selection phase in which the preferred bidder is identified. This process ends with 
the technical requirements and contract terms being concluded and is a 
significant way of attracting investors from all walks of life.  
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CHAPTER 7 
FINDINGS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of findings that were derived from the extensive 
analysis of Public-Private Partnerships in different parts of the world. 
Internationally, the decade of the 1980s reflected a growing trend in the 
establishment of Public-Private Partnership arrangements. It is expected that 
Public-Private Partnerships will remain a primary tool in the provision of services 
and facilities during the twenty-first century. The chapter covers among other 
things the conclusions and recommendations of the significant role played by 
Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa, as well as the proposal for the 
establishment of a transport economic regulatory authority to regulate the 
competitive behaviour of different modes of transport in South Africa. 
7.2 ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
7.2.1 Findings derived from the study  
• Both sectors (private and public) should be fully involved in service delivery 
based on each party’s distinctive competency in the area of involvement;  
• there should be a dictate of efficiency and fairness and the risk should be 
allocated to those who will benefit most from the project;  
• the partners should strive towards the accomplishment of a common 
primary objective; and  
• compliance with the overall legislative framework is absolutely essential, 
otherwise any effort towards a Public-Private Partnership may be defeated. 
The study unveiled that in Australia, Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) 
that operate as businesses are subjected to the national competition 
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policy and this needs to be investigated by South Africa for the possible adoption 
and refinement of the policy. 
7.2.2 Summary  
This chapter dealt with the analysis of the concept of Public-Private Partnerships. 
The outcome of the analysis unveiled the fact that an agency that is in 
partnership with any sphere of government may not qualify to be a Public-Private 
Partnership but rather a Public-Public Partnership. Of fundamental importance in 
the partnership is that both sectors should be fully involved in service delivery 
based on each party’s distinctive competency in the area of involvement. 
However, for this to happen as planned, the intervention of the transport 
economic regulatory authority is needed.  
Certain basic elements need to be considered if a partnership is to be managed 
successfully. These elements consist of the intention to genuinely participate in 
the project, the desire to strive towards the attainment of a common objective, the 
ability to design an appropriate organisational structure, the capacity to 
demonstrate sensitivity to issues and the ability to assess environmental factors.  
In terms of the different forms of Public-Private Partnerships, the study unveiled 
that there are several ways by which the private sector could be engaged in the 
public service. In the process of engaging the private sector in any public service, 
the first logical step followed in South Africa was to form the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited. This was meant to serve as an intermediary 
between the Department of Transport and concession companies. It should be 
noted that the public service in this context should not be commercialised as a 
way of freeing them (public service) from public accountability and control by the 
legislature. In fact, the public service must remain in control and be subjected to 
public accountability in any Public-Private Partnership agreement.  
The concept of concession was defined as the granting of an exclusive right to 
provide a service without payment by the authority. The authority referred to in 
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this regard is the South African National Roads Agency Ltd, which is currently 
dealing with making decisions on tariffs charged by concession companies or 
imposing minimum service requirements. Concession contracts make provision 
for concessionaires to be technologically innovative as they emphasise output 
specifications rather than input. 
A variety of concession contracts is designed in such a way that the risk is 
eventually transferred to the private sector. Such concession contracts involve 
the Build Own Operate (BOO), where the concessionaire is required to build, own 
and operate the infrastructure. Such concessions typically are on a fixed-term 
basis, after which the operating rights can be transferred to other private service 
providers. The Build Own Operate does not involve the transfer of the assets 
back to government. This means that the assets remain private and this may give 
investors more protection and could facilitate the financing of the          
concession by making these assets available as collateral.  
Under the Build Operate Transfer (BOT), the private investors finance and build 
roads at their own risk, operate these roads for an agreed period, and then 
transfer ownership to the public sector. In the case of a Build Transfer Operate 
(BTO), a new facility is built on a turnkey basis with private capital, and the 
ownership title is transferred to the host government after completion of the 
construction. The private contractor operates the facility for a fixed term under a 
separate agreement. 
A Rehabilitate Operate Transfer (ROT) is the same contractual arrangement as a 
BOT, but for the rehabilitation of an existing facility rather than the construction of 
a new one. A Rehabilitate Operate Transfer requires a contractor to repair and 
operate a public-owned facility, which is transferred back to the public sector  
A Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) arrangement or agreement provides for a 
project company to finance the building of an infrastructure facility and to operate 
it for a fixed period, after which the ownership over the assets is transferred to 
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the host government. A lease is a contract that provides a right to the use of the 
assets, legally owned by the lessor, in exchange for a specified rental paid by the 
lessee. A lessee rents state-owned facilities for a time, and is responsible for the 
expense of the operation, maintenance and management functions associated 
with these.  
The study indicated that Public-Private Partnership projects involve significant 
investment in terms of time, energy and capital. The projects are generally of 
social significance and have public policy consideration, hence emphasis is more 
often than not on job creation and eradication of poverty. The analysis of Public-
Private Partnerships in various countries revealed that the concept is interpreted 
differently by different countries. The concept may take many forms, from simple 
commercialisation to a point where the private sector is dominant. Of 
fundamental importance is that for the partnership to be sustainable, there should 
be a long-term agreement between the public and private sectors to provide and 
operate a transport infrastructure or services. There should be a sharing of 
responsibility and risk by the public and private partners. As the transport system 
operates in a turbulent macro-environment, a great deal of challenges brought 
about by this dynamic environment reflects the complexity of the system within 
which highways operate. Many disciplines such as transport economics, 
engineering, environmental science, the social science, and law, to name a few, 
must be involved in finding solutions. 
7.2.3 Conclusions 
• Liberalisation and concessions are fashionable in many countries. These 
concepts need to be encouraged in South Africa. 
• Build Own Operate may not be ideal for South Africa due to the fact that the 
public sector’s power of eminent domain may not be exercised. 
• Build Operate Transfer is ideal for South Africa due to the fact that 
government’s ownership of infrastructure is maintained. 
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• Build Transfer Operate may not be ideal for South Africa due to the fact that 
government is denied the ownership of infrastructure. 
• Rehabilitate Operate Transfer affords the public sector the ability to 
exercise its power of eminent domain. 
• Build Own Operate Transfer is still to be tested. For the mere fact that 
infrastructure is transferred back to the public sector at the end of the 
concession period, it may be tested for its functionality. 
7.2.4 Recommendations 
As the rationale for Public-Private Partnership is based on the fact that 
government needs capital injection, it is recommended that more spatial 
development initiatives be identified where the Public-Private Partnership 
concept can be applied. It is envisaged that this would be a method of acquiring 
resources or technological innovations. Among the various forms of Public-
Private Partnerships that are applicable in the transport infrastructure, it is 
recommended that the franchising and concession agreements be encouraged 
as they are long term by nature and would therefore give the private sector 
enough opportunity to mature in the field. 
Japan has experienced challenges with respect to the resistance to change on 
the part of trade unions during the rollout of its Public-Private Partnership 
projects. It is therefore recommended that the unions be brought on board as part 
of the public participation process during the unfolding of the Public-Private 
Partnership  processes in South Africa. 
7.3 STRATEGIC OPTIONS AS DERIVED FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
7.3.1 Findings 
The present chapter dealt with the reciprocal relationship between the 
environment in which the toll road operates and that constituted by the 
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surrounding macro-environmental factors. Ecological economists are of the view 
that the economy and the natural environment are interdependent systems. From 
a strategic management point of view, a transportation industry, just like any 
other industry, needs to focus on the broader environment that is referred to as a 
general environment.  
Within this context, the role of the Department of Transport within the macro-
environment needs to be analysed. In a way, this chapter examined the entire 
remote environment as well as how it impacts on the Department of Transport 
especially with regard to the role of the emerging commercialised entities such as 
the National Roads Agency.  
In the toll roads industry, technology has greatly contributed to the establishment 
and development of the field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) that are 
nowadays driving various efforts intended to secure safety on our roads through 
amongst others the dissemination of information about the road network that 
allows authorities to take pro-active action in advance.  
In terms of the impact of ecological factors on the transport industry, it is 
important to note that every effort must be made to comply with the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA), Act No 107 of 1998, the 
concessionaire is expected to bear all the risks and costs with respect to 
environmental damage caused by the project. To this end, the concessionaire 
has to procure the services of a specialist to undertake environmental studies in 
compliance with the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), Act No 
107 of 1998.  
In dealing with feasibility studies of Public-Private Partnerships, it is imperative to 
acknowledge culture from both the ecological economics and strategic 
management points of view. According to South Africa’s National Heritage 
Resource Act, Act No. 25 of 1999, it is a requirement that an environmental study 
should cover any cultural heritage that may exist through which the road will 
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pass. Persons who might be affected by the project are very important role 
players to be brought on board prior to the commencement of the project. 
In terms of the assessment of the impact of economic factors on the transport 
industry, the expectation is that the South African economy will grow by about 5 
percent a year over the next three years. If the operation of the economy and 
society are to be accelerated, transport infrastructure is of great interest and is 
vitally necessary in overcoming the problem of distance. As the economy grows, 
so does the provision of transport infrastructure or facilities and this is positively 
correlated with the level of economic development. In as far as the political 
factors are concerned, every Public-Private Partnership arrangement involves a 
political context and would be influenced by the relevant political party in 
question.  
The analysis of various environmental factors received attention. The influence of 
these factors precipitated various outcomes, such as the establishment of the 
South African National Roads Agency Limited. The impact of a range of 
externalities on the entire transport system was also analysed. It became evident 
that these factors also influence one another. On the economic side, it must 
however be emphasised that a healthy economic growth is expected in the 
coming decades.  
In the final analysis, the Department of Transport has to evaluate a range of 
options. It has to analyse whether to contract out the management of national 
roads to consultants and contractors. The second option would be that of 
outsourcing the management of roads to the private sector while under the 
control of the Agency.  
Three investment models have been suggested, and the preferred option is the 
one that ensures that the private sector becomes fully operational in the road 
transport infrastructure. Of fundamental importance is that different spheres of 
government need to be taken into account in a Public-Private Partnership 
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arrangement.  
7.3.2 Conclusions 
Government at all levels plays a major role in the supply of transportation 
infrastructure. Figure 3.2 of this study has categorically indicated that the private 
sector can be a useful complement to government action. A practical example is 
the Build Operate and Transfer scheme that is being executed by the N3 Toll 
Concession Company for the rehabilitation, construction and financing of the N3 
Toll route from Heidelberg in Gauteng to Cedara in KwaZulu Natal.  
7.3.3 Recommendations 
The study recommends that the concerned spheres of government get involved 
in the Public-Private Partnership projects, as it is a significant means of investing 
in infrastructure. 
7.4 THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION IN THE PROVISION OF 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
7.4.1 Findings 
While the Competition Commission is involved in competition matters, the study 
has advanced detailed facts why a transport economic regulatory authority is 
needed in the transport industry. The introduction of competition could be seen 
as a way in which government reasserts its power over concession companies 
through appropriate regulations that are designed to govern the behaviour of 
both state-owned and private sector companies. To this end, the study suggests 
that an economic regulatory authority is the body to level the playing ground.  
In the process of introducing competition policy as a means of regulating the 
transport industry, one of the considerations should be to promote a culture of 
competition, after which regulatory authorities may be established to police 
anticompetitive behaviour and to ensure that prices converge to a competitive 
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price.  
Competition for the market in the transport industry was discussed in the light of 
the whole tendering process leading to the appointment of the successful bidder 
in the concessioning of a road transport infrastructure. What was emphasised in 
the study is that the traditional approach used in the past in terms of managing 
infrastructure was now history, and competition is sought to attract a significant 
number of well-qualified bidders in the market.  
With regard to competing through the tender process, specific procedures need 
to be followed and these include that the tender has to be advertised through the 
tender bulletin, which is often called "call for tenders". The tender process begins 
with a government organisation establishing a future need for a high-value good 
or service. The logical methodology to be applied here is to define the need, to 
cost it and to include it in the next budget. Once the budget is approved and 
introduced, the organisation may then call for tenders. 
The received tenders must be assessed and, in an ideal situation, tenders must 
be opened in public, and all those who submitted proposals for tendering should 
be invited to be present. In case none of the bids presented on the appointed day 
satisfies the criterion that is popularly known as "value for money", then all the 
bids on offer should be rejected. However, in a case where bids are of an 
acceptable quality, they have to be ranked so that the second-ranked bidder 
could be considered in case a satisfactory contract cannot be concluded with the 
first ranked bidder. 
In the technical examination of bids, the technical proposal should be suitable for 
local needs. The bidder may not use a high technology solution where a low 
technology one would suffice. The financial evaluation on the other hand should 
consider among other things, the financial flows used in the bid document and 
should be consistent with the minimum technical design and performance 
standards and with specifications in the bid documents; 
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There is also a stage called "negotiations" with the preferred bidder whereby the 
agency elects one or two of the bidders and then undertake negotiations with 
them, eventually agreeing and signing project contracts. This is followed by the 
"awarding of tenders". The tender-awarding authority should immediately make 
public the winners of tenders and the next step should be to draw up a contract 
with the successful tenderer.  
Competition was discussed as key to unlocking the fundamental rights of users, 
such as the freedom of choice. The perception here is that government should 
implement policies designed to improve competition because competition is seen 
as a key to unlocking the people’s right to freedom of choice in the transport 
industry. The fundamental rights sought by consumers are to: 
• afford them to make meaningful choices;  
• afford them the opportunity to be heard; 
• provide safety; and  
• inform them of the services provided. 
7.4.2 Conclusions 
This chapter dealt with historical issues of protectionism in the transport industry 
and how these issues were superseded by new constitutional imperatives that 
gave the public the right of choice in as far as public transport provision is 
concerned. To give expression to the people’s right to choose what mode of 
transport they want, competition became the fundamental key to unlock the old 
transport monopoly that was protected by the government of the day. Seen as 
such, it is no longer problematic to come across Public-Private Partnerships in 
the market place and in road transport infrastructure as a way of enhancing 
service delivery.  
The study dealt with the concept of competition in detail because it is central to 
the exercising of the right of choice by the people who intend to achieve 
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individual freedom as a way of protecting their fundamental rights within society. 
There is therefore a critical need to deepen the talent and skills of those officials 
who are involved in both the public and private sectors so that they are 
empowered to protect the citizens’ right to choose. A variety of problems was 
entertained and solutions were advanced regarding how to make road use safer. 
It needs to be pointed out that many transport issues had been flagged and 
examined and pertinent answers suggested and proposed on how to deal with 
problematic situations.  
The fact that a monopoly is not desirable as it limits the user’s right to choose 
was investigated. The user’s choice and sovereignty were explored and it was 
concluded that users should be offered latitude of choice and users themselves 
are the ones to determine what those options are. It is therefore concluded that 
the Department of Transport review the withdrawal of an alternative non-toll route 
as it contradicts the principle of free competition and thus limit the road user’s 
freedom of choice.  
7.4.3 Recommendations 
It is recommended that the concessionaires that are engaged in commercial or 
economic activities such as the collection of toll fees be subjected to a transport 
economic regulatory authority. While it is acknowledged and accepted that the 
National Roads Agency operates as a concession-granting authority, it needs to 
continue as such and create space for a transport economic regulatory authority 
to exercise its regulatory powers. Of fundamental importance in the process of 
establishing a transport economic regulatory authority is that there should be 
adherence to corporate governance principles and transparency should be the 
order of the day. 
 
 
 287
7.5 TRANSPORT ECONOMIC REGULATORY REGIMES IN THE 
TRANSPORT INDUSTRY  
7.5.1 Findings 
This chapter dealt with aspects flowing from Chapter 4, such as competition for 
the market and competition in the market. The focus was on the after-award of 
the bid, which requires the establishment of a project company, which is 
sometimes referred to as an interim concession company. It is this concession 
company that needs to be regulated to ensure that it does not operate as a 
monopoly, hence the necessity to establish a transport economic regulatory 
authority as the central focus of this study. 
A conceptual framework for a Public-Private Partnership was unfolded. This 
framework contains critical elements such as the relationship between the 
Department of Transport, the agency or granting authority and the concession 
company. The long-term relationship between the granting authority and the 
concession company makes it imperative to suggest various regulatory regimes 
that should ensure that users of services are protected. 
In trying to investigate the autonomy of a transport economic regulatory authority 
in South Africa, a variety of independent agencies was analysed and it was found 
that some had been created outside the normal cabinet organisation. There are 
those who are engaged in staff functions in support of other agencies. Agencies 
such as one for environmental protection fall outside cabinet level departments 
and are regarded as independent agencies. The personnel managing these 
agencies are appointed by the President with confirmation by the Senate.  
Another area investigated was that of regulatory commissions that are formed to 
regulate a particular area of the economy and which are structured differently. 
Typically, these commissions are headed by a group of individuals called 
directors or commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. These commissions are protected in various ways from removal by the 
 288
President. In some cases, their terms of appointment overlap with presidential 
terms. Presumably, the regulatory commissions are to perform their tasks 
independently and objectively, free from undue influence either by the political 
incumbent or by the affected clientele. The nature of regulatory work makes this 
task exceedingly difficult. 
Seen in the above light, the study proposes that the introduction and 
establishment of the transport economic regulatory authority be made to fall 
within the department of transport for a specific period before becoming 
completely autonomous in order to be well guided and funded. It is further 
emphasised that, for the transport economic regulatory authority to function 
efficiently and effectively in the long term, it needs to be independent and 
insulated from political pressures. It must enjoy independent legal status and 
should not serve simply as a mouthpiece of government.  
Various research studies conducted by Kessides, Basanes and the INTOSAI 
Working Group focusing on the autonomy of transport economic regulatory 
authorities were consulted, but it was found that it would be virtually impossible to 
free the proposed transport economic regulatory authority from political 
intervention. The various research findings prove that political leadership is 
generally sought to guide the effective functioning of a transport economic 
regulatory authority. This implies that there is a need to establish a specific action 
plan on how government can introduce an effective transport economic 
regulatory authority. It should be a regulatory authority, which would commit itself 
to monitor transport activities credibly with a view to adhere to transparent 
governance in the transport industry.  
A host of different types of regulatory regimes was analysed and a multinational 
regulatory authority was suggested since South Africa is currently dealing with 
SADC members. The regional transport economic regulatory cooperation might 
be a more realistic option for alleviating scarce regulatory expertise and 
resources. It was further suggested that the creation of separate regulatory 
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institutions might yield a degree of independence from political interference. Of 
major importance regarding a transport economic regulatory authority is that it 
should acknowledge the fact that the private sector is the primary mover of 
economic investment, although the public sector attracts, stimulates and 
encourages private sector economic development efforts 
The concept of a granting authority versus a regulatory authority was analysed 
and on the one hand the former is said to be responsible for granting a 
concession, a license or some other right. In this study, a granting authority 
would refer to the National Roads Agency, which is in essence involved in the 
granting of roads concessions. A regulatory authority, on the other hand, would 
ensure that there is compliance with minimum and maximum toll fees charged to 
the road users. The current state of affairs in South Africa is that the public 
authority that signs the contract is the party responsible for its performance. 
Presently, the South African National Roads Agency Limited still has the final say 
on tariffs and is the party legally entitled to intervene unilaterally in or to terminate 
the contract on the grounds of "public interest". 
A host of institutional requirements was discussed and this covered aspects such 
as coherence, independence, accountability, transparency, predictability and 
capacity. Different regulatory options were discussed and it was established that 
the adoption of an appropriate regulatory option depends on its autonomy to 
execute regulatory decisions with the minimal political interference. 
7.5.2 Conclusions 
The study concludes that a transport economic regulatory authority may be an 
appropriate structure to introduce mechanisms that could control the transport 
industry and make it competitive by doing away with monopolies. A well-
functioning transport economic regulatory authority should be creative and 
responsive to any market demands that are imposed upon the transport industry. 
Finally, for Public-Private Partnerships to function optimally they should be well 
regulated, implying that there should be an effective transport economic 
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regulatory authority that has legal powers in order to eradicate the deficiencies 
detected in a contract. It was noted that certain infrastructural activities are best 
advanced by private entrepreneurs, and the intervention of a transport regulatory 
authority is indispensable in this respect.  
7.5.3 Recommendations 
It is evident that setting up a transport economic regulatory authority to govern 
concession companies would significantly promote competition and thus cultivate 
a mutual relationship between road users and the toll road industry. Having a 
separate transport economic regulatory authority could also signal a commitment 
to enforcement and, in the long term, may bring about experience in dealing with 
complex competitive behaviour in the market place.  
7.5.3.1   Need for enforcement 
Procedures should be put in place to ensure that regulatory enforcement is 
implemented in the different spheres of government. Road users should be 
protected in terms of being afforded an intermediary to complain to if the service 
quality is not provided to their satisfaction. 
The monitoring of concession companies has to be done by an independent 
regulatory authority with minimal political interference. 
Traffic and revenue forecasts should be produced by independently recognised 
experts, and should reflect the willingness of motorists to pay tolls. 
The terms of the concession, and particularly its length, should be compatible 
with the nature of the project and should allocate an appropriate mix of risks and 
rewards to the private sector. 
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7.6 TRANSPORT ECONOMIC REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
7.6.1 Summary and recommendations 
This chapter constitutes a summary of the entire study and the concept of Public-
Private Partnerships, and an assessment of the validity of establishing a 
"transport economic regulatory authority" was expressed throughout the study. 
The process of monitoring and evaluating Public-Private Partnerships is seen as 
an essential aspect of strategic management, and a transport economic 
regulatory authority is meant to fulfill the function of monitoring Public-Private 
Partnership processes.  
From the study, it is clear that a norm regarding a transport economic regulatory 
authority should be able to promote the interest of various stakeholders such as 
government, the toll road industry and road users. Chapter 2 of the study gave 
detailed information of the experience gained from a number of industrialised 
countries. These experiences were thoroughly investigated to assess to what 
extent they have influenced the South African transport industry. This has 
culminated in the suggestion of a Public-Private Partnership model depicted as 
Figure 6.1, which is believed to be suitable for the South African situation after 
weighing available options. The model stipulates the broad strategies that are 
stipulated by government at the strategic level and goes on to be linked with 
operational strategies at the functional level. It must however, be reiterated that 
strategic management involves processes such as environmental scanning, 
strategy formulation, strategy implementation, evaluation and control. The 
establishment of a transport economic regulatory authority serves as an ultimate 
strategy to monitor, evaluate and control Public-Private Partnership processes 
and issues with transport economic implications, as is evident from the model 
(see Figure 6.1). 
For the assessment of a regulatory intervention mechanism in the transport 
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infrastructure, this study has suggested establishing mechanisms such as a 
regulatory body with full understanding of public sector economics and 
operations. It is further suggested that a body of expertise within the Department 
of Transport be created to deal with transport infrastructural issues. This aspect 
should be treated with the utmost urgency and an action plan should be sought to 
expedite the process. 
The study has pointed out that practical challenges in implementing transport 
economic regulations are imminent. This revolves around the scarcity of technical 
expertise such as transport economics, accounting, auditing, transport 
engineering, law and economics. To overcome these challenges, it is suggested 
that there should be regional transport regulatory advisors to facilitate information 
exchange. It is further suggested that there should be a call for proposals by the 
Department of Transport for the creation of a database of regional transport 
regulatory advisors. The intention is to build skills capacity in the transport 
economic regulatory environment. This aspect too should be treated with a sense 
of urgency. It means that an action plan stipulating who should be responsible 
and when to get the process off the ground should be set in place. 
A need to establish a multinational regulatory authority was expressed. This 
followed on South Africa’s cooperation with neighbouring countries for its ultimate 
success. The study proposed that the current mandate of the Cross-Border Road 
Transport Agency be explored particularly with respect to finding out whether it is 
currently able to deal with transport economic regulatory issues across the South 
African borders.  
The study acknowledges a concerted effort of the provincial government of 
Gauteng to establish an independent certifier for the monitoring of the progress 
and impact made by the concessionaire. However, it is proposed that it should be 
seen as a transition measure towards the establishment of a fully-fledged 
institutionalised transport economic regulatory authority.  
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In projecting the role of the transport economic regulatory authority, it is evident 
that one of its functions would be to intervene during the operating phase of a 
Public-Private Partnership project because it has to ensure that the 
concessionaire has sufficient funds for maintenance and repair of the assets. 
Among the tasks to be performed are the evaluation and monitoring task, which 
is done to ensure that service quality is not compromised, thus ensuring that 
users derive value for money. In addition, it is important to assess the 
concessionaire’s financial capability through reviews and audits throughout the 
operation phase.  
The study proposes that a transport economic regulatory authority be linked with 
all relevant stakeholders in order to discharge its duties of promoting the interest 
of government, toll road industry and road users efficiently. It is emphasised that 
the fundamental rights of users be honoured, namely the right to make 
meaningful choices, the right to be heard, the right to safety and the right to be 
informed. 
The concept of competition for and in the market was examined in the light of the 
entire tendering process. With regard to competition for the market, the study is 
of the opinion that those activities that constitute the tendering process are 
crucial as they level the playing field for prospective bidders. The key stages in 
the procurement process were listed and include the consultation stage, the 
deadline, tendering, negotiation, analysis and the selection phase in which the 
preferred bidder is identified. The process ends with the technical requirements 
and contract terms being concluded and is a significant way of attracting 
investors from all walks of life.  
The study also referred to competition in the market, which refers to that type of 
competition that takes place after the bid has been awarded. This type of 
competition requires the earnest intervention of a transport economic regulator, 
which would regulate, inter alia, the relationship between the different modes of 
transport. The question around the assessment of introducing a transport 
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economic regulatory authority has been validated as evidenced in sections 6.2 
and 6.2.1 of this study. A transport economic regulatory authority is therefore 
essential to regulate competition for the market as well as in the market. 
The assessment of how regulatory intervention mechanism would operate was 
investigated and it was found that the use of a single regulator for several 
industries was the preferred option. The preference is based on scaling down 
fixed costs and consolidating scarce talents in a cross-cutting manner. 
Figure 6.1 gives a broad indication of the contributory role of the construction 
management and competitive operational phases towards the realisation of the 
broad strategies at the national level of government. 
The establishment of a transport economic regulatory authority should not be 
seen as a way of encroaching on the good work currently being done by the 
South African National Roads Agency Limited. The aim of the transport economic 
regulatory authority is to ensure that effective monitoring takes place to satisfy 
the interest of government, the toll road industry and road users. The impartial 
intervention of the transport economic regulatory authority is sought to ensure 
that a harmonious relationship among these parties is maintained.  
The White Paper on National Transport Policy (Republic of South Africa, 
1996c:16) states that infrastructure will be regulated where monopoly situations 
could occur, which implies that setting up a transport economic regulatory 
authority is justified and should be established.  
7.6.2 Conclusions 
Issues that received particular attention in this study include the aims and 
objectives of the study as they pivot on the need to establish a transport 
economic regulatory authority by the Department of Transport as reflected in 
(DoT, 2005:40). This body should ideally be free from a fragmented approach, 
which in the past has paralysed the transport industry. It is not surprising 
therefore; that the current regulatory environment in South Africa proposed as 
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noted in the National Freight Logistics Strategy is not acceptable. It is therefore 
suggested that the roles and responsibilities of the proposed transport economic 
regulatory authority be explicitly articulated and workshopped with stakeholders 
such as Transnet, the Competition Commission, the South African National 
Roads Agency and others who would be affected during the course of its 
operation. After these workshops, clearly refined regulations can then be 
legislated because any inconsistency and possible overlap would have been 
eliminated.  
The wisdom derived from McNutt (2005:191), was utilised, as this author says 
the establishment of a national regulatory authority whose role is to play an active 
role in the regulatory reform of the Public-Private Partnership arrangements, is 
required. Equally so, the researcher is of the opinion that a transport economic 
regulatory authority in South Africa could play a role of transforming the state-
owned transport enterprises. It is therefore; proposed that                          
within the transport economic regulatory unit, a specific portfolio dealing with the 
regulation of Public-Private Partnerships be established as this continues to gain 
momentum. 
7.6.3 Recommendations 
Rather than embarking on high-tech capital-intensive equipment, emphasis 
should be on equipment that is operable within the South African context. The 
labour force should not be faced with sophisticated machinery that would take 
ages for them to understand and operate. 
7.6.3.1   Need for training 
Training should be provided on an ongoing basis to ensure that individuals in the 
Public-Private Partnership fraternity are capacitated with respect to the initial 
bidding, negotiations towards financial closure, different modalities applied in the 
construction industry as well as the actual operation, monitoring and control 
function of a transport economic regulatory authority. This should also include 
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exposure to the Public-Private Partnership guidelines that have been prepared by 
the National Treasury, and training needs analysis should be an ongoing 
process. 
 
7.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
South Africa is currently reaping the major economic and social benefits of 
quickly improving the road network with minimum public expenditure as a result 
of private sector investment in toll roads. The mechanism by which the private 
sector is participating in concessions to construct, finance, operate and maintain 
roads in return for toll revenue has gained popularity. It needs to be emphasised 
however, that the absence of alternative routes in the toll road industry would 
prompt concession companies to behave like monopolists and thus raise prices 
in pursuit of profit, knowing very well that road users have no other choice. 
7.7.1 Need for international agencies  
Based on Section 3.2.6.7 of this study, it is explicitly stated that the purpose of 
the South African Competition Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998a) is to 
promote employment and to advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans. As the Act strives to expand opportunities for South African participation 
in world markets and to recognise the role of foreign competition in South Africa, 
it is necessary to recommend the intervention of agencies such as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in future Public-
Private Partnership projects. The IBRD provides loans and development 
assistance to middle-income countries, of which South Africa is one. Such 
countries need to be creditworthy and should strive for the achievement of 
sustainable development. It is important to note that the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development is not a profit-seeking entity but committed to 
deal with Public-Private Partnership projects. 
7.7.2 Need for the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
Section 3.2.6.7 of this study indicated that, through the implementation of the 
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Competition Act, there should be a great potential to encourage the promotion of 
direct investment in South Africa. Measures that have been put in place consists 
of inter alia the Tax Holiday Scheme, which is open to firms making new 
investments which exceed R3 million. For investments to take place in earnest, it 
is recommended that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) be considered 
as a solution for easing direct foreign investment in South Africa.  
7.7.3 Absolute need for transport economic regulatory authority 
Section 3.2.6.7 of this study dealt with Competition Act, Act No. 89 of 1998 
(Republic of South Africa, 1998a), which put into place a regime that is meant to 
contribute to economic growth and global competitiveness. The purpose of the 
Act is partly to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices. 
The matter of choice is the central focus of this study, hence it is concluded that 
establishing an independent transport economic regulatory authority that would 
ensure, inter alia, that the toll fees charged by toll road concessionaires are 
justified and fair, is a strategic must. The establishment of a transport economic 
regulatory authority is seen as the right intervention at the right time to ensure 
that a whole range of Public-Private Partnership processes is well monitored and 
regulated.
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ANNEXURE 2: A list of countries that underwent a Public-Private Partnership process 
COUNTRY PUBLIC AUTHORITY TYPE OF INSTITUTION 
FORMED 
ROLE OF PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
FUNDING TYPE OF 
REGULATORY 
INTERVENTION 
United States 
of America 
 State-chartered turnpike 
companies were formed 
Private sector carries out 
construction, maintenance 
and operation of toll roads. 
-Pays and equips state 
police seconded to the toll 
authority 
Private sector financing 
of roads 
Transport 
Regulation Board 
with regulatory 
oversight over all 
sectors.  
Regulatory agencies 
are independent from 
policy makers 
 
France Toll Act drafted.  
The Act authorized 
-creation of state owned 
toll roads 
-right to levy tolls to 
finance construction, 
maintenance and 
operation of highways.  
Agency awards concessions and 
manage road network 
 
Concessionaires 
operated by publicly owned 
companies. 
500 miles operated by a 
private company (Cofiroute)  
Both publicly owned & 
private companies 
access funds from 
private capital market. 
Two agencies 
evolved into 
regulatory 
authorities 
United 
Kingdom 
DE TR established a PPP 
Unit 
Highways Agency manages, 
maintains and improves the 
national road network 
Concessionaires build roads 
meeting Highways 
Agency’s technical 
requirements 
Public authority or 
Highway Agency 
arranges funding under 
DBOF 
Existing Economic 
Regulators not  
exclusively focused 
on Toll roads. 
Japan  Combination of BOT & 
franchise 
Concessionaires private loan capital 
and government 
borrowings 
 
Mexico Ministry of Finance  
Toll Authority 
established in 1963. 
Secretariat to the Inter-
Ministerial Commission  
used as channel for 
managing concession loans 
or 
Concessionaires were 
awarded to domestic 
construction companies, 
 Not in existence  
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donor support to the 
programme. 
Australia State gvt. controls 
infrastructure sectors 
- Gvt. draft investment 
policy & published by 
Dept of Treasury and 
Finance 
-Gvt departments 
design & award 
concessions 
-project responsibility 
assigned to a single 
minister. 
-The minister facilitates 
consultation with other 
gvt dept involved in the 
project.  
-The minister also 
expected to work with 
Treasury & Finance 
Treasury and Finance 
had to set up the 
Partnership Victoria  as 
a centre of expertise 
Gvt-owned utilities 
transformed into 
Government Business 
Enterprises (GBEs) that 
operate as businesses and are 
subject to the national 
competition policy 
-each state to have a road 
agency with statutory 
authority to be in charge of 
managing, planning and 
maintaining the state road 
network. 
-state's road agency 
responsible for the 
maintenance and 
development of the 
national highway network 
within its boundaries  
- - 
It is customary for the 
agency to contract out or to 
outsource construction 
Funding sourced by 
Agency from federal 
government 
Economic Regulator 
Austria Federal Ministry of 
Ttansport, Innovation 
and Technology. 
Austrian established a 
The Federal Highway 
Financing Act of 1996 
drafted 
Concessionaires   
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State owned Enterprise 
called ASFINAG 
Canada  Canadian Treasury Board 
Secretariat 
Concessionaires deploys 
Roadside Motorist 
Assistance team 
 -Regulated by 
Highway Operations 
Control Centre 
-Work in 
coordination with 
Environment 
Canada to anticipate 
road conditions and 
surface temperatures 
New Zealand Two levels of govt, 
national owns National 
Highway System & 
local spheres of govt 
which owns and 
maintains other public 
roads in the country. 
Contracted its management 
out to gvt. owned entity 
(Transit New Zealand) 
Local govt contract roads 
out for construction and 
maintenance to the private 
sector or to Local 
Authority Trading 
Enterprise (LTE) 
Funding for both the 
national highways 
and local roads is 
provided by 
Transfund, an entity 
contracted to 
distribute and 
prioritise road 
expenditures from the 
national 
government’s road 
funds 
Non existent 
The Philippines National, Provincial & 
Municipal authorities. 
Investment 
Coordination 
Committee (ICC) of the 
National Economic 
Development Authority 
Sectoral Agency / Specialist 
BOT unit 
Coordinate, design & 
implement projects 
-update national inventory of 
all nominated projects 
-provide general advice to 
foreign investors  
.  -Toll Regulatory 
Board,  
. 
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-developing infrastructure 
projects 
-provides technical 
assistance and training to 
central and local gvt. 
officials on design and 
implementation of projects 
-marketed BOT concept to 
private investors 
-BOT Centre to train 
national and local 
government officials. 
Hungary Ministry of Transport, 
Communication and 
Water Management 
- Govt passed a law for 
formation of strong 
legal framework for the 
control of privately 
financed infrastructure 
projects.. 
Established Bureau for 
Motorway Concessions  
Concessionaires  
-Concession arrangements 
allowed for toll variations 
Private financing Faced with regulatory 
challenges wrt toll 
rates regulation.  
South Africa PPP Unit under Dept of 
Finance for all PPP’s 
other than national roads 
SANRAL award concessions 
and manage relationship with 
concessionaires.  
Concessionaires maintain 
and improve road network. 
private loan capital 
and government 
borrowings 
Existing economic 
regulators not 
applicable to Toll 
roads. Currently 
performed by 
SANRAL which is a 
concession granting 
authority 
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